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The Architecture ofGenocide





All bidsforpurity sediment dirt, all bids for order create monsters.
Zygmunt Bauman1
The survivors of the extermination camps, the inmates of concentration and
internment camps, and even the comparatively happy stateless people could see
without Burke's arguments that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but
human was their greatest danger.
Hannah Arendt2







The central purpose of this thesis is to reinterpret the crime of genocide. To
accomplish this task, I explore genocide by external and immanent critique. An
external critique means comparing genocide as a policy to other kinds of contrasting
practices which rest upon different standards of value than those which substantiate
genocide. An immanent critique entails turning the language, intensions and
consequences of genocide in on itself by evaluating this policy from within the
governmental authority's own standards of value. To establish a basis for this
critique, I first explore the history of genocide in international law and politics, and
critically evaluate its current conceptual meanings within genocide studies. I argue
for a reading of genocide that is consistent with the work of Rafael Lemkin, while
exploring the limits of other approaches. Secondly, I address the theories of genocide
and argue for a conceptual distinction between war and genocide. I then establish a
central proposition of the thesis: that genocide is a deeply paradoxical policy in two
essential respects; one concerning victimology, and the second involving the
perpetrators' intentions. I explore these two paradoxes through a comparative
examination of the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and in the Ukraine under Stalinism
(1930-33). To account for these paradoxes, I then turn to an examination of the form
of government empirically most associated with genocide: totalitarianism. Through
an examination of Arendt's theory of politics and totalitarianism I show how
genocide is fundamentally opposed to authentic politics because of how this policy
divergences from positive law. Through this analysis of genocide and law, I argue for
a new understanding of genocide in topographical terms, which specifically entails
that genocide is a policy that collapses political and social space. I explore how a
policy of genocide constrains the purposes of subjective action in perverse and
puzzling ways. Finally, I examine this collapsed topography by analyzing the
language underpinning genocide—its 'grammar' and 'speech'—and revealing some
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Chapter One
Genocide: the Creation of a Global Concept
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed
group: the other, the imposition ofthe nationalpattern ofthe oppressor.
Raphael Lemkin1
Introduction: Genocide and Statelessness
In 1941, Winston Churchill had referred to the atrocities occurring in Europe as "a
crime with no name" (Churchill quoted in Jensen, 2003: 9). The world had to wait until
1944 for Raphael Lemkin, a jurist and scholar from Bialystok in Eastern Poland, to
create a term that could categorize these events; he called it Genocide. Initially,
Lemkin understood genocide as a problem confronting the comity of nations, as an
action imposed upon nations or groups from other foreign nations, rather than as act
committed upon one's own citizens (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). Further reflecting
upon such acts following the Second World War revealed that the crime of genocide
was a global problem that threatened the existence ofmany minority groups. Lemkin's
new concept therefore confronted a uniquely global problem pertaining to nation states
and their treatment of peoples within their borders. His insights about an old crime
with a new name contained an amount of receptivity that persuaded a post-war
audience to confront the failures of past efforts to ensure the protection of minority
peoples. Even though, in certain cases, these efforts to conventionalise Lemkin's vision
were inspired by national self-interest, they eventually culminated into the United
Nations' creation of the Genocide Convention (UNGC) on December 9, 1948.
Beginning in late 1946, Lemkin's broad understanding of genocide was
embraced by the original draft of the convention, proposed by Saudi Arabia. However,
following the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 96(1) in December 1946, it
soon became clear that "any international consensus on the scope of genocide would be
considerably more narrow" (Schabas, 1999: 152). This narrowing of Lemkin's
understanding would help to ensure the success of the convention and eventually led to




came into effect in 1951. The importance of this convention in part addressed a history
of international agreements that failed to protect the existence ofminority groups. One
need not look far beyond the League of Nations to see that attempts at upholding
minority treaties to secure the civil (but not political) rights of stateless groups after the
First World War were completely fruitless. The internal political pressures of the time,
constituted by the occurrence of nationalist and 'minority' revolutions seeking self-
determination combined with the preponderance of imperial and international
movements sponsored by larger nations, meant that nation states systematically
discriminated against their minority populations. Consequently, the appearance of
minorities and a growing refugee movement also created serious problems for the
stability of moderately sized nations in Eastern and Southern Europe.
These forces posed problems to the then emerging idea of what Zygmunt
Bauman has called the trinity of "territory, state and nation" (Bauman, 2003: 132).
This "globally binding norm" meant that nation-states hubristically assumed "the
prerogative of a metropolis to set the rules by which the periphery should live" and
enforced the observance of rules without governing consent of their minority
populations (2003: 132). Minority peoples and international movements were
obviously threatened by this trinity in a number of ways, that is by the denial of civil
and political rights. Yet, what all peoples explicitly recognised was that without a
territory no group could survive; a territory with no nation-state was a place not worth
inhabiting; a nation without a state became an absurd anomaly which seemingly
accepted the choice of voluntary disappearance or execution, since they did not possess
the means of violence that would ensure protection and civil rights; and a state without
a nation, or a state with more than one nation, was a residue of times past that faced the
likelihood of perishing if it was incapable of 'modernising' (that is, homogenising).
This thinking not only further inspired movements of self-determination, but also
established a convention among nation states that they were embroiled in a struggle to
maintain 'national purity'. As Bauman describes,
The dirty monsters of the era of the promotion of the territory/nation/state trinity were
nations without states, states with more than one nation, and territory without a nation-
state. It was thanks to the threat and fear of those monsters that the sovereign power
could claim and acquire the right to deny rights and set such conditions for humanity
as a great part of humanity, as it happened, could not meet (Bauman, 2003: 133).
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Faced with excluded populations in states governed by these new principles, a crisis
situation formed in regions where new nations lacked the very conditions necessary for
a desired 'nationalist' stability—a homogeneous population or culture rooted within a
particular geography governed by a state. Following World War I, attempts by the
League of Nations to face this "nationality problem" culminated in the creation of
peace and Minority Treaties that would ensure that peoples lumped together under a
single state would be equal partners in government, which in reality proved to be
absurd.2 Rather than solving the stateless problem, these treaties effectively
exacerbated statelessness. More importantly, Minority Treaties made apparent that
only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy
the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed
some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced
from their origin (Arendt, 1968: 275).
Since many western states were exempt from the obligations established in these
treaties, they became increasingly resented by newly created states as they betrayed the
promise of an equal status of national sovereignty amongst European nations.3 This
strain in relations meant that compliance with these treaties was non-existent and
destroyed any impetus to grant civil rights to groups that were unwelcome elsewhere in
Europe. The granting of political rights by these new states to more than 100 million
Europeans, who had never reached the stage of national freedom and self-
determination under old European aristocratic systems, was predicated upon excluding
about 30 percent of their own residents. As a consequence, many minorities had little
faith in the League ofNations, since it was composed largely of statesmen sympathetic
to the new breakaway or revolutionary governments and strongly favoured minority
assimilation into the nations where they resided. As all nations refused to seriously
address this problem, it served to convince the 25 to 30 million strong minority
populations in Europe that the only route to securing political and human rights was
2 In 1921, the Yugoslav constitution was "accepted" despite all the Croat and Slovene members voting
against. As well, the Slovak's struggle against the Czech government incited interest and received
support from other movements and governments (Arendt, 1976: 270 fn.).
3 Johannes Morsink (1999) states: "One of the problems was that the states that had been made to sign a
Minority Treaty felt like second-class citizens of the League in comparison to the other states which had
no such restrictions put on their sovereignty. This two-tier system led to distrust and resentment" (1012).
4 The French and British delegates strongly favoured this position, cf. C McCartney (1934) National
States andNational Minorities, pp. 276, 277; also Arendt (1976: 272-73).
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through full national emancipation.5 These emancipation efforts signified that nation
states feared 'ideological struggles' which resembled those of the International
Brigades in the Spanish civil war. This situation, favouring new national sentiments in
societies of diverse and increasingly mobile cultures, served to exacerbate the
problems of statelessness and allowed states to increasingly exclude minorities under
the rubric of national security. Statelessness, as it legally excluded those defined by
group affiliation, thus added further credence to racist discourses and other
exclusionary rhetoric, all of which affirmed the pariah status of many European
groups.6
It soon became clear that minority treaties, particularly in the case of the Jews
and Armenians, not only failed to provide protection to these groups, but also,
paradoxically, "could serve as an instrument to single out certain groups for eventual
expulsion" and allow the exercise of colonial methods of rule into European affairs,
which was something many imperial movements had always desired (Arendt, 1968:
282). This production of outlaws—people beyond the legal protections granted to
citizens by states—seemed like the "expression of some unredeemable stupid fatality",
where peoples were denied rights as national citizens within their own national and
territorial origins (1968: 267). This demonstrated not only the victory of the nation—
the principle of an ever-present homogeneous culture rooted in common ideals—over
the state's basis within the rule of law (as Nazi ideology had forecasted7), but also gave
nation-states the ability to create stateless persons by denaturalising those "who were a
threat to the social order" (Arendt, 1968: 279). Where national movements sought the
exclusion of these populations, there followed the concomitant production of millions
of stateless peoples, most ofwhom could not be repatriated, since neither their country
of origin nor any other state would accept hordes of destitute stateless persons. Mass
5 Minorities themselves were not a passive mass as one might assume by my description. They
organized a "Congress ofNational Groups in European States" to address their particular national
concerns (Arendt, 1976: 273-90).
6 This status was affirmed not only on the national level of states, but also on the community level by
segments of the local population. For resentment of such immigrants in the Jewish community of
Cologne, see Martin Doerry (2004: 6).
7 Adolf Hitler stated that "Since the State in itself is for us only a form, while what is essential is its
content, the nation, the people, it is clear that everything else must subordinate itself to its sovereign
interests" (Hitler quoted in Lemkin, 2002: 39).
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naturalization was not contemplated8 and traditional naturalization procedures proved
to be an inadequate solution since no European civil service could cope with the scale
of the demand. Likewise, the political desires to force domestic and regional
integration of minority peoples in their regions of origin meant that the situation of
discrimination and exclusion of stateless persons served a political function by
discouraging people to flee in the first place. Overall, this crisis excluded millions of
people from the protections of law in their genuine place of origin, targeting them not
only for discrimination, but also, as the end of the Second World War would reveal, for
annihilation. To both states and their local populations, stateless peoples seeking refuge
were considered the scum of the earth.
The efforts to enact a resolution preventing and punishing genocide was one
way the United Nations sought to confront the failures of the past and also to address
contemporary challenges regarding the plight of minorities and stateless persons. As
Lemkin wrote in 1947
By declaring genocide as a crime under international law and by making it a problem
of international concern, the right of intervention on behalf of minorities slated for
destruction has been established (Lemkin, 1947: 150).
Although the efficacy of upholding the obligations to intervene on behalf of minorities
has been seriously questioned in light of the many episodes of genocide committed by
states, the creation of a fundamentally new crime and international convention has not
been without promise. The United Nations intervention in the Sudan is an on going
attempt to prevent the systematic destruction of minority groups in Darfur within the
parameters set out in the genocide convention. In this respect, the concept of genocide
became central to the mission of the United Nations in confronting the failures of the
League of Nations to protect minority groups. In 1948 the General Assembly passed
the following resolution:
Genocide is the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is
the denial of the right to live of individual human beings; such denial of the right to
existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these groups, and is contrary to
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (UNGC quoted in Chalk
and Jonassohn, 1990: 9; emphasis added).
8 The only exceptions to this prevailing trend was the naturalization en bloc of Greek refugees from
Turkey in 1922 and the naturalization ofArmenian refugees fleeing Turkey to Syria and Lebanon
(Arendt, 1976: 285 fn.).
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Despite the centrality of Lemkin's concept to the character of the United Nations, these
ideals of safeguarding the constitution of groups were not fully implemented in the
way he had initially envisioned them in his bookAm Rule in Occupied Europe (1944).
From the start, the United Nations downplayed the element of ethnocide or cultural
genocide—the destruction of a culture by non-lethal means—that was a significant part
of Lemkin's vision. Yet, the resolution, at least initially, also expanded the definition
of genocide to include political groups as potential targets of genocide—a category not
explicitly set out by Lemkin9 (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). However, after protests
from Soviet and Eastern Bloc delegates and the behind-the-scenes compromise by
other Western powers to preserve the convention, political groups were excluded from
the definition of genocide. The following article from the United Nations Genocide
Convention (UNGC) became the core definition of genocide:
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction on whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UNGC 1951).
The essence of Lemkin's vision is somewhat preserved in the resulting convention, but
only in so far as it protects groups against physical destruction. To add greater depth to
this examination of genocide the question that needs to be addressed is how the UNGC
relates to Lemkin's vision of genocide.
Many scholars have criticized the omission of political groups from the United
Nations' final draft, along with the accompanying concept of "cultural genocide"—
intentional acts destroying language, religion, and culture (Fein, 1993: 11). In the effort
to reach an international consensus, this idea of protecting a group's culture took on a
distinct physical connotation of destruction as the principal element constituting
genocide. In fact, so dominant was the physical element of genocide that it eventually
9 For Lemkin, these non-physical aspects of genocide did not apply to political, cultural or social groups
as such, but pertained to the rights of groups to practice these capacities as a distinct group. Lemkin's
own unpublished ideas on the subject suggested he "did not consider political groups as targets" of
genocide (Fein, 1993: 11). Rather, 'groups' for Lemkin were effectively national, racial, religious or
ethnic in nature.
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colonised the way in which nations think about the destruction of groups. As Schabas
correctly notes, the convention "merely lamented the cultural loss occasioned by
physical genocide, without necessarily suggesting that the destruction of
culture...might also amount to the crime of genocide" (Schabas, 1999: 152). As we
shall see, one central divergence between Lemkin and the UNGC pertains to the acts of
non-physical genocide.
From an examination of Lemkin's published and unpublished writings it is
clear that he understood that an act of genocide can encompass both physical and non-
physical forms of violent destruction. Lemkin does qualify the terms of this definition,
but in a way that has added to some confusion which pertains to the issue of physical
genocide. The ambiguity in Lemkin's text arises from what is understood to be the
principal aim of genocide. Lemkin states:
Genocide...is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different action aiming
at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim
of annihilating the groups themselves (Lemkin, 2002: 27).
From this widely quoted passage, one might assume that the "aim" of genocide is
physical destruction of a group in its totality. However, in the following sentence
Lemkin states:
The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic
existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups
(Lemkin, 2002: 27; emphasis added).
What Lemkin means in these passages is that genocide represents the annihilation of
the foundations of groups using a range of techniques from the biological (the
prevention of reproduction) to the eradication of cultural practices. Physical death is
therefore neither the absolute, nor necessary condition for genocide—a point which is
incongruent to how it is defined in the UNGC. However, some scholars like Fein have
argued that the general thrust of the UNGC suggested that physical genocide was the
mainstay of Lemkin's idea of genocide. Fein argued that the "objective of genocide
was both the social disintegration and the biological destruction of the group" (Fein,
1993: 9). Thus, violent operations of "coersed assimilation without killing...was not
cited by Lemkin as genocide" (1993: 10). In the next section I want to take issue with
this interpretation as it pertains to how Lemkin's insights are employed for the
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scientific study of genocide, making it necessary to describe what exactly constitutes
the actus reus of genocide.
The Reification ofGenocide
More often Lemkin's work is noted in passing as the source of the concept and
influential contributor of the Genocide Convention, but rarely does his work feature in
an evaluation of current theorising. What I want to show here, however, is that the
spirit of Lemkin's treatise, as it was described in his work Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe (1944), is only partly compatible with Article II of the UNGC and has become
materially defined in terms of physical annihilation. The ramifications of this
reification of the term have significantly influenced how scholars have investigated and
defined genocide.
Lemkin derived the term genocide from combining the ancient Greek word
genos meaning race or tribe, and the Latin cide, meaning killing. The Latin ending was
designed to configure the term with the existing paradigm of killing, as exemplified by
the terms homicide and infanticide. Lemkin saw the need for this term based within
"the realities of European life in the years 1933-45" when the "Nazis had embarked
upon a gigantic plan to change permanently the population balance in occupied
Europe" (Lemkin, 1947: 147). This reference to both the term genocide, which
contains the suffix 'cide' and to the Nazi policy of physical extermination has meant
that the actus reus of genocide pertains to physical annihilation, even though this
meaning is not accurately representative of his own work. This is more evident when
we consider the inspirations for this concept of genocide.
Even before the events of the Second World War, Lemkin viewed European
expansionism in critical terms, particularly concerning their overseas colonial exploits
(McDonnell and Moses, 2005). A recent examination of Lemkin's still unpublished
writings reveals that he was deeply interested in colonial genocides of the Americas
and how various techniques or kinds of oppression contributed to the demise of
indigenous groups. Lemkin came to model genocide not only on the German
occupation and oppression of European peoples, but also based on the concern of
groups under repressive occupations. Prior to the revelation of the scale of German
atrocities and the paradigm of the Holocaust, Lemkin was concerned particularly with
what he called "Germanization" as a strategy of genocide in political, social, cultural,
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economic, biological, physical and religious terms. The very nature of these
endeavours were not only derogatory and oppressive of groups, but crucially for
Lemkin they were genocidal—oppressive expansionism fundamentally destroyed, in
biological and cultural terms, the constitution of these groups. Thus, genocide was
conceived as "techniques" which interrupted the biological, political, social, cultural,
economic and religious spheres of human groups (Schabas, 1999: 151). Lemkin thus
derived the meaning of genocide from these studies in oppressive occupations, which
explains why even non-lethal acts that compromised the existence of a group's cultural
or political constitution, such as forced assimilation of indigenous peoples as occurred
most notably in Australia and the Americas, could be seen as acts of genocide. From
these writings it is clear that Lemkin
regarded the extinction of culture as genocide. It [genocide] did not require the entire
physical extermination of the victims, only the elimination of the culture-bearing
strata. As he wrote elsewhere, the "permanent crippling" of a people was tantamount
to genocide (McDonnell and Moses, 2005: 514).
The spirit underlying Lemkin's understanding of genocide as methods of strategic
intervention is that groups lose their existence when they are prevented from
constituting themselves through the practice of politics, sociality, religion and
economic production. His intent to criminalise these patterns of strategic violence
meant to signify the moral importance of these specific capacities which constitute
groups. By proclaiming a convention which intends to sanction such acts, Lemkin was
attempting to convince us that the violent techniques which undermine these capacities
are morally abhorrent. Thus, a commitment to punish these actions serves to sanctify
these specific capacities of groups. Thus, convincing states to accept this
criminalisation constitutes an effort to build a conventional understanding of the
constituting features of a human group.
The success of Article II has meant that this spirit to guard the constituting
capacities of groups from the onslaught of the techniques of cultural annihilation has
not only been overlooked, but also has become reduced to the material element of
killing. Another way this spirit may have become convoluted is by a certain reading of
Lemkin's own text. For some, like Fein, the "annihilation of the groups themselves"
signifies that physical extermination is the central method by which kinds of cultural
destruction occur (Lemkin, 2002: 27). The central contention surrounding Lemkin's
statement concerns what we take 'annihilation' to mean. Even if interpreted in terms of
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its Latin etymology—annihilation meaning to "reduce to nothing"—one still is left
with the interpretation of whether the termination of biological or a group's social or
political constitution constitutes genocide. Yet, only by assuming that annihilation
means biological extermination, can one have understood that genocide primarily
involves physical, rather than other distinct forms of cultural destruction. What may
account for this confusion centres on Lemkin's later discussions surrounding the UN
resolutions in 1947.
This ambiguity surrounding Lemkin's original usage of the term genocide and
its interpretation through and following its codification in the UNGC may also be aided
by Lemkin himself during his involvement with the United Nations. In 1947, Lemkin's
discussions as to the use of the term genocide solely employ the term 'destruction'
when reflecting on Germany's conduct and treatment of minorities during the war.
With the revelations of systematic extermination, and trials of senior Nazi officials, the
physical-annihilation element of genocide was emphasized and privileged over other
techniques cited in his earlier work. Lemkin wrote:
The crime of genocide involves a wide range of actions, including not only the
deprivation of life but also the prevention of life (abortions, sterilizations) and also
devices considerably endangering life and death (artificial infections, working to death
in special camps, deliberate separation of families for depopulation
purposes... (Lemkin, 1947: 147).
In no other part of this article is the destruction of culture or other non-lethal acts of
genocide mentioned in detail. It appears that in the aftermath of the war, the term
genocide became reconfigured and reified into a term pertaining to physical
annihilation, which made the genocide of a group synonymous with "homicide as a
denial to an individual of his right to live" (1947: 149). Yet, Lemkin's statement also
needs to be read in light of the failure and exclusion of'cultural genocide' from Article
III of the UNGC, which had sought the separate outlawing of non-lethal forms of
cultural genocide. To preserve the international consensus even for Article II meant
that member states faced considerable opposition pertaining to genocide as a way of
getting involved in the domestic affairs of nations. This arose from the concern by
member states that "political groups in the Convention would expose nations to
external interference in their internal affairs" (Leo Kuper quoted in Markusen and
Kopf, 1995: 41). Yet, it was not only the issue of political groups that raised the
presumption of unjustified involvement in domestic affairs, but also the question of
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having a clear and enforceable definition of genocide that is not open to overzealous
partisan-political manipulation. It was thus reasoned that the establishment of cultural
genocide in Article III would open the way for greater international involvement into
the domestic affairs of nations. In the end, it was the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly in October 1948, which decided to delete cultural genocide from "Article
III...and just make it one on physical and biological genocide" (Morsink, 1999: 1022).
One can conclude that the ambiguity surrounding Lemkin's ideas on genocide are
likely based upon the effort to build an international consensus for a new crime which
is not too invasive of the affairs of state as it pertains to their 'order-keeping' activities.
Helen Fein's argument regarding genocide as physical interdiction thus appears
to interpret Lemkin's text through a narrowed version adopted by the UNGC, which
excluded the variance of strategies (social or political) employed to destroy the
constituting features of a group. From my reading of Lemkin, it is misguided to claim
that killing or biological destruction of groups solely constitutes genocide.10 Thus,
physical interdiction is not the only means by which political (or other forms of)
genocide may be committed.
This reification of genocide, following the developments that enshrined its
meaning in the UNGC into a concept of biological annihilation, was accomplished at
the expense of excluding social, cultural and political traits of groups from the final
definition. The more complex and varied definition of genocide developed by Lemkin
in his early work became reduced during its UNGC implementation despite its
congruence with protecting the integrity of minority peoples from various forms of
state-directed violence. The exclusion of cultural genocide and political groups from
the definition adopted in the UNGC, and the effort to exclusively associate genocide
with physical or biological-annihilation, should not obfuscate the contribution of
Lemkin's original understanding of genocide. Any re interpretation of Lemkin needs to
honour this original perspective for reasons not only of historical accuracy, but also to
recognise that this reification of the term has had repercussions in the way scholars
define and research genocide. The fact that remembering Lemkin's varied contribution
demands a certain effort reflects the influence that the physical destruction of life has
had upon the foundation of groups and suggests something about the character of our
current intellectual and political climate. Despite these reifying influences that have
10 A recent exemplar of this reading of Lemkin is put forth by McDonnell and Moses (2005).
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colonised this broad outlook, Lemkin's perspective maintains its value as a vantage
point with which to evaluate existing UN policy regarding the protection of minority
groups, and, as I shall now discuss, the various research definitions of genocide.11
Lemkin and the Study ofGenocide
The extent to which the atrocities of the Second World War and the success of Article
II have influenced the understanding of genocide is considerable and extends well into
the study of genocide. In all the theories evaluated here, genocide primarily means the
physical destruction of a group. The scholarly reaction to the global concept of
genocide has led to a divergence in meanings as each specific approach relates the
definition of genocide to their particular form of inquiry. This has meant that some
have reacted to this definitional reification of genocide in specific ways. Some scholars
have thus argued for a 'wider' or more inclusive definition of genocide on moral,
rather than epistemological grounds. These scholars argue that researchers should, as a
moral effort, recognise the oppression of groups and their right to exist, even if they are
not under threat of physical extermination. In this section I want to explore how
genocide is defined by certain scholars in the field and show how this issue of
'definitionalism' has pejoratively preoccupied the study of genocide.
The study of genocide as an enterprise of social science has benefited from
Lemkin's original vision. Genocide studies is an effort, unlike most scholarly
endeavours, to gain knowledge in order to prevent or eliminate patterns of violence
that threaten groups. Lemkin's perspective has aided the study of genocide by
encouraging a greater human sensitivity towards how genocide, as a varied form of
violence, affects not just the existence, but also the essential capacities that constitute
groups. As I suggested, the perspective's greatest contribution in this social scientific
regard derives from a humanist undertone which guards the integrity certain capacities
that constitute groups. A consequence of defining the term in such a reified form
means that the study of genocide has treated this form of violence as expressed
concretely in terms of the slaughter of 'human material'. Neglecting Lemkin's holistic
view of human sociality means that killing and body-counts becomes the primary
1' For example, being that systematic acts of cultural oppression often precede physical annihilation may
the effort to criminalise and enforce a definition of cultural genocide help to stay or prevent greater
biological-destructive atrocities? These kinds of questions only become possible from an understanding
of Lemkin's original position.
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signifier of genocide. This consequence itself has sparked debates whether the issue of
'body-counts' is an ethical way of signifying genocide. Almost all scholars have
addressed this issue and some have even pursued different understandings of genocide
to avoid the degrading and practically difficult method of qualifying an act of genocide
by counting those killed (Card, 2003).
With the UNGC defining genocide solely in terms of biological interdiction in
contrast to Lemkin's initial broad array of "techniques of genocide", a bifurcation has
developed between those scholars that have interpreted genocide in an analogous
manner to the United Nations version (Fein, 1993; Kuper, 1981) and those that
understand the term principally in broad categorical terms (Charny, 1994). Many have
referred to this divide as understanding genocide in narrow versus broad terms
(Huttenbach, 1988), while others remain altogether sceptical about having a restricted
definition based entirely upon legal norms (Churchill, 1986). This is not to suggest that
all scholarly definitions conform to these definitional types, but, as I will document
throughout this Chapter, there exists an array of definitions that form around these two
poles relating to Lemkin's work and the UNGC.
Charny, Horowitz and the Recognition ofMass Atrocity
Israel Charny is a scholar who has crafted a definition of genocide that directly
addresses the moral importance of victim recognition. The overriding concern that
shapes his definition is that "there should be no situation in which thousands and even
millions of defenceless victims of mass murder do not "qualify" as victims of
genocide" (Charny, 1994: 64). Charny's "generic definition of genocide" intends to
qualify and conform with "the realities of life" of those who are subjected to mass
murder and the ways that "reasonable people" who use the term characterize such
events (1994: 75). Charny argues that we should adhere to "commonsense" meanings
of the loss of human life and he fears that definitions might "exclude in arbitrary,
cynical, or intellectual elitist ways, the death of any group of...human beings" (1994:
75). His definition states:
Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human
beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an
avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of
the victims (1994: 75).
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As with most contemporary definitions of genocide, the biological destruction of
peoples is the prominent feature here, but like Lemkin, Charny suggests that "we also
need to create a series of definitional categories of genocide" all of which are
congruent with this generic definition (1994: 75). This entails describing the violent
measures inflicted upon groups in broad categorical terms, which reflects their actual
impact upon groups. Genocide, under this view, may be a result of ecological
destruction or abuse, colonial genocide, or aggressive (unjust) war. Charny also
advocates the category of cultural genocide that can arise from efforts to destroy a
group's culture or language ('Linguicide') without destroying human lives.
One strategy in developing this generic definition is designed to address the
political uses of the term genocide. By using the term to encompass other acts of
violence targeting the existence of groups, Charny seeks to restrict any monopoly of
the term genocide by political sources that often neglect cases for strategic reasons.
Charny argues that
the passion to exclude this or that mass killing from the universe of genocide, as well
as the intense competition to establish the exclusive "superiority" or unique form of
any one genocide, ends up creating a fetishistic atmosphere in which the masses of
bodies that are not to be qualified for the definition of genocide are dumped into a
conceptual black hole, where they are forgotten (1994: 91-2).
This position actively acknowledges the power of describing various acts of mass
atrocity as genocide and seeks to use the term for the purpose of protecting groups
through scholarly research. Despite the laudable humanitarian intentions underlying
this effort, there are shortcomings associated ascribing a wide variety of mass killings
under the rubric of genocide.
Charny does not acknowledge that a liberal application of the term genocide
actually may encourage its political (mis)usage, thereby diminishing its efficacy in
rallying attention and support to confront serious cases of genocide. The most common
challenge to Charny's perspective is that applying the label of genocide in broad terms,
as it pertains to most acts of mass killing, actually robs the term of its urgent potency.
By associating the term genocide with more varied forms of state and non-state
violence, corporate negligence and natural disasters, genocide becomes, as Fein has
suggested, "a debased term" that fails to inspire concrete preventative action for the
most serious cases of violence (Fein, 1994: 95). Within this gamut of wider usage the
term may also be perverted by groups involved in political struggles seeking strategic
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liberation from other dominant political forces. To gain international recognition to
advance and gain support for their political struggles, groups strive to petition for
'genocide status' where the term becomes the proverbial 'crying wolf for overstated
cases, thereby undermining future efforts at intervention. Due in part to these practical
concerns, there are those who, for the purposes of scientific study, oppose this varied
perspective on methodological grounds and base the definition on the 'biological-
annihilation' premise founded in Article II of the UNGC.
Irving Horowitz, for example, thinks that quasi-genocidal terms like "selective
genocide" or "cultural genocide" are an "emotive effort to lay claim to the special
character of mass murder, perhaps to heighten the sense of the horrors these neglected
people have experienced" (Horowitz, 2002: 41). Unlike all forms of organized
violence, genocide, Horowitz argues, should be judged principally as an irreversible
physical impact upon groups. In a blunt passage he claims,
Actual genocides involve real deaths. These deaths are not reversible by posthumous
rehabilitation, party edict, or collective assumptions of guilt. They are finite, final
events...It is the irreversibility of state murder that gives the subject of genocide its
unique and awesome dimension (2002: 43).
Horowitz attempts to redirect inquiry into genocide as a physically destructive act of an
entire people. This approach conceptually binds genocide to the total physical death of
groups in a much more stringent way than contained in Article II. This means that the
requirement of what Horowitz calls "counting bodies" becomes a necessary endeavour
of social research into genocide (2002: 46). By focusing on actual deaths, Horowitz
argues that researchers will avoid the lofty "metaphorical extractions" and "empty
platitudes" that are implied by other diversified approaches while avoiding
"exaggerated claims of emotion" that obstruct adequate knowledge claims (2002: 46).
Horowitz's insistence on the reified version of genocide entails that his approach
focuses not upon the conditions of genocide as a policy, but rather upon the institutions
of violence directly associated with systematic killings. Genocide is thus defined as a
"structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic
apparatus...'''' (2002: 23). For Horowitz, the apparatus of the state, although not the
only institution used for genocidal purposes, is transformed into a weapon of elite
groups that dominates society and uses its position to eliminate a less powerful group.
The most serious complication for this approach derives from Horowitz's
reliance upon total annihilation as a condition for genocide. Remarking on the
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atrocities in Rwanda, Horowitz has questioned whether the term genocide should
apply. He writes:
Hutu hit squads, estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000 men, are estimated to have
massacred anywhere from five to ten times that number of Tutsi peoples. But calling
this mutual assault on Hutu and Tutsi peoples a genocide is as problematic as using the
term "genocide" for the massacre of the Kurdish people. Despite the brutality and the
savagery involved, both the Hutu and Tutsi peoples survive, and the dominant regime
categorically denies any systematic effort at total destruction of a whole people
(Horowitz, 2002: 41).
The reliance upon a definition of genocide, which is based purely upon a vision of total
extermination, leads Horowitz to absurd characterisations. Questioning whether the
killing of "75 percent of the Tutsi population" of Rwanda constitutes a case of
genocide is just the kind of lofty academic exclusiveness that Charny's approach
warned against (Des Forges, 1999: 16). Yet, these characterisations between what
counts as genocide are, for Horowitz, necessary "surgical distinctions" that "social
research must confront" (Horowitz, 2002: 41).
The irony of Horowitz's definition is that excluding cases such as Rwanda on
spurious definitional grounds actually hinders investigations into genuine cases of
genocide (for example, Rwanda). By crudely calculating the survivability of the victim
groups as a qualification for the term genocide, Horowitz is able to exclude cases by
counting the number of survivors. Aside from the moral questions of defining human
groups in reified or material terms, Horowitz does not acknowledge that the task of
counting bodies is not a precise science as it may seem. As Des Forges has pointed out
concerning Rwanda, the task of assessing those killed is "important to counter denials,
exaggerations and lies", yet these counts are "usually informed more by emotion than
by fact" (Des Forges, 1999: 15). The challenge of counting bodies in such cases as
Rwanda is a huge task that has yet to be adequately completed. This scale of atrocity
and the precise numbers of those killed needs to be addressed, yet the lack of the exact
numbers killed should not deter scholarly research.
Horowitz's definition therefore represents a shift away from the efforts of
recognition through focusing on calculating the results of systematic killing in the
desire for a more precise form of social inquiry. Yet, the issue of counting bodies raises
more questions pertaining to the actus reus or material element of genocide.
Unfortunately there is no discipline-wide consensus on what materially constitutes
genocide, yet some like Alvarez have argued that a reliance on the UN criterion of
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genocide is sufficient to overcome this definitional concern of a "numerical threshold",
like the one implied by Horowitz's definition (Alvarez, 2001: 54). What alleviates a
minimum 'body count' qualification for genocide is the "in part" phrase contained in
Article II of the UNGC. More recent case law from the two genocide tribunals have
shown that the legal understanding of genocide does not depend upon any minimal
body-count qualification in order to charge defendants with the crime of genocide
(Schabas, 2001).
Both Charny and Horowitz represent two opposing sides of a definitional
debate, one in favour of providing recognition to victims of mass atrocity while the
other attempting to preserve the integrity of social inquiry from perilous divergences
based on moral grounds. As it stands today this debate is currently unresolved. Yet,
from the point of view of Lemkin and the history of the UNGC, it is clear that both
authors repeat and expand, in a scholarly forum, the international debates that involved
the establishment of the genocide convention. Some scholars, however, have sought to
circumvent this debate altogether and redress some of the limitations of the UNGC by
focusing on the perpetrator's motivation as a way of defining genocide.
Defining Genocide & the Perpetrator's Perspective
One of the most well-known definitions of genocide, which is less restrictive and
posits a relative and dynamic notion of group at its core was developed by Chalk and
Jonassohn. In their version of genocide, they "attempt to identify the social conditions
and situations in which genocide is likely to occur" (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 4).
Their definition therefore acknowledges the variance of defining those groups that are
encompassed in forms of one-sided mass killing. They argue that "it is futile to search
for rational and objective boundaries to define" victim groups as they "were mythical
to begin with", since they were often broadly and functionally conceived neologisms of
the phrase 'enemies of the people' (1990: 10). The result of this analysis was to
develop a notion of group based on the perpetrator's definition of their intended
victims.
Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority
intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the
perpetrator (1990: 23).
23
Similar to Horowitz they acknowledge that genocide requires state or other
organizational capabilities of force, yet what differentiates their account is that the
outcome of genocide can be a result of characteristics associated with motive. Just as
with Charny's effort to bring recognition to victims, Chalk and Johassohn's perpetrator
classification of victim is seen as a conceptual strategy to include occurrences of mass
killings that would not qualify under as genocide under the UNGC's definition, such as
of the mentally ill and homosexuals in Nazi Germany. They write: "Because our
definition leaves open the nature of the victim group, it allows the inclusion of groups
that were excluded from the UN Convention" (1990: 25). Despite the laudable
intention of historically acknowledging these victims within the gamut of genocide,
formulating an indeterminate notion of a group entertains certain logical problems for
their definition.
Firstly, if genocide is to exist in any social scientific capacity, then the
destruction of a 'group' cannot be exclusively defined by one who perpetrates this
form of destruction, since groups are not mere constructions of authority, but are
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forged through actual relationships and interactions of people. Even though, as I shall
discuss later, the constructions of'enemy groups' have served a vital strategic function
for elites to eliminate opposing social or political forces within their domains, these
classifications are malleable, and, conversely, can encompass real groups that are also
destroyed under genocidal policies. With this being the case, a definition of genocide
that rests on how the perpetrating authority defines the enemy 'group', entertains a
paradox that jeopardizes the concept of genocide based on its link to the term 'group'.
This paradox becomes evident if one recalls that social science (and science in general)
reserves the right to freely determine and classify the objects which it observes.
Privileging the perpetrators' classification of their victims as being determinate of the
parameters of genocide contradicts the basic power of social inquiry that intends to
bring recognition to actual victim groups. If genocide is to be understood as the
destruction of an actual group, then a definition of group cannot be solely and openly
defined by perpetrators. If genocide is to be understood as a sociological problem to be
solved, then it is imperative that definitions of group, the essential foundation of the
12 One may, on the other hand, rebut that the first part of their definition ("authority intends to destroy a
group") is distinct from the subsequent part ("as that group.. .is defined by the perpetrator") and thus
allows for other interpretations of victimised 'groups'. If this is the case, which I think is unlikely, then
this would be a fallacy of ambiguity (equivocation) since the same word 'group' that premises genocide
is used with two (or more) divergent meanings.
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term genocide, be logically formulated and, hopefully, agonistically contested vis-a-vis
the reality of circumstance. It is thus paradoxically uncritical for social inquiry to take
the perpetrators' view of the 'enemy other' as given as well as being informative of the
term genocide without contesting the dynamics involved in this vital process of victim
selection.
By embracing the categorising procedure that the architects of genocide employ
to define their victims as 'groups', Chalk and Jonassohn repeat and re-incorporate this
process within their definition of genocide, thereby implicitly confirming the fact that
such 'groups' actually exist, when, in fact, these categories of the 'enemy other' are the
categories that demand scrutiny by social scientists. As they suggest, "since many of
the political victim groups (for example, "enemies of the people") were mythical to
begin with, it is futile to search for rational and objective methods to define them"
(1990: 10). In their view, scholars should strictly accept the desire to recognize
victimized groups however they are defined by their perpetrators. This definition thus
appeals to a necessary stage in the conduct of genocide: "in order to perform a
genocide the perpetrator has always had to first organize a campaign that redefines the
victim group as worthless" (1990: 28). In other words, such a definition embraces the
idea developed by the architects of genocide that a group (or their 'enemy') is an
illusive and flexible category that camouflages the true identity of their enemy. As a
result, such a view merely repeats, in its definition, an implicit notion of group identity
employed by the perpetrators which actually catalyses the operation of genocidal
policy. In other words, their definition treats the processes of enemy construction
uncritically by harbouring the perpetrators' perspective in their definition.
The factor that has led this definition and approach astray is its dependence
upon a mistreatment of the Thomas Theorem to account for the neglected categories of
people that are systematically targeted by a policy of genocide. The Thomas theorem
suggests that "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences"
(Merton, 1957: 421). In other words, there is a tendency for people to create a self-
fulfilling prophecy in certain situations. Instead of reading this theorem as a concern
about the influence of social expectations on individual action which enacts the self-
fulfilling prophecy, as it has been done by Merton, the theorem is understood as a
statement confirming the proposition that "a group may be any collectivity of people
that is so defined by the perpetrator of a genocide" (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 25). In
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other words, what or who the perpetrators define as real is real by their actions to
destroy the other. What this theory proclaims is that groups are made real by the
perpetrator's actions to categorise, dehumanise and destroy the other.
What is lacking in this equation is a sense of realism as it applies to what we
mean by a 'group'. Unfortunately, the construction of 'the enemy' by the perpetrators
of genocide does not actually create the existence of groups. Instead, as I shall discuss
in detail later, what is created by this definitional process of the perpetrators is an
image of the other which serves as a point de capiton designed to gather allies and
support for a violent course of action. The theoretical shortcoming of Chalk and
Jonassohn's definition is that any level of critical speculation about this practice is
overlooked in favour of recognising the categories of people targeted by genocidaires.
This definition thus repeats the discourse of the perpetrators as an explanation for
genocide by implying that the value of their definition makes sense in characterising
the genocidal situation.
Sociologists Holmwood and Stewart have aptly characterized this form of
theorising as a "horizontal fallacy", because observations are privileged "by arguing
that it makes sense to those whose behaviour is being considered", rather than to an
academically derived standard (Holmwood and Stewart, 1995: 43). In such accounts,
what seems unintelligible can be made intelligible by invoking "a diversity of equal
truths each established by will and commitment" (1995: 43). The diversity of truths
presented by Chalk and Jonassohn effectively restates, but does not solve, the basis of
social inquiry; that is, their approach restates the problem of investigating these
classifying/mystifying practices and simply reincorporates these practices as their
definition of genocide. The problem with this fallacy is that because this 'enemy
creating' process makes sense to those involved in the situation, "it does not require
social scientists to seek the reconstruction of their explanations and therefore consigns
them to the lack of resources intrinsic to current difficulties" (Holmwood and Stewart,
1995: 44). More often 'the lack of resources' is translated within the discipline as a
shortfall of adequate empirical evidence to validate more detailed theoretical
explanations (Huttenbach, 2004). The key shortcoming of this kind of definition of
genocide denies the creative solution to problems of explanation by restating that
which is in need of critical explanation.
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General Theory and the Symmetry ofDefinitions and Theories
The effort to achieve a definition of genocide that avoids the potential of overexposure
by ascribing it to various forms of atrocity and an over-reliance upon physical
extermination has meant that there is no universal acceptance of a precise definition of
genocide. Although most scholarly work understands genocide in its reified form, few
have settled on a single consensual definition of genocide. As I shall discuss, most
genocide scholars have crafted their own definitions as a way of establishing the
theoretical parameters of explanatory inquiry. Chalk and Jonassohn's definition of
genocide, like others I will consider in this section, creates the parameters of their
definitions of genocide in large part through how their theories investigate genocide.
Their perpetrator centred definition establishes an investigation to "meaningfully
compare" occurrences of genocide by constructing general typologies relating to the
motives of the perpetrators (1990: 29). What I want to show in this section is that there
is a symmetry between the specific investigations of genocide and the way scholars
have come to define the term.
There is a tendency amongst the established scholars of genocide to construct
typological schemes of categorising genocide for the purposes of comparison in an
effort to render a more adequate explanation of its nature. These respective typological
schemes are a practice that sets forth a clear understanding of the scholar's explanatory
paradigm. Chalk and Jonassohn, for example, described four types of genocide classed
according to the dominant aspects of the perpetrator's motive.
1. to eliminate a real or potential threat;
2. to spread terror among real or potential enemies;
3. to acquire economic wealth; or
4. to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology (1990: 29).
Chalk and Jonassohn's typology seeks to indicate the "dominant" motivation contained
in genocidal incidents (Chalk and Jonassohn 2000: 11). Yet, the challenge for this
scheme is that what is 'dominant' is never quite apparent until one contends with the
practical details of events. In other words, classifications of motives are largely
empirically dependant upon adequate historical information that describes the stability
of the perpetrators' intentions. As I shall discuss later concerning the case of Rwanda,
the issue of genocidal intent largely depends upon what strata of the killing structure
one investigates. In fact, the divergence ofmotivations in society that inspire genocide
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actually function to increase civic cooperation. The second concern is thus that these
motives may actually exist interdependently in a single case of genocide. Even though
Horowitz has correctly noted that "in real-world terms, [Chalk and Jonassohn's] four
properties tend to coalesce", he is not troubled that this approach fails to offer a
sufficient explanation of the motivational structure of genocide (2002: 15).
Moreover, there are other cases of genocide that have been organised with
complementary motives. The genocides being conducted by governments, often on
behalf of corporations or other governments, against rural-indigenous peoples, which
has been described as 'utilitarian genocide' or genocide for wealth (Chalk and
Jonassohn's type three), often harbour other motivational incentives. The effort in the
1980s to "de-Indianize" the rain forest areas of Colombia and Brazil was widely seen
to be conducted in order to facilitate the mining of large quantities natural resources
(Alvarez, 2001: 101). Thus, when conflicts between miners and indigenous groups
ensued, these governments expedited the persecution and killing of these indigenous
groups despite public reassurances to improve their overall welfare. In this case, it
appears that the genocide committed against indigenous populations was in support of
the mining corporations and government revenues from production. However, there are
other interwoven motives for this kind of genocidal policy.
The first concern when positing profit motives is that there must be a detailed
consideration of the clear profits to be gained as measured against any costs. One must
therefore consider the costs of organizing the deaths of thousands of people by
methods (as are known) of bombing, dispersal of poisons, and other military pogroms.
These methods all entail considerable costs of their own, in the area of logistical
planning and public relations, execution, maintenance of equipment and personnel.
Thus, it might actually prove to be more economically advantageous to 'economically
incorporate' indigenous peoples, rather than destroying them. To posit these kinds of
economic motives one must thoroughly calculate the variables of profit or loss. Yet,
these calculations do not feature as recommendations of any scheme featuring this
motivational category, nor are they cited in the cases used to support this type of
genocide. A second concern is that it is difficult to isolate (or control for) the major
motives as such cases are further accompanied by racist discourses that are employed
by governments and corporations pledging to "help to raise the Indians out of savagery
by bringing them the benefits of modern technological life" (Chalk and Jonassohn,
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1990: 102). This raises the spectre of the modern role of racism or other ideologically
influential doctrines in the perpetration of genocide. This case, and others resembling
n
it , may seemingly be attributable to economic incentives, but actually serves a
number of motives pertaining to the perpetrators ideology. Another problem of relying
upon motives to characterise genocide is that the professed motives of the perpetrators
maybe part of a plan to deceive bystanders and encourage them to cooperate with and
hence expedite atrocities.
The central issue here is whether these general categories of motive aid us in a
critical understanding of these events and help highlight other influential processes.
Unfortunately, the problem of the horizontal fallacy is not overcome by the
construction of their typology of motivation. Even though their categories do provide a
framework to explore and classify genocides according to motives, the issue of a
creative or critical explanation of the perpetrator motive is still wanting. This is due to
the lack of rigorous detail paid to specific cases of genocide, and the need to rule out
motives by critical investigation.
Another example of this symmetry between definition and inquiry concerns the
work of Robert Melson in his revered book Revolution and Genocide. Unlike Chalk
and Jonassohn, Melson critically explores two cases of genocide in great historical
detail. The crux of his argument in uncovering the origins of the Holocaust and
Armenian genocide is that "in the modern world total genocides have mainly been
launched by revolutionary states seeking to transform society in their image" (Melson,
1992: xvi). The purpose of this investigation is "to shed light on the empirical
conditions, [and] the underlying pattern of empirical similarity, that led to genocide in
the past and may lead to it in the future" (Melson, 1992: 2). To explain how it was
possible for such revolutionary movements to secure the institutions of states (in
Germany and Ottoman Turkey) and further revolutionize society de novo, Melson
seeks to identify the overlapping conditions specifically related to the development of
genocide. For Melson the occurrence of revolutions and other crisis situations, such as
war, enable the formation of "fundamental transformations both of the political and the
social structure" (Melson, 1992: 30). These changes are manifest in the form of social
13 One of the most recent actions of this kind is being conducted against the rural tribes ofBotswana in
the service of diamond mining in association with the de Beers diamond company. Cf. Mother Jones,
January-February, 2005.
29
revolutions14 that establishes the "structural and historical setting—a necessary but not
sufficient condition—making it possible for ideologically motivated vanguards
actually to implement their ideas, including those favouring genocide" (1992: 21-2).
Although there are passages in the work that suggest that revolution itself has a direct
influence on the outcome of genocide,15 which is incongruent with the preceding
passage, I understand his thesis to be exploring structural influence of revolutionary
ideals. As a result of this endeavour Melson defines genocide in terms of the physical
extermination of a wide variety of groups and human categories. The focus of his
investigation concerns "total domestic genocide"—those cases of genocide that
annihilate groups within the borders of the state (1992: 278).
There is little question that the Nazi and Young Turkish revolutionary parties
undermined the social and political conditions of the old orders in the face of serious
crises in social and political legitimacy, and that these parties organized and executed a
policy of genocide in the service of a new society. The challenge for this approach,
however, is the determination of the precise relationship of revolutionary action and
the policy of genocide. Melson's account does clearly acknowledge the influence of
the international war and crises in domestic circumstances—for the Young Turks it
was the losses in the First World War and the domestic secession of minorities seeking
independent national representation (1992: 159). However, the idea of revolution is a
broad concept that can be seen to incorporate all other actions and influential
conditions as they are directed in creating a new society. The question concerns what is
the necessary role of revolutionary action for the outcome of genocide. Melson argues
the factors of international war,16 domestic crises, and policies of other international
governments pressured these governments to revolutionize their society in order to
resolve fundamental 'problems'. He argues:
14 Melson defines a social revolution as "a fundamental transformation, usually carried out by violence,
in society's political, economic, and social structures and cultural values and beliefs, including its
reigning ideology, political myth, and identity" (1992: 32)
15 He writes that this study "relates total domestic genocide specifically to revolution and not to other
structural crises of the state or ofmodern society" (1992: 16), and (inversely phrased) "the present study
of genocide is viewed as a kind ofpolicy that may be an out come of revolution" (1992: 31).
16
Melson argues that "the Great Powers took the opportunity ofmomentary Ottoman weakness and
distraction to grab more territory and to ask for more concessions. The consequences for the Turkish
revolution and its outcomes were disastrous...by 1912, as the Young Turks became more nationalistic,
xenophobic and intolerant, the very aptitude of the Armenians for modernization only worked to
emphasize their apparent threat to the new regime." (1992: 160-1).
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The genocide of the Armenians should be understood not as a response to "Armenian
provocations" but as a stage in the Turkish revolution, which as a reaction to the
continuing disintegration of the empire settled on a narrow nationalism and excluded
Armenians from the moral universe of the state (1992: 169-70).
What the revolutions accomplished was the possibility of extreme factions to use the
impetus of revolutionary change to commit genocide. Melson's insights therefore rest
exclusively on a theory of opportunity that opens the possibility for the execution of
genocide. His argument thus suggests that the probabilities of repression and genocide
"increase substantially" when (1) "revolution leads to war," (2) when there exists
"excluded communities included poorly integrated "problem" groups under the old
regime," and (3) "other options... are seen as impossible or too costly to implement"
(1992: 205). Revolutions, therefore, enable a gradual and systematic implementation of
ideological doctrines when these specific conditions are in place. One is left to
conclude that revolutions open the way for ideologies whose content is composed of a
radicalised devotion to one's own group.
Melson's theory of opportunity accounts in historical detail the conditions that
influence the social and political climate which animates collective action and
government policy towards genocide. Concerning the Nazism and the war conditions
he writes:
the war was given a new meaning, that of an apocalyptic race war, and all things
become possible...The war against Russia transformed the Jewish Question from a
problem of deportation of racially undesirable aliens into a titanic struggle between the
forces of Good and Evil. The time had come for the "Final Solution" (Melson, 1990:
240, 244).
These war conditions, which animated radical struggle on the battlefield, also
influenced radical solutions to domestic 'problems'. Yet, it is unfortunate that
Melson's account does not explore in practical detail the influence of these conditions
upon the soldier, or the genocidaire. To better account for the potency of these
conditions it is best to reveal how these circumstances influenced the daily
circumstances of the genocidaires. One way to accomplish this could be to explore the
particular functional needs of the institution. Only by inquiring into these practical
dynamics of the genocidaires can an investigation be on solid ground in judging the
effects ofwar or revolutionary contexts on the outcome of genocide.
One of the best accounts of this kind explores the reasoning of German soldiers
as documented in their letters sent home from the Eastern front. In Omer Bartov's,
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Hitler's Army, he argued that Germany's war against Russia was animated by a
commitment to Hitler as Fiihrer and a deceptive vision of the enemy (Jewish-
Bolshevism), both fundamental tenets of Nazi ideology. This mind-set effectively
served to support the morale of troops facing the heavy losses experienced by the core
of the German army and arduous conditions of battle in the East that did not
correspond "to their previous image of war" (Bartov, 1990: 28). Soldiers on the
Eastern front "accepted the Nazi vision of war as the only one applicable to their
situation" and which gave "license to vent their anger and frustration on the enemy's
soldiers and civilians" and perpetrate or tolerate other atrocities including genocide
(1990: 28). Thus, it can be viewed that the "Final Solution", as perpetrated by various
methods throughout the empire, was representative of Germany's entire struggle, and
was further animated by the expected threat of brutal retaliation for such atrocities. As
other military advantages where absent, the brutalization of non-Aryans served to
solidify and motivate the entire war effort from the camp guard to the soldier in the
trench. Bartov's investigation shows that theoretical propositions can be founded upon
substantive empirical evidence which makes the behaviour of the genocidaires more
coherent in terms of the conditions they experienced. Just as there are exemplary
approaches that successfully qualify general explanations, there is one typology which
has broken with the principle of symmetry.
One scholar who has successfully developed a typological definition to
circumvent problems incurred by the symmetry of definition and inquiry is Ward
Churchill. He has argued that typologies can form "an adequate conceptual basis for an
effective global consensus juris vis-a-vis genocide" without "becoming mired in
considerations of government intentions" and other issues of inquiry (Churchill, 1986:
416). Churchill suggested that we can avoid these problems by establishing a
codification of genocide akin to degrees of homicide.
Genocide in the First Degree would encompass instances where clear intent to commit
genocide was evident...
Genocide in the Second Degree would encompass instances where intent to commit
genocide per se is unclear, but where genocide occurred while it perpetrator was
engaged in otherwise criminal activities...
Genocide in the Third Degree would encompass instances where genocidally specific
intent is lacking, and where the perpetrator is not otherwise engaging in activities
judged to be illegal, but...allows genocide to occur as an "inevitable by-product" of its
national activities...
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Genocide in the Fourth Degree, which should be viewed as corresponding to
manslaughter rather than murder, would accommodate instances where intent, other
forms of criminality and reckless insensitivity are all unclear or lacking, but where
genocide nonetheless occurs... (Churchill, 1986: 416-7).
Churchill's "gradient of criminality" represents an effort to construct a typology of
genocide without harbouring explanatory statements that exclude certain cases based
upon case-specific or theoretically contrived characteristics (1986: 417). This kind of
model, contrary to many other typological ones, helps to classify and judge the
seriousness of cases without making implicit explanatory statements about genocide's
'essential' character.
Some of the problems raised by the symmetry of definitions and inquiry, and
the problems of general explanation, really pertain to questions of methodology. In the
following section I want to examine how my approach plans to overcome the shortfalls
of these approaches examined above.
Genocide and Method
In a recent article by the editor of the Journal of Genocide Research, Henry
Huttenbach touches on the tendency in genocide studies to "hurry towards
generalisations" (Huttenbach, 2004: 149). Reacting to a sense of "urgency" pertaining
to atrocities, scholars have tended to put forth generalisations in the hope of explaining
and preventing these crimes. Yet, Huttenbach suggests that scholars should "curb the
temptation to rush into premature conclusions... because not enough cases of genocide
have been sufficiently studied" (2004: 149). His concern is that there is not enough
empirical exploration of various cases of genocide to substantiate general theorising. In
agreeing with this judgement, I have argued above that typologies of genocide and
those approaches that shy away from the effort at greater empirical specification are
unproductive attempts to explain genocide. For some like Chalk and Jonassohn the
motivation for creating their typology was intended to raise awareness of the scale of
the problem scholars face. Yet, the paradox of this effort is that even though they
succeed in raising awareness of various cases throughout history, the methodological
employment of general typologies hinders the development of new and creative
understandings about genocide.
My contention with these approaches thus presumes that by reflecting more
critically and substantively about the discourses and actions of the perpetrators,
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scholars can better qualify their theoretical propositions about the character of
genocide. Thus, the following examinations in this thesis side with Huttenbach's
caveat that "good theory is nurtured by a series of well-tested generalities and factual
common denominators extracted from empirical regularities" (2004: 150). In this
section I want to clarify the method I shall use to investigate specific cases of genocide
and account for these empirical regularities.
The methods of social science used to study genocide approximate to two
models. First, positivist social science, whose goal it is to make predictions about
events by isolating their causes, can be construed according to subset two models: 1)
the deductive-nomological form of explanation that consists in relating statements
describing a phenomena to a series of other conditions and to one or more general laws
such that the explanatory statement is deducible from its conditions and laws.
Exemplars of this approach are the typological models which explain genocide as
deduced from general conditions such as war or economic crisis, such as Melson's
theory of war and revolution. 2) The "inductive-probabilistic" model, on the other
hand, employs statistical probability instead of the general laws of the deductive
model. In enabling inductive support for its conclusions, the validity of its hypothesis
is dependant upon the relation of statistical probability between measurable variables
(Fay, 1975: 34-6). Two theories of genocide that I evaluate in Chapter three, one
developed by R J Rummel (1995) and the other by Harff and Gurr (1998), approximate
to this inductive-probabilistic model, since both theories make claims about the
predictiveness of specific variables based on statistical measurement of genocide under
measurable conditions. In other words, specific variables are measured against the
outcome of genocide and statistically correlated (either positively or negatively).
A second form of social science that explore genocide approximate to another
model that has been classed as "interpretive" (Fay, 1975: 36). This model does away
with causal or probabilistic statements such as 'necessary and sufficient conditions',
and instead favours vocabularies "comprised of action concepts, and attempts to give
an account of social science by examining the logical implications of this class of
concepts" (Fay, 1975: 71). Such concepts require an interpretation on the part of the
observer as they are referenced upon intentional action (plans or desires) or
conventional actions (moral, legal or social rules). Such accounts rest principally upon
the intentions which entail implicit references to social or political practices. The
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scientist is then faced with the task of uncovering "the set of rules which underlies a
given class of actions" (1975: 76). These rules themselves presuppose sets of what Fay
calls "constitutive meanings" that constitutes the logical possibility of certain practices
in society. The social scientist must then convince his audience, with direct reference
to their subjects' meanings, of the "structure of intelligibility" that accounts for actions
in their own terms (1975: 76). However, a shortcoming of this interpretive model is
that intentionality must constitute a theory of coherence within the logical meanings of
the perpetrators of genocide. This entails that contradictions within the ideological
logic of genocide must be ignored and left unaccounted for within this kind of
explanation.
My proposed method is a variant on the interpretive model. Like the
interpretive approach, I explore the genocidaire's 'structure of intelligibility' and the
rules that directly influence perpetrator and victim action. The divergence from this
model arises from my examination of two paradoxes common to cases of modern
genocide which, I claim, exposes these structures of intelligibility that direct genocidal
policy. In other words, I attempt to avoid the shortcoming of the interpretive model by
confronting the paradoxes of genocide and revealing the intelligible and logical
structure underlying this pattern of violent action. After contending with these
paradoxes I suggest in chapter Five that these structures of intelligibility that make
genocide possible can be adequately understood by analytically distinguishing between
the 'grammar' (how it is principally constructed) and 'speech' (how it is employed) of
these constitutive meanings. Before reaching an examination of these paradoxes,
however, it is necessary to explore in the next chapter the conceptual distinctiveness of
genocide as a concept of study to establish the parameters of my forthcoming
investigations.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the crime of genocide, developed by Raphael Lemkin
found an audience in the United Nations and world community as it helped address not
only the spectre of Nazi atrocities, but also the failures of the League of Nations and
confront the particular and (still present) problem of protecting stateless persons and
minority groups. Although the term has come to be understood by the United Nations
and much of the scholarly community in a reified sense based upon the physiological
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and reproductive characteristics of groups, Lemkin's influence, in his outspoken desire
to safeguard peoples against annihilation, is only somewhat preserved. The neglect by
the UN and some scholars like Horowitz to consider other non-lethal techniques of
violence as genocide, betrays a large part of Lemkin's vision as he understood that
groups require certain capacities of action (economic, cultural, religious) to constitute
themselves as a group. Despite this divergence the reification of Lemkin's vision into
the materialism of killing has made for a "broad consensus as to the definition of
genocide" founded upon how governments organise the deaths of large numbers of
people (Horowitz, 2002: 14). This has entailed that Lemkin's vision of genocide as
techniques of annihilation has been largely overshadowed by the attention focused
upon the disturbing scale of organised mass killings.
My discussion of the symmetry between definitions of genocide and their
respective general theories of inquiry has sought to show that there are unproductive
features present within the current theories explaining genocide. Some definitions of
genocide formulate the details of its meaning to correspond with their theoretical
propositions of inquiry. With the example of Chalk and Jonassohn, 1 have shown that
their approach entertains a horizontal fallacy which uncritically restates the
perpetrator's method in their definition and explanation of genocide. Likewise,
Melson's theory also defines a form of genocide (total domestic genocide) particular to
his theory of genocide which claims that revolution and war are necessary conditions
that lead to genocide. Melson's theory, like Chalk and Jonassohn's typology of
motives, shares problems pertaining to its method of inquiry which fails to adequately
support its general claims. This tendency of definitional symmetry is so pervasive that
it has led some like Churchill to devise a new criminological definition of genocide.
These problems of inquiry raise the question ofmethodology as it pertains to the study
of genocide. I proposed to avoid these methodological problems by following the
interpretive model which accounts for the constitutive meanings appropriate to the
perpetrators and victims of genocide. In the following chapter I will examine the
concept of genocide in opposition to other concepts that often convolute the essence of
what this form of violence means. It is to this investigation I now turn.
Chapter Two
Situating Genocide Conceptually




In this chapter I will explore the conceptual dimensions of genocide in a new attempt
to situate genocide on distinct foundations separate from the practice of warfare. I will
show that the efforts to situate genocide in a paradigm of warfare neglect unique
aspects of genocide that demarcates this form of violence. As noted in the first chapter,
Rafael Lemkin, in his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe sought to describe the
'Germanisation' of Europe in a new conceptual light by employing the term
'genocide'. This effort also entailed another necessary feature of conceptual
construction, a step by which a set of delineations serve to substantively distinguish
genocide from other concepts. Lemkin understood that articulating a new term
demanded understanding the antitheses of genocide. "Genocide", he stated, "is the
antithesis of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine, which...holds that war is directed against
sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians" (Lemkin, 2002: 28). Modem
wars, in this view, are thus fought between rival forces of a state—their respective
means of violence—and not against groups who lack such forces. Under this view,
genocide is a method of violence exacted against groups for the purposes of
annihilation rather than domination. Lemkin predicated this distinction upon the Nazi's
rejection of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine in their 'total war' in Eastern Europe,
which was deemed from the start a "war of annihilation" to secure and reshape Europe
into a new racial dominion (Wolin, 2004: 259). The National Socialist doctrine viewed
itself as a racial nation of Germanic volk, rather than a state composed of diverse
subjects. As Hans Mommsen has written, Nazi foreign policy was "domestic policy
projected outwards", which was intended to "conceal the increasing loss of reality"
concerning the state's actual condition; this was maintained "only by...political
dynamism through incessant action" (Mommsen quoted in Wolin, 2004: 492). This
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'domestic project' of incessant expansion ofGerman domination in Europe came at the
expense ofmany local populations and diverged from the traditional course of warfare.
The scholars that I examine below have sought to add or relate the concept of
genocide, in their own theoretical way, to war. I will argue that whilst wars have the
inherent potential to become genocidal by virtue of the conditions of war (that is,
genocide and war are similar in form), they differ significantly in substance.
I. War and Genocide
I would like to begin by putting forth a categorization of two divergent propositions
pertaining to war and genocide, both of which resonate in current arguments. The first
point argues that war and genocide are distinct forms of violence (as suicide is to
murder) and that there no common conditions shared by these forms of violence. The
second position argues that war and genocide share common conditions and are
inextricably linked and categorically bound as violent processes—that is, war and
genocide are, in some cases, indistinguishable. Following this format, there are
theoretical propositions that fit into each of these two groups.
The second category argues that there are inherent links between war and
genocide. An argument of this kind has been put forth most recently by Martin Shaw in
his work War and Genocide (2003). Shaw explores the connections between war and
genocide by looking at the roots of killing practices in modern society. For Shaw, war
and genocide are not causally linked phenomena, where one can be causally derived
from the other. Rather genocide, he argues, should be seen as a particular form of
"degenerative warfare" where "the logic of war...can be seen as an extension of
degenerative war" and consequently genocide (2003: 5). This position falls within the
second proposition listed above in that genocide is not seen as a sui generis violent
phenomenon, but merely an organised set of "intentional actions" subsumed under the
category of warfare that is represented in a continuum of destructive violence directed
at a perceived enemy (2003: 26). These genocidal actions are derivative of the
"tendency in war [that] is a manifestation of the internal linkages between these types
ofpolitical violence" (2003: 26; emphasis added).
Sociologists Eric Markusen and David Kopf, on the other hand, approach the
question of war and genocide from a different perspective, yet they acknowledge the
strong links between war and genocide. In their work The Holocaust and Strategic
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Bombing (1996), they neither treat genocide as a form of warfare, nor as a sui generis
form of violence, but rather as a practice linked by a set of collective actions and
conditions common to total warfare. Drawing on the work of French writers who
developed the term "total war" following the First World War, Markusen and Kopf
argue that there exist "several commonalities and connections between genocide and
total war" (Markusen and Kopf, 1996: 55). For these authors, genocide and total war
are "forms of governmental mass killing that...are closely related" and do share
important overlapping conditions (1996: 62). Rather than explore an idealized
conceptual distinction between war and genocide, they use the adjective total to lay
claim to a particular dynamic of warfare as it occurred in the last century, which they
argue, bridges the distinction between war and genocide. Total war differs from war in
terms of the societal scope of those rallied to support the war effort, as well as the
societies demonised by the scale of the conflict. In other words, total war remained
largely what it was for the French forerunners of the concept (Leon Daudet and
Alphonse Seche): the rallying of an entire nation's productive forces—not merely its
military complex—that seeks and often results in the greater escalation of destruction
directed at one's enemy society, rather than at the state's means of offensive violence.
Total war is a concept that applies to conditions of "societal mobilization and
destructiveness" that creates the propensity to kill entire civilian communities of each
society engaged in the conflict (1996: 62). From this position of total war, Markusen
and Kopf suggest that the connections and commonalties between total war and
genocide are that:
1) Total war often serves as a catalyst for genocide. 2) Both genocide and total war
involve the deliberate massacre of non-combatants. 3) Both forms ofmass killings are
generally conducted by nation-states and rationalized as being in the service of
national security. (1996: 55).
These observations by Markusen and Kopf concern the common conditions which
positively influence the occurrence of genocide and total warfare. Wars, in their view,
can increase inter-group tensions where a minority group is portrayed as collaborators
with a genuine external enemy. Secondly, the use of modern weaponry in war, namely
large capacity aerial bombardment and atomic weapons that have the potential to
destroy entire regions or countries, contributes to the establishment of a climate which
"increases popular tolerance of cruelty" (1996: 65).
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For Markusen and Kopf these elements ofwar are derived from the structure of
modern governments, and serve to further enhance their position as a monolithic
authority. Thus, wars which pose "a dire threat to the society" can create widespread
instability between "preexisting inter-group tensions" which could result in "violence
directed by the majority against members of a minority group", that can become
genocidal (1996: 64). Even without a history of these tensions they argue that the
consequences of total war, whether they involve democratic or totalitarian
governments, tend to enhance the "centralized, secret, and powerful" nature of
governments due to the employment of censorship and propaganda (1996: 64). These
overlapping tendencies encourage the military power of the state, which is often a
necessary precondition in targeting of minority groups. These tendencies mean that
genocide shares the conditions conducive to total war and thus warfare can serve as a
catalyst for not only a policy of genocide, but also for warfare to escalate and
degenerate into genocide.
Similarly, Shaw's work repeats some of these observations. He argues that the
distinctions that separate genocide and war "are only partial", in the sense that
genocide expresses identical traits of warfare (Shaw, 2003: 26). The most important of
these traits are that 1) "the opposing sides aim to destroy each other's power" and 2)
"they are prepared to engage in mass killing of the enemy in order to achieve their
goals" (2003: 28). Genocides, like revolutions, are both "contests" that resemble
patterns of war. Shaw seeks to challenge the prevailing view that the asymmetrical
character of power evident in cases of genocide (and revolutions) is "definitive
contrasts] with the symmetry of war" (2003: 28). In fact, he contends that genocide
should be viewed as a distinctive form of degenerate war that expresses inherent
societal conflict that exists between groups.
Following Clausewitz, Shaw's central claim that "escalation is a law" of
modern warfare means there is an inherent tendency for war to degenerate into
systematically targeting civilian populations, what he calls "degenerate war" (2003:
183). Likewise, degenerate war can further degenerate into genocide, since both
involve the use of lethal violence against civilian populations. He writes:
As Clausewitz argued, escalation is a law of war. We may say that it is a law of
slaughter in general, including genocide. Once inhibitions on violence are broken,
there is no logical limit: only what is dictated by its outcomes. This means that, one
the one hand, once killing has begun, perpetrators will often continue until they have
40
reached their objectives (which the process of killing may enlarge) or, more likely,
until they are checked (2003: 183).
This escalation occurs because the inherent propensity to use greater force is
accompanied by the decreasing inhibitions towards killing. What further intensifies this
process of escalation is that each side in a conflict seeks to out-perform and destroy
each other, often in degenerative ways. Shaw draws these conclusions from empirical
observations which suggest that genocides often occur in the context ofwar, revolution
or political struggle where external and internal enemies clash in terms of their "social
power and experience between two socialforces" (2003: 40). Sources of these conflicts
can derive from wider societal forces such as social inequality and globalisation, since
such factors can exacerbate tensions between social groups and create the propensity to
target their social power vested in civilian populations.
Genocide as Mutually Assured Conflict?
The principal limitation of Shaw's theory concerns the concept of conflict. Within this
perspective, what makes genocide a degenerative aspect of warfare is the existence of a
conflict of social power. To understand the mentality of the perpetrators, Shaw argues
that competing social forces of society are the cleavages, which enables a policy of
genocide. As he writes: "genocide...is the attempt by an organized, armed force to
destroy the power of a social group through killing" (2003: 93).
The one significant empirical regularity that is overlooked by this theory
specific to many acts of genocide is that the victims of violence are forced into an
oppressive situation which was not entered into by their consent. In other words, for
genocide to be understood as derivative of conflict there has to be a notion of mutuality
present in the situation between groups. Instead of resembling a collision (from Latin
meaning conflictus) of social forces, genocide is more like a singular pattern of attack
by the powerful against the ill-constituted. Most victims of genocide do not take sides
in a genuine conflict of opposing social forces.
Shaw does acknowledge that "the issue of genocidal ideology" identifies
groups "as enemies in the minds of perpetrators" who often comprise "people who do
not recognize themselves as a community, and whose imputed power bears little
relationship to reality" (2003: 41). Likewise, Shaw does recognize that the victims of
genocide are often mythical creations of the perpetrator's propaganda and do not
conform to any genuine notion of a 'group'. Unfortunately, these observations do not
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influence his theory of genocide-as-conflict. Instead, his theory of conflict attempts to
challenge the "cult of the pure victim" in acts of genocide, where victims are viewed as
helpless individuals (2003: 187). Passive subjects of violence are, in Shaw's view,
mythical and are instead viewed as pawns of competing organizational and social
power who, despite their powerlessness, still have "roles as agents" (2003: 187).
Subjects are thus imbued with the potential for resistance, even though such actions are
nearly always futile. Only by mitigating this reality of genocide can Shaw's theory
overlook the fact that subjects of genocide refuse and do not consider themselves
engaged in social competition against other groups, and thus do not control the grounds
of 'conflict' which engulfs them. This means that the victims of genocide are always
politically arid organizationally powerless and, as I shall examine later, are selected for
destruction in part because of this standing within the social structure. Even though
victims are organisationally powerless, they are imbued by their perpetrators with
threatening features that reveal their 'genuine' dominance. It is thus odd that Shaw
should suggest that "we should define genocide... by the experience of the victims as
well as the mentality of the genocidists" when it is clear that most victims of modern
total genocide do not share the perpetrators' competitive world-view, but are forced to
contend with it (2003: 40). This forced contention characteristic of genocide shares
little resemblance with the mutuality implicit in notions of conflict which Shaw
suggests is a feature of genocide and war.
The conceptual consequence of this definition is that the social scientist is now
constructing a model of genocide legitimating the arena in which the discourse of the
perpetrators function, all of whom view 'History' (Stalinism), 'Nature' (Nazism) and
'Nationalism' (Milosevic's Serbia) as the environment of social competition and
survival at any cost and by any effective method. The genocide in Rwanda was an
example where the international community chose not to intervene because it viewed
the conflict as a civil war between rival ethnic groups', thus validating, in part, the
Hutu's ideology of "self defense" (Des Forges, 1999: 78). As pawns constituting the
power of social groups, Shaw's theory views victims, whether they embrace 'their own
group' or not, as part of a struggle between groups.
1 A reflection of this can be found in The New York Times front page article in October 1997 that
reported on "the age-old animosity between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups", despite there being no
recorded acts of violence before 1959 (Gourevitch, 1998: 59).
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In his attempt to understand genocide from the mentalities of the genocidaires,
Shaw has repeated a discourse of conflict employed by those who perpetrate genocide
as an explanation for genocide. I am not suggesting that this approach directly
legitimates the discourse of the perpetrators—as in verifying the legitimacy of racist
doctrines or other specific supremacist worldviews. However, what this approach does
is explicitly embrace the grammar of genocide which imputes the general conditions of
conflict that substantiates and enables a policy of genocide and thus reclaims this
condition by restating it on the level of theory as an explanation for genocide. This is
perhaps the clearest example of a performative contradiction that betrays the character
of those victimized by the violence of genocide. No matter how well intentioned this
theory is, Shaw still repeats the discourse of the perpetrators at the expense of
representing the force of the contention with which victims must struggle against. If
the concern is to advance our understanding of genocide it does a disservice to the
victims (and to the study of genocide) to accept without critical oversight the central
doctrines that enabled their elimination.
Unfortunately, this conflictual element of genocide—Shaw's key conceptual
link with warfare—is not an effective explanation of many cases of total domestic
genocide. The only way this conceptual scheme could account for genocide in the case
of Rwanda would be if one could argue persuasively that the Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF) was the representative force of the ethnic Tutsi community as a whole. The
problem with this position, however, is that it presupposes that Hutu government
propaganda which recruited executioners and allowed further administrative unity in
favour of genocide, is an accurate description of'Tutsi political life'—that there was in
fact "no distinction between the civilian Tutsi population and RPF Soldiers" (Des
Forges, 1999: 282). The raison d'etre of the "civilian self defense" program, which
organised much of the genocide in Rwanda, was premised on the expectation that there
was or would be a 'Tutsi alliance' with the invading RPF (1999: 282). Shaw's
approach neglects fundamental attributes about the victims of genocide, namely that
they are, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, targeted because of their powerlessness
and do not accept the perpetrator's conflictual worldview.
Shaw's theory of genocide, unlike Markusen and Kopf s theory, is limited by
the adversarialism that is posited at the centre of the concept of genocide, which he
uses to suggest that genocide is a form of warfare. Markusen and Kopf s position, on
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the other hand, distinguishes war and genocide by its reference not to a specific kind of
conflict, but rather to the conditions shared and inspired by total war. Yet, both Shaw
and Markusen and Kopf acknowledge the propensity for warfare to degenerate into the
targeting of civilian populations which increases the likelihood of genocide, and all
seek to define genocide in terms of the processes that leads toward it. Shaw writes:
A Major cause of misunderstanding in the discourse of genocide is its equation with
the successful completion of the process in a maximum sense...Genocide is then
understood as a state of completed destruction rather than a process leading towards it.
'A genocide' as a discrete event is generally understood in this way, but it is
misleading as it separates the result from the process that leads towards it (Shaw,
2003:38).
Unlike Shaw, Markusen and Kopf focus on how war radicalises public opinion, and
even those involved in war, into accepting the killing of civilians and other groups
associated with the enemy population. The key factors in this 'escalation of violence
theory' are the psycho-social forces brought about by the employment of organised
violence itself. They arise from the propensities of customary warfare, which as
Clausewitz recognised, leads to a mutual escalation of destructive violence. These
patterns of escalation facilitate the effects of dehumanisation and technical distancing
which inspire conformity and situate the other outside the boundaries of customary
moral considerations. Unlike Shaw, these authors do not claim an immanent link
between war and genocide. Rather, they argued for the propensity for total war to both
escalate into and establish the conditions for genocide.
Shaw's theory, however, does not only seek to bridge the gap between these
two concepts by arguments of propensity, like those discussed by Markusen and Kopf.
Instead, Shaw takes this position further by claiming that conflict over social power is
the immanent link between war and genocide. His theory thus unites war and genocide
together by emphasizing their adversarial nature in terms of a competition or clash
"between two social forces''' (Shaw, 2003: 40). I argued that what is absent from this
account is any critical scrutiny of the conditions of 'conflict'. In my preliminary
discussion of the relationship of victims and perpetrators, I argued that victims are
forced into a contention and situation which professes to speak on their behalf. Instead
of critically evaluating this situation and the appearance of conflict, Shaw's theory of
genocide-as-war merely restates the perspective of the genocidaire as an explanation
for genocide. I will take up this relationship between the victims and perpetrators in
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much greater detail in the chapters that follow. Before reaching the greater depths of
this particular inquiry, I will now critically review those scholars advocating the
position that strongly distinguishes between war and genocide.
The Exclusive Divergence between Genocide and Warfare
One of the strongest proponents of genocide's unique character derives from the work
of Irving Horowitz. He argued that "genocide must be clearly distinguished from other
forms of the destruction of human beings" since "domestic destruction and
international warring are separate dimensions of struggle" (Horowitz, 2002: 29).
Horowitz's argument that war and genocide are fundamentally different forms of
violence is not based upon evaluating their empirical conditions, but by citing their
moral differences. He wrote that
a social scientific vantage point must try to understand and analyse genocide as a
distinct social phenomena...For this purpose genocide must be clearly distinguished
from other forms of the destruction of human beings...The collective nature of
genocide, in which the victim is "punished" for being part of some particular
group...sets it apart from other social evils. The act of genocide contradicts traditional
Western norms and approaches to law and morals, which emphasise individual
responsibility for actions and, hence specific forms of punishments for transgressions
(Horowitz, 2002: 29-30).
Horowitz thus argues from a moral perspective that genocide differs from other forms
of violence because of the way victims are targeted and how they are systematically
destroyed.
Markusen and Kopf, however, contend that Horowitz has been inconsistent
regarding this distinction between war and genocide. Their claim is based upon
Horowitz's arguments concerning the conflict in Vietnam, where he stated that "the
line between war and genocide becomes profoundly blurred" during the new era of
warfare where formal declarations of war cease to be imperative (Horowitz quoted in
Markusen and Kopf, 1996: 60). Yet, this criticism fails to recognise that Horowitz is
not averse to acknowledging the propensities that war can escalate into genocide
because his argument is predicated upon moral, rather than empirical grounds. Thus,
these arguments run past each other because the grounds for debate are premised upon
either moral arguments or overlapping empirical conditions. The difference with
Horowitz is that his theory breaks with this perspective of defining genocide in terms
of the processes that enable it. Instead he claims that genocide is, unlike war, always-
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already outside the boundaries of legitimate organised violence and operates under a
different set of governmental and societal ideals than those involving war.
In support of this distinction, Horowitz cites empirical research which is based
upon the work of R J Rummel. In Rummel's earlier work, he argued for an exclusive
distinction between genocide and war, claiming that there are "no common conditions
or causes" (Rummel quoted in Markusen and Kopf, 1996: 61). However, in his later
work, Rummel developed the concept of democide that included types of mass killings
under a more general rubric, one which does away with such strong conditional
divisions between war and genocide. Rummel thus shifts his position to include the
deaths of non-combatants who are killed during military attacks as a measure of
democide and proposes empirical evidence to mitigate the arguments that there are
common conditions directly linking war to genocide. Nevertheless, Rummel's theory
still maintains that genocide is a unique form of government killing that can be
measured and distinguished empirically by documenting the correlations between
forms of government killing with the types of government. Although his work has
developed to include other kinds of murderous actions by governments that may
appear to create an umbrella under which genocide may be subsumed, Rummel still
maintains a distinction between genocide and other forms of government killing based
upon empirical measurements which documents the correlations between genocide and
other types of government violence. Rummel maintains a distinction between war and
genocide because
...the amount of overall democide is highly related to the number of people
characteristically killed in rebellions, but in general, this in turn has little to do with a
regime's disposition to commit genocide or its annual rate of domestic democide
(Rummel, 1995: 20).
The evidence Rummel cites seems to suggest that "all genocides are independent of a
regime's tendency to be involved in other forms of violence," such as war or
revolution, because there is no empirical correlation between genocide and these forms
of violence (1995: 20). Because "genocide is carried out even by regimes that have
had...few or no war-dead", Rummel concludes that war has little to do with
influencing the occurrence of genocide (1995: 20). If war was to have had such a
positive influence upon the occurrence of genocide, this would be manifested in the
positive correlation between war fatalities and cases of genocide. Although Rummel's
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research does not rule out the influence of war, his evidence suggests that genocide
occurs without the influence of large-scale killing resulting from war.
Both Horowitz and Markusen and Kopf s theories approach the distinction
between war and genocide from very different positions to the extent that their
respective arguments run pass each other and, yet also overlap at crucial points. Both
authors in fact regard war crimes and genocide as forms of governmental mass killing,
yet Markusen and Kopf wish to assert the propensity for total war to become genocidal
and reveal common forces which links these concepts. Rummel's later work does not
deny this propensity claim because his empirical evidence shows only that most cases
of genocide do not correlate with the intensity ofwar or revolution. This point does not
deny any of Markusen and Kopfs claims outright, since Rummel's research does not
measure the existence of any specific conditions established by warfare. Thus, their
claims that the influence of total war can create not only the conditions for a policy of
genocide, but also the crime of genocide itself by the use of modern (atomic) weapons
remains unchallenged by Rummel's findings. Thus, what Rummel's evidence reveals,
however, is that the intensity of war does not make genocide more likely to occur. This
evidence is used to support his specific claim that wars are planned and conducted
separately from the policy of genocide.
This section has attempted to demonstrate that the concept of genocide has
been embroiled in debate about how its practice is related to warfare. The position that
genocide is exclusive from warfare does not examine the influence of catalytic
conditions caused by war or the propensity that war can directly result in genocide due
to the use of modern weapons. The point to be taken from the arguments of Rummel
and Horowitz is that genocide can be distinguished from war despite the existence of
catalytic conditions created by regional or international war. The reason for this
conclusion is that the processes that enable the possibility of genocide are not the
'proper' or only ways to define genocide. On the other hand, Markusen and Kopf, as
well as Shaw, privilege conceptualising genocide by primarily considering the
processes that lead to genocide. The problem with this position is that it convolutes
genocide with war to such an extent that other processes which distinguish them are
overlooked. As I shall examine below, there are very common practices of warfare that
operate differently (or cannot operate) under conditions of genocide. These practices,
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as I shall examine in the next section, help to distinguish between the practice of war
and genocide.
Asymmetry and Surrender
There are two practices that operate in a different manner under the conditions of war
and genocide. The first, the asymmetry of violence, is conceptually the less poignant of
the two, yet it reveals something important about how war differs from genocide.
Scholars like Helen Fein and Chalk and Jonassohn argue for a distinction between war
and genocide on asymmetrical grounds. For Fein in particular, genocide "is usually
conceived of as an asymmetrical slaughter of an unorganised group or collectivity by
an organized force" (Fein, 1993: 31). Chalk and Jonassohn, on the other hand, also
suggest that "the victim group" is characterised by a lack of "organized military
machinery that might be opposed to that of the perpetrator" (Chalk and Jonassohn,
1990: 23-4). Critics of this position, such as Markusen and Kopf, point out that their
views rest on an overestimation and an idealized vision of warfare that is symmetrical,
when in many cases aggressive nations "are often stimulated to undertake invasion
precisely because they believe that they can prevail" when their enemy is most
vulnerable or weak (Markusen and Kopf, 1996: 67).
Even though asymmetry of violence is also a feature of warfare, it is a much
more common aspect of domestic oppression of groups because of the nature of
modern nation states. The raison d'etre of states and revolutionary organisations rests
in their capacities for monopolising violence, which is not shared by many groups
targeted by a policy of genocide. States and revolutionary organisations almost always
possess an organisation of violence to secure or advance their political agenda, whereas
victims of genocide rarely have the capacities for organisational violence. The essential
point to recognise here, one that is not explicitly mentioned by the proponents of
asymmetry, is that total domination is often a necessary condition for total genocide.
Whilst asymmetrical violence is a variable feature of warfare, it is almost always an
aspect of genocide, since most victim groups do not have the capacities for violence.
This view does not mean that states and revolutionary organisations cannot also
become the targets of a policy of genocide. Rather, my argument relies upon the
empirical fact that most total genocides have been committed when all means of
resistance has been extinguished regardless of the character of the targeted group.
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Genocide is a feature not of battle or struggle, and is thus not accomplished within
forms of violent symmetrical conflict, but instead exists principally as an aspect of
total domination. Only when total domination is secured does genocide become a
possibility.
The other, more revealing, practice that can better distinguish war and genocide
is a feature of surrender. In Fein's later work, she argued in her definition of genocide
that the concept of surrender is pivotal in revealing the distinction with war. Only
under conditions of war will surrender mean an end to the killing of victims, "but the
surrender of victims in genocidal situations does not avoid their mass murder but
[instead] expedites it" (Fein, 1993: 21). She argued:
Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a
collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social
reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat
offered by the victim (1993: 24; emphasis added).
Mass surrender of troops in cases of warfare can reduce and even end the killing of
battle, whereas mass surrender during a case of genocide will only fuel the policy of
extermination.
The ability of surrender, the giving up of oneself to an opponent to signify an
end to hostilities, is a feature of conflict and hence of contemporary warfare, even
though its practice does vary in certain cases and under certain conditions. The act of
surrender in genocidal situations, however, is not seen by the perpetrator as a cessation
of organized conflict, since most victims are untrained civilians who have no
connections with 'opposing' or 'threatening' forces. Instead of practicing surrender as
a life-preserving strategy in conditions of warfare, under genocidal conditions
surrender is seen as the conformation of the victim's relinquishing of life to dominant
forces. As the perpetrators have associated their victims with inherent characteristics
that constitute a threat by their very existence, surrender, in the hope of preserving life,
becomes futile. As I shall discuss later, the architects of genocide procure and inculcate
the idea of 'enemy' through methods to be examined below. Yet, it is sufficient to
conclude here that the policy of eradicating a group due to inherent characteristics that
defines one's association with a group privileges racial, ethnic or class characteristics
2 It is well-known that Allied soldiers of the Second World War, for example, who fought behind enemy
lines, rarely took prisoners as they assumed that the risks of being discovered would be increased if
prisoners were taken.
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as the distinguishing "knife" upon which policies of genocide are conducted (Hintjens,
2001 ).3
Thus, the practice of surrender operates differently under conditions of
genocide than during warfare. Situating genocide in the war paradigm has convoluted
these divisions between war and genocide, as exemplified by the practice of surrender
and the asymmetry of force. In order to render new understandings about genocide I
have argued that asymmetry and surrender are two practices that reveal the distinction
between genocide and war. In the next section I will argue that the distinction between
war and genocide is more apparent when one compares them to the practice of politics.
II. Genocide in a Linguistic Paradigm
Schmitt and Clausewitz on War's Relationship with the Political
By virtue of its organization, genocide shares many characteristics with the practice of
war. Yet, as I have discussed above, genocide, unlike warfare, is not mitigated by the
act of surrender, and is instead fuelled by a condition of total domination. In this part
of the chapter I will argue that this difference in the practice of surrender entails that
genocide, unlike war, is not dependant upon dialogic communication to achieve an end
to this policy. In other words, the policy of genocide cannot be mitigated by the actions
or negotiations of its intended victims. Conversely, I will show that warfare shares an
affinity with politics which reveals why its conduct can be concluded or contained by
dialogic communication with an opponent.
The most notable contribution to the modern understanding of warfare was
developed by Carl von Clausewitz in his complied lectures On War (1976). Clausewitz
is well-know for observing that war entails a tendency to exceed any restrictions
(political and legal) placed upon it. Clausewitz's famous remark that "war is a
continuation of political intercourse by other means" is an apt characterization of war's
relation to political practice (Clausewitz quoted in Shaw, 2003: 19). War, in this view,
is fundamentally a strategic action of force, designed to achieve a particular end by the
deployment of military organisations. This description also reveals that war entails an
3 There are few cases where one might have saved themselves before the incitation of hostilities by some
form of conversion, as in the Armenian case this might mean converting to Islam (Chalk and Jonassohn,
1990). However, such acts of clemency are exceptionally rare in cases of genocide.
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instrumental logic that shares a procedural resemblance with images of governmental
forms and political practice.
Clausewitz's idea of the extension of politics as armed conflict resembles
Machiavelli's understanding of the political in The Prince. The instrumentalisation of
politics features centrally in both accounts. Machiavelli viewed politics as a place
where "ideals are centered on the issue of ends (what kind of society do we want?) and
means (how will we get it?)" (Zinn, 2001: 124). The means of violence during war are
principally directed at destroying an opponent's ability to exercise force for their own
political purposes. Thus, the use of military force is expressed in service of political
ends in order to carry through the opinions of authority. War therefore aims at the
destruction or defeat of the opponent's armed forces through the creation of battle
spaces where lethal engagement takes place.
Theories of just war, for example, argue that the use of violence can be
underpinned by political communication. The central principle of 'just war', as
Michael Walzer suggests,
looks to the restoration of the status quo ante—the way things were, that is, before the
aggression took place—with only one additional proviso: that the threat posed by the
aggressor state in the weeks or months before its attack not be included in this
"restoration" (Walzer, 1992: xvii).
This description of just warfare as "restoration" means that war is not merely the event
at which military forces collide in seeking the opponents' destruction, rather the
military actions are themselves underpinned by negotiable, and hence variable,
objectives. Walzer thus shows that there are political forces inside and outside of
warfare that "can decide...that war is limited", and can therefore conform war to the
principles ofjustice as they embrace political ends that seek restoration, in spite of the
war's inherent tendency to escalate and exceed conventional boundaries (Walzer,
1992: 24). Regardless of how just the imposition of military force might be, it does
emanate from a decision to compel its opponent to certain demands, in this case
restoration. To this extent, dialogic communication manifest as negotiation has the
possibility to limit or end conflict.
There is also another important reason why warfare is associated with politics.
A second example of war's affinity with the political is acknowledged by the jurist
Carl Schmitt. In his The Concept of the Political, Schmitt, unlike pacifist-liberal
adherents or Clausewitz, understands "the political" by "virtue of its being able to treat,
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distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis independently of other
antitheses" (Schmitt, 1996: 27). This friend-enemy antithesis is to be "understood in
their concrete and existential sense" where each side "denotes the utmost degree of
intensity of a union or separation" (1996: 26). "The political", he writes, "is the most
intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much
more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point" (1996: 29). The
confrontation between friend and enemy does not merely constitute or resemble
political action, but rather is fundamentally the condition ofpolitical action. As "War is
the existential negation of the enemy" in its most 'extreme point', the real meaning of
enmity, and thus politics, is precipitated by this condition between friend-enemy—that
is, politics is animated by the possibility of realizing physical killing (1996: 33).
Whereas Clausewitz merely understood war as an instrument of politics, Schmitt notes
its meaning/or politics:
War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the content of politics. But as an ever-
present possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic
way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior
(1996:34).
War, as an ever-present potential condition of friend and enemy, shares a close affinity
with politics by virtue of a contention. Both sides in a political dispute craft their
decisions based upon this potential to engage in physical killing. Thus, for Schmitt the
potential of war inspires and conditions political opinions and negotiations between
opposing views.
Both Clausewitz and Schmitt's theories are testimonies to the relations between
politics as negotiation and the spectre of warfare. An ironic feature of these theories is
that they reveal the influence of political action in avoiding the use of force, a point
central to anti-war doctrines. Thus, one of the reasons why anti-war positions are such
appealing doctrines is the fact that war does share this relation with political action,
and is often avoidable by other dialogic means where the contention can be mitigated
or resolved through negotiation. This relationship can be demonstrated historically by
the countless cases involving the surrender of opponents and by cases where warfare
has been avoided entirely. Nevertheless, the importance of both Clausewitz's and
Schmitt's testament to war's close affiliation with the political decision demonstrates
clearly that war is a situation of countering acts of will designed to compel through the
use of violence (Clausewitz, 1982: 103). The tendency to progressively escalate the
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scale of destruction until one can gain an unequivocal voice and determination of one's
political will is the desired end. Thus, for Clausewitz "war" remains "an act of
violence intended to compel our opponent tofulfil our will" (1982: 103).
The most crucial question that now must be faced for an understanding of war
vis-a-vis genocide is how the victor performs in the moment of complete domination
over one's 'opponent'. As I shall show in the next section, genocide does not share the
same kind of conflictual nature, which is the hallmark ofwarfare.
Genocide as Monologue
The reasons why genocidal actions differ communicatively from the political enmity
embodied in warfare is due to its monologic nature. Genocide, unlike war, is primarily
employed in the moment of complete domination where all effective resistance has
been extinguished. In this circumstance, the desire to destroy the constitution of a
group is independent of the will of those persons targeted by the perpetrators. Unlike
genocide, the act of warfare presupposes that there is a will to be compelled on behalf
of one's opponent; for the victor to exact demands from the vanquished. Genocide, on
the other hand, does away with the will-compelling situation entirely. Genocide, as the
act of total destruction of a group, denies that is there a will even to be compelled by
the demands of the victor.
The acts of violence intended to destroy a group in a situation of domination
indicates that the actions of perpetrators can never be mitigated by forms of dialogic
communication. This is due to the intention to destroy, through biological interdiction,
the living constituency of a group. As I will explore in chapter Four and Five, victims
of genocide are targeted for extermination not because of who they are individually,
but because of what their existence is understood to represent. Genocide is violence
directed at destroying the physical representations of what a group constitutes, that is
their 'nature'. Likewise, this 'nature' may also pertain to a group's history which has
conditioned its members to act in certain patterns that cannot be changed. In either
case, genocide is dependant upon a theory of action, which as Bauman observes,
proclaims that "Man is before he acts, nothing he does may change what he is"
(Bauman, 1991: 60). The Universalist (Natural or Historical) condition of
extermination entails that no amount persuasion can save those targeted by a policy of
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genocide. Thus, the desired ends are not political because the voices of those targeted
are never considered except in so far as it might expedite their own demise.
Thus, a central feature which signifies and informs the distinction between
genocide and warfare is a result of the incorrigible and non-linguistic characteristics of
'History' or 'Nature' attributed to the victims of genocide. For this reason—that these
traits cannot be augmented to accommodate the will of the perpetrating authority—
genocide does not entail a discursive dimension that is comparable within the demands
of what I have defined as the political. Genocide is thus the monologue of forced
eradication or extirpation since what is targeted is not the will-power of their position,
but the other's 'nature' that 'constitutes' their existence. Before I conclude this chapter
I would like to explore two other interwoven practices which demarcate war from
genocide.
Secrecy and Illegitimacy
There are other practices that operate differently under the conditions of war and
genocide. Unlike the general conduct of warfare, one practice concerns the element of
secrecy as an essential performative element of genocide. Whilst the detailed battle
plans ofwar are always kept secret to prevent counter attack and ensure the element of
surprise (often so fundamental to military success), the knowledge of battle is not only
commonly known, but is also a rallying point for nationalist and patriotic sentiments.
In international settings, on the other hand, the threat or expectation of warfare may be
sought to encourage predicable actions of opponents that might end conflict by
deterrence rather than by decisive military engagement. Thus, even the threat and
expectation of warfare can change the contours of potential resolutions to conflicts as
well as practical military strategies.
Knowledge of genocide, on the other hand, is always deceptively disguised as
'legitimate' conflict (warfare or emergency police action) or conducted in secret for the
reason that such actions represent the purest sense of illegitimacy to the outside world.
By keeping the action of genocide under a layer of secrecy or deception, the
perpetrating authority seeks to ensure its effective execution without compromising the
state's international standing. In other words, secrecy is necessary as the perpetrator's
expectations are that the extremity of genocidal violence against civilian populations
would likely provoke an organized response which could pejoratively influence the
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government's standing. The recent evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from the
case of Rwanda where leading "intellectuals debated strategies to counter international
criticism... to persuade the world of a series of lies" (Des Forges, 1999: 26). Diplomats
acting on behalf of the interim government in Rwanda, presented a situation to the UN
that claimed the killings were "less serious than depicted abroad" and were influenced
by "a spontaneous outburst of rage by a grief-stricken people" that was "justified by
the need of "self-defense"" (1999: 26). Following international concern about the mass
killings, authorities dispatched orders that the "killings should be brought under control
and removed out of sight" (1999: 26). Rwandan national radio immediately broadcast
that
the French were ready with further aid, but on condition that there be "no more
cadavers visible on the roads" and that people "no longer kill...while others stand
around and laugh" (Des Forges, 1999: 26).
The necessity of deceiving the world community about the genocide and veiling the
actual conduct of the government's actions within a space of secrecy, demonstrated
that should the slaughter be acknowledged as 'genocide', international condemnation
and intervening action would have more likely followed. As such, secrecy was a
necessary strategy to prevent any clear humanitarian grounds for intervention brought
about by the moral revulsion of genocide. As the case of Rwanda demonstrates,
government actions were purposely disguised as warfare to maintain this element of
secrecy, which allowed this policy to become possible.
The case of Rwanda was perhaps one of the clearest examples of how the
international community avoided intervention in a genocide. These denial strategies
indicated that if atrocities can be portrayed and disguised as 'legitimate' military-police
interventions in domestic affairs due to conflict, the architects of genocide can not only
avoid hostile actions from other states, but also elicit material and logistical support for
these operations.4 As the efforts to maintain secrecy through deception are paramount
for genocidal operations, one can make better sense of the fact that many genocides in
4 In 1965-66 the United States government supplied information ("the shooting list" of 4,000-5,000
persons) to Indonesian military forces regarding persons who were implicated as communist party
members or sympathisers (Pilger, 2003: 17-48). Some 300,000 'communists', mostly rural villagers or
ethnic Chinese, were systematically slaughtered by Indonesian military and para-military forces
following an alleged 'coup' by senior 'communist' military officials. More recently, it has been revealed
that the British government financed the sale ofHawk fighter-bombers that were used to attack East
Timor where it was acknowledged by the Australian Parliament that "Suharto's troops had caused the
deaths of at least 200,000 East Timorese, a third of the population" (2003: 23).
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the last century have been ended, not by forms of dialogical communication
(diplomacy or politics), but through the military acts of force.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored the conceptual substance of genocide in contrast to
warfare. Through an examination of specific theories of genocide, I have conceptually
distinguished genocide from warfare by highlighting the difference between specific
practices related to both concepts. My position has argued that genocide and warfare
can be analytically distinguished by exploring how these practices diverge under the
circumstances.
I first reviewed research that viewed genocide and warfare as conceptually
linked and compared two variations of this kind of argument. Both Shaw, and
Markusen and Kopf s work argued that genocide should be understood by the practices
which lead toward the fulfilment of this policy. I argued that Shaw's attempt to
understand genocide as a form of war (rather than as a sui generis phenomenon)
entertains a performative contradiction, which restated the central ideological
assumption of the perpetrators' worldview as an explanation of genocide. The flaw of
this theory assumed that genuine conflict was the inherent conceptual link between
genocide and war. I also discussed approaches that viewed war and genocide as
distinct forms of violence. I showed that on one level the arguments between both sides
failed to adequately engage each other as Horowitz's distinction was predicated upon
moral, rather than conditional concerns. Nevertheless, Rummel's earlier arguments
pertaining to the complete exclusivity between genocide and war appear to have been
not only overstated, but have also undergone reconsideration as set forth by his theory
of democide. Although his hypothesis is not conclusive regarding war and genocide, as
it does not directly address the claims of Markusen and Kopf, Rummel has provided
some helpful empirical evidence to show that the intensity of wars and revolutions do
not make intense genocides more likely.
I have argued, unlike both positions above, that there are specific practices that
can help us better distinguish between war and genocide due to how such practices
operate and diverge under specific circumstances. By explaining the practices of
surrender (first proposed by Fein), it became possible to make an informed distinction
between war and genocide because under conditions of genocide surrender would only
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expedite a policy of killing, rather than mitigate the loss of life as with war. This
divergence indicated that the genocidal situation was not one of conflict, but one more
resembling a monologic form of domination. This meant that in most cases of total
genocide, victims did nothing to instigate this form of violence that was to besiege
them. It was as if victims were the targets of a schoolyard bully who instigated
violence upon a powerless or less powerful target for reasons only derivable from
within the bully himself Thus, as an intervention akin to narcissism, genocidal violence
by an aggressive state cannot properly be called conflict, because there are no grounds
that resemble a dispute in which the victim can comply or surrender. I supported this
conclusion further by exploring the relationship between war and politics. I argued that
the each side in a conflict is seeking to impose their will through the organisation of
force. In cases of genocide, however, I showed that the will-complying situation of the
victor no loner applies because what is sought is the destruction of the other's will
itself, and not its compliance. Likewise, I have argued that genocide is distinct from
war based upon war's relationship and affinity with the political, whereas genocide
rests upon a monologic character in relation to the 'enemy-other'. This type of
distinction may point to the reasons why, when genocides are halted, they are most
commonly done so by the use of military force. Lastly, this monologic character of
genocide is evident in the organised destruction of a group's biological-reproductive
capacities regardless of the other's attempt to negotiate or surrender.
Although I agree with Leo Kuper's conjecture that "forms of genocide are too
varied, with quite different sequences of action, and great differences in scale, raising
different 'logistical problems'" to formulate a single causal scheme involving
genocide, it is possible to make meaningful distinctions in isolating genocide from
other violent practices (Kuper quoted in Markusen and Kopf, 1996: 57). In the
following chapter I will build upon these distinctions in my exploration of the
paradoxes of genocide.
Chapter Three
Paradox, Governance and Modern Genocide
Not one of them was guilty ofanything; but they belonged to a class that was guilty of
everything.
The SecondDay, by Ilya Ehrenburg1
Our great goal was the universal triumph ofCommunism, andfor the sake ofthat goal
everything was permissible—to lie, to steal, to destroy hundreds of thousands and even
millions ofpeople, all those who were hindering our work or could hinder it, everyone
who stood in the way. And to hesitate or doubt about all this was to give in to
'intellectual squeamishness' and 'stupid liberalism,' the attribute ofpeople who 'could
not see the forestfor the trees'.
An activist's reasoning of the
Ukrainian genocide2.
In this chapter I endeavour to recontextualise the study of genocide by prioritising an
examination of its paradoxes. My goal in contending with these paradoxes is to reveal
that there are quintessential aspects of genocide that require a certain kind of
explanation. I argue that the paradoxes reveal that there are practices and a set of ideas
about government which run though and link particular cases of genocide. The
existence of these genocidal patterns can be accounted for theoretically and in the
following chapters I give an explanation of what these practices are and how they
function in making genocide possible.
Within this chapter, however, I argue that the existence of two paradoxes in
particular is an indication of empirical patterns which expose the nature of what we
know as modern genocide. I analyse these paradoxes and regularities through a
detailed study of two distinct cases of genocide. I will describe these empirical traits of
genocide and explain why any theory of genocide should contend with them in the
course of explanation. I suggest that the reasons for contending with these paradoxical
aspects of genocidal practice is that such occurrences are preponderant characteristics






variables that can allow one to gain greater insight into how governments employ the
highly organised resources of the state in making such an action possible.
In the second part of the chapter I show how the paradoxes of genocide can
reveal the weakness of specific theoretical presuppositions. I expose these fallacious
assumptions within two important empirical contributions to the study of genocide.
Whilst the empirical research of these theories is important and properly qualifies an
inquiry into genocide's association with totalitarianism, I argue that their approaches
harbour fallacious presuppositions that mitigate a more adequate understanding of
genocide. In light of these paradoxes, I argue that it is possible to reveal the links
between genocide and the empirical evidence in a new and more adequate way. Thus
my goal in part two of this chapter is to show how these paradoxes can be used to
throw new light on the available empirical evidence, and identifying the specific
variables worthy of investigation.
Critically evaluating the paradoxical practices and discourses of states that
commit genocide requires the observer to make an evaluative distinction between the
actions of government officials and their self-defined motives. I will have more to say
about the particular point of motive later on in chapter Six. In this Chapter, however, I
address how the policy of genocide fits with their self-professed principles of
government. I expose these paradoxes by squaring the intensions of government with
their reactions to crises situations. I therefore conduct an immanent critical evaluation
of the motives and actions of such states by employing the perpetrators' own logic
against the actions and consequences of their own polices. This method avoids
privileging un-testable and general categorical variables presented as explanations of
genocide (like the authors examined in chapter One and Two). By focusing on the
common strategies of genocidal governments and their own self-described motives,
this method also allows one to offer descriptions without attributing unfounded
situational values (such as 'ethnic conflict') as informative of general conditions of
genocide or general values (as in materialist or psychological explanations) to specific
policy decisions. As this examination critically evaluates the values that are already
present in the situation, I believe these kinds ofmisjudgements associated with general
theory can be avoided by an immanent examination of the paradoxes of genocide.
Ultimately, this chapter establishes the foundation of my approach to describe
the essential system of ideas that shapes and enables forms of governmental action that
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makes genocide thinkable and enactable as a policy. I suggest that deciphering these
performative paradoxes reveals the links between the genocidal atrocities and
totalitarian thought that can give a better indication of these influential ideas. It is to
this that I now turn.
I. Paradoxes ofModern Genocide
The opportunity to identify and exploit the paradoxes of genocide as methodological
tool has not been fully explored by scholars of genocide. Even though some have
acknowledged and subsumed these contradictions under other 'morbid rationalities',3
the opportunity of identifying the contradictory tendencies in genocide as paradoxes
that direct and inform the course of study has been overlooked by all scholars to date.
The most important and revealing paradoxes of genocide are those which allow
the analyst to disprove and exclude specific descriptions and open the way for new
understandings about the thinking underlying genocidal practice. Although not a study
of genocide, a recent exemplar of this form of analysis has been conducted by Slavoj
Zizek in his evaluation of Stalin's self-destructive treatment of his own party. Zizek
has suggested that Stalin's purges highlights "The radical ambiguity ofStalinism" as
such secret police action "bears witness to the radical self-contradiction of the regime"
(Zizek, 2002: 128). As Zizek reveals:
This inherent tension between the stability of the rule of the new nomenklatura and the
perverted 'return of the repressed' in the guise of repeated purges of the ranks of the
nomenklatura is at the very heart of the Stalinist phenomenon: purges are the very
form in which the betrayed revolutionary heritage survives and haunts the
regime...incessant purges were not only to erase the traces of the regime's own
origins, but also as a kind of 'return of the repressed', a reminder of the radical
negativity at the heart of the regime (Zizek, 2002: 129, 128; emphasis added).
This "perverted authentic revolution" is expressed paradoxically (that is, self-
destructively) as it "compels the post-revolutionary new order to (re)inscribe its
betrayal of the Revolution within itself' in the form of arbitrary arrests and killings of
its own members (2002: 128, 129). This type of analysis, in illuminating the
ambiguous and paradoxical tensions within governmental practices, can lead to new
3
Zygmunt Bauman identifies a contradiction of the Nazi genocide not as a paradox, but as "the morbid
tendency of substituting the means for the ends" concerning the "episode of the murder ofRomanian and
Hungarian Jews, perpetrated with the Eastern front just a few miles away, and at an enormous cost to the
war effort: priceless rail carriages and engines, troops and administrative resources were diverted from
military tasks in order to cleanse distant parts of Europe for the German habitat which was never to be"
(Bauman, 1991: 106). An important paradox Bauman does identify concerns the history of racism vis-a¬
vis Nazi racism (1991: 61).
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understandings; in this case, of the Stalinist regime as not a betrayal of a revolutionary
heritage (as many leftists have claimed), but a self-contradictory perversion of
revolutionary practice (2002: 93).
The importance of addressing these paradoxes derives from their position
within the operations of governments as they encompass two key elements of
genocidal practice: the performative classification of the victim group and the
professed and genuine values of the perpetrator group. The latter paradox I characterise
as the perpetrator's paradox. This is where the state elite desires the achievement and
creation of a new social or political existence by the elimination of the other forms of
existence that directly negates the actual fulfilment of the government's own professed
vision for its ideal community. Put simply, the efforts to totally eliminate the enemy-
other actively contradicts the practical realisation of the new professed social order,
rather than serving to fulfil it. The key formula within the perpetrator's paradox
concerns the existence of a moment of self-negation that undermines a government's
professed ambitions—desires which are central to the self-identity of the state. The
policy of genocide is a self-negating intervention that qualifies the central ideals of the
state by destroying them. The perpetrator's paradox of genocide is the elimination of a
people through a language that professes to express their will. Genocide is thus an
immanent expression of the universal category that performatively contradicts it. The
paradox is that genocide is the prime expression of a universality that is also its own
negation. Revealing this paradox does not mean that this self-negation is always fatal
for the perpetrating government, even though there are cases where this has occurred.
Rather, I am suggesting that the perpetrator's paradox undermines the government's
self-identity and structure in various ways.
The victim paradox, on the other hand, occupies a different place within the
policy of genocide. Qualifying the self-contradiction with the term 'victim' entails that
this paradox involves the practical processes of selecting the targeted-other
populations. This is where the victims of genocide are portrayed as powerful and
persistent threats to the existing social and political order, yet in actuality such groups
are virtually powerless as they are excluded from any serious or determining positions
of authority, not only over their own affairs, but also over wider society. The targeting
of the other is predicated upon the notion that weak and ill-constituted peoples are
threatening agents for reasons that derive from their powerlessness. The paradox is that
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the other's incorrigible or 'natural' weakness is the pervasive-threatening component
to the current existence and future design of society—the 'power' of their
powerlessness which is to be eradicated.
As expressed within a determinist formula, the other's otherness—their
weakness and ill-constituency—is expressed as a contained, yet abstract category that
serves a vital function for the policy of genocide. This category that contains the
paradoxical image of the other, what Zizek has called the "quilting point (the Lacanian
point de capiton) of our ideological space", serves to "unify the multitude of actual
political opponents" into a single point, where this classification itself represents an
"intervention that changes the coordinates of the very field of meaning" when thinking
about the other (Zizek, 2002: 111; Zizek, 2002a: 132). A necessary component of this
unified category, indeed the capacity that makes this category function, is the power of
transcendental imagination—the Kantian category of Einbildungskraft. In order to
identify the ill-constituted enemy, one must situate this figure in a logical scheme that
expresses tangible features of the enemy which demarcates this image as a target which
demands intense confrontation. By providing the concrete instances of this enemy
figure, the other's otherness becomes the point de capiton of struggle that 'reveals' and
'solves' the problem of their ill-constituency to the point where the other's 'observable
traits' becomes synonymous with insecurity and danger.
This shift in judgement creates the potential for arguments embracing special
pleas which result in 'special treatments' that are derived from this 'threatening' other
which one must consider and confront in a fundamentally new way—that is, outside
the conventional boundaries of the existing moral and political order. Facing this
problem in a 'new way' thus entails challenging moral assumptions about the other and
overcoming any traditional restrictions that might allow society to think of this threat
in a conventional way as, for example, a society may treat a criminal or traditional
political foe. A key feature of the paradoxically caricatured and unified image of the
other is that it serves to generate social expectations that are formulated into concrete
action directed toward this new-categorical 'threat'. The technical measures involved
in adapting the moral and political order to confront this threatening other will be
explored in Chapter Four. However, the kinds of emergency interventions that extend
from the decisions of executive authority, which circumvent or suspend of the moral
and juridical order, constitute measures that attest to the fundamental premise of the
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victim paradox—that the view of the unified enemy-other is self-contradictory as the
'strength' of the other is constituted by their Natural or Historical powerlessness. This
caricatured and paradoxical figure inspires a paradigm of motivations that enable a
radicalisation of policy, all of which restricts, suspends or circumvents the traditional
appearance of the other as moral and political subject.
By revealing these paradoxes I want to suggest that they uncover something
about the practice of genocide and government which has hitherto been unexplored in
detail. The genocidal reactions to this paradoxical point de capiton not only undermine
the intentions to preserve the success of a new social order, but more importantly
reveal the underlying components of what I call, and will later explore, the logic of
genocide. These two paradoxes are an indication that there are other intentions
informing the government's policy of extermination. Once these are revealed they can
be differentiated from other traditional 'principles of rule' that will give us a clearer
picture of the motives and influences informing genocide. I suggest at the end of this
chapter that a prime motive of genocide is greatly influenced by the effort for radical
societal self-creation where the other becomes, in a perverted way, the guiding struggle
of this effort.
Finally, these paradoxes of genocide, despite being perverse and horrific, are in
keeping with the logic of modernity. As I argued in the last chapter, the policy of
genocide assumes that there is a stage of resolution where the antithesis with the other
is settled by their eradication. The modern assumption underlying this effort is that
genocide has a purpose in reshaping society within a kind of universality. As Zygmunt
Bauman famously suggested, modern genocide "is genocide with a purpose" that is set
within an instrumental logic of social engineering (Bauman, 1991: 91). The idea of the
"gardening society", where social institutions are grown or extirpated according to
bureaucratic procedures, is of a rational social order organized by the state where
"society is a subject of planning and conscious design" (1991: 91). This does not mean
that merely reforming particular elements of society are subjected to rational review,
rather the goals and plans of a gardening vision are much more radical and ambitious.
This entails that "one can and should remake the society, force it to conform to an
overall, scientifically conceived plan" (1991: 91). As Raul Hilberg has described, the
way the Nazis achieved their policy, which embraced the modern rationality of the
highest effect at minimal cost, was done through implementing progressive stages to
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the policy of genocide. He suggested that the destructive process begins with
'definition', where the individual member of the group is seen as exemplars of a
different category who demands special treatment. This stage is followed by
'dismissals and expropriations' from civic enterprise and the concentration or
segregation of the other from society. From here genocide and the confiscation of
personal effects are the final stages of annihilation. As Bauman has argued, these
"logically determined" stages form a rational sequence of means-end reasoning that
"prompts us to seek the shortest ways and most efficient means to the end" (Bauman,
1991: 191). These modern sequential stages signify "the logic of eviction from the
realm ofmoral duty" that creates mental and physical distance between the other and
the rest of society (1991: 191). Thus, for Bauman the logic of distancing, that removes
the victim from all moral concerns, situates the other as objects of technical
considerations—they become the exclusive objects of expert-bureaucracies—making
their destruction morally possible. In the two case studies I explore below, there is little
question that the hypotheses of Bauman's theory possesses valuable explanatory power
for understanding the moral and modern-technical features of genocide. Yet, the two
kinds of paradoxes that 1 expose can tell us much more about the specific motivational
logic underpinning of genocide and, later, how these logics differ radically from
politics and law.
Rwanda, 1994
In 1994, the Rwandan genocide was conducted on a scale that marks it as "the fourth
biggest genocide of the last century", claiming the lives of 800,000 people including
75% of the Tutsi population (Lemarchand, 2002a: 307). The genocidal paradoxes in
this case are embedded within a complex history emanating from colonial rule in the
Great Lakes Region of Africa. These events, which predated the seizure of power by
Hutu groups under the banner of "Hutu Power" (locally known as 'Hutu Pawa')4 and
the subsequent genocide, cannot be confined merely to the state of Rwanda. Rather, the
movement behind the 1994 genocide was interwoven with a common colonial history
4 As Des Forges reports, this term "Pawa" served as a shibboleth for civilian cells that guarded the
checkpoints or "barriers" and patrolled the villages or zones. They were highly organized into cells by
the prefecture in an operation that held records about registered residents and their personal details. The
Tutsi in these areas faced a conundrum, either they registered and exposed themselves to attack by local
security forces or they risked immediate condemnation as "Inyenzi" ('cockroaches') if they were
discovered (Des Forges, 1999: 524).
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where the question of internally displaced persons (IDP) has been a languishing, yet
intense political issue following the colonial revolutions. Under these conditions, elites,
particularly in Rwanda, have exploited the tensions between 'ethnic' groups for their
own hegemonic advantage that contributed to a policy of genocide (Mamdani, 2000).
Following the movements toward independence in the 1960s, there was a
competition for national authority in these states emanating from particular regional, as
well as ethnic centres, some of which sparked and coincided with political-ethnic
violence. One of the most severe cases occurred in Burundi in 1972 where Hutu
parties, who had attempted to take control of the government on several occasions,
were savagely slaughtered by the Tutsi-dominated army killing some 100,000 Hutus
(Des Forges, 1999: 134). In neighbouring Rwanda the dynamics of this post-colonial
power shift should be seen as internal to the newly emerging government in
geographical, rather than ethnic terms. "Regionalism", Lemarchand writes, "rather than
nativism"—the relations between ethnic groups—was the hallmark of the 1959
revolution as it placed the levers of power firmly in the hands of politicians from the
south-central region (the Banyanduga), thus paving the way for the revenge of the
northerners (Bakiga)" (2002a: 308). This fact challenges the prevailing 'age-old'
ethnic-political vision of the region as represented by popular journalism. Most
journalistic accounts following the 1994 genocide reinterpreted Rwandan pre-colonial
history as founded upon historic 'ethnic-tribal conflict' between groups5; even though
is was known that "Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were used as status terms rather than ethnic
terms...inseparable elements of a single social structure" (Hintjens, 2001: 27). Even
until the early 20th century, an individual could be both Hutu in relation to his patrons
and Tutsi in relation to his own clients, indicating that these were civic rather than
ethnic terms of identity (Lemarchand, 1996: 9-14). 'Tribalism', reported by popular
journalistic accounts, is a term that yields greater credence to the discourse of those
groups that sought to conduct genocide in order to support this ethnic worldview. It
must therefore be noted that it was not until the beating of a Hutu political activist,
Dominique Mbonyumutwa, by Tutsi political activists in 1959 that there had never
been any "systemic political violence recorded between Hutu and Tutsi—anywhere"
(Gourevitch, 2000: 59). Underlying this tribal terminology are colonial-racist
5 See the front page of The New York Times, in October 1997 that reported on "the age-old animosity
between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups" (Gourevitch, 2000: 59).
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assumptions about black Africans and their inherent unintelligent disposition towards
violence, all of which ignores the sophisticated propaganda and organizational
planning that made the genocide of 1994 possible. From the local burgomaster to the
military and ministerial officials, the genocide was an organized enterprise with the
prime purpose of extermination, practically enacted by tracking persons, monitoring
the demographics of targeted populations, determining their ethnic identity, directing
victims and perpetrators to the places of killing and organizing the disposal of corpses.
All logistical issues were confronted by government officials at varying levels in
coordinating popular participation through rewards and punishments, and financing
and supporting the bands ofperpetrators (Des Forges, 1999: 231-62).
The kind of colonial rule developed in Rwanda was derived and built upon
already existent social stratifications within society. The unique developments of the
colonial methods of rule came in the form of substantiating this stratified society using
racial distinctions. Thus, the perpetrators of genocide did not create any of the racist-
ideological language used to rally the population behind the idea of a Hutu state.
Rather they relied upon already established patterns of popular race thinking and
animated these stories that would help promote 'the Tutsi' as a point de capiton of the
Hutu dominated society. Those "defined as Hutu and Twa, according to the race
theories of the day, were lower down the evolutionary ladder than Tutsi" based on
'biological' traits, such as the tendency for Tutsi to be taller (Hintjens, 2001: 28). Even
the Catholic mission in Rwanda in 1930 viewed the Tutsi as the proper and "well¬
born" aristocracy, and were great advocates of Hutu disfranchisement (Gourevitch,
2000: 56). Despite racism being "the cornerstone of colonial policy", where identity
cards, racial theories of origin taught in schools and other political measures carved up
the Rwandan landscape in favour of the Tutsi monarchy, the missionary Monsignor
Louis de Lacger remarked in 1950 that
One of the most surprising phenomena of Rwanda's human geography is surely the
contrast between the plurality of races and the sentiment of national unity. The natives
of this country genuinely have the feeling of forming but one people (2000: 54).
Rwanda is a country where the majority of people share a common language,
Kinyarwanda, yet the colonial restructuring of Rwandan society meant that new
discourses supporting this division were a fundamental accompaniment. Thus, with
"every schoolchild reared in the doctrine of racial superiority and inferiority, the idea
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of a collective identity was steadily laid to waste" (2000: 57-8). The divisive
discourses that arose out of this situation were based on the competing claims of
entitlement and injury, which fell "on either side of the Hutu-Tutsi divide" (2000: 58).
It was only during Rwanda's revolution, which lasted from 1959 until independence in
1962, that "marked the first time in Rwandan history that civilian Tutsi were killed" in
acts of racial-political violence (Hintjens, 2001: 32). Rwanda's self image, drawn from
the experience of colonial rule, became interwoven with an ethnic view of the world
during colonial rule. Once this racial worldview was brought into a revolutionary
context where governmental authority was in contention, groups supporting justice for
the Hutu majority became influential, making the ethnic tensions between Hutu (the
majority), Tutsi and Twa (the minority) an essential element of recent political history.
Thus, race language was not an inherent force that existed prior to colonial rule which
served as an ever-present spring of latent hatred and cause of social division. Rather,
this kind of political discourse only became socially preponderant and systematically
influential in Rwanda during periods where state authority was in serious contention,
principally following the revolution and during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the
erroneousness of this perspective, racial discourse was consistently associated with
political expediency. Although this language was never completely reliable or
successful method of securing political support, this began to change following the
assassination of the president of Burundi and the military threat posed by the RPF.
With the regional struggles for and against ethnic diversity being a dominant political
issue since the rise of regional tensions associated with political issues (like
democracy, IDP, the RPF), the idea of ethnicity became a viable, yet caricatured and
disingenuous political discourse in the hands of those who sought to remake the
Rwandan state.
Strategies of Violence in Rwanda and the RPF
In order for ethnic difference to become the blade with which to divide and reshape the
human landscape of Rwandan society, the government employed a set of strategies
which could ensure the conditions necessary to employ genocide as their method of
securing a Hutu state. What will be argued below is that genocidal violence was a
method bureaucratically crafted and specifically designed to liberate an ethnic logic
from the kinds of common sense restraints and counter political interests within
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society. Genocide and other acts of mass atrocity are the methods that can add greater
realistic fervour to ethnic ideologies and political parties. Such movements exploit and
incite social divisions which were once marginal or nonexistent. This pattern of
violence challenges the line of thought that deep seated hatred of a racial form is a
necessary precondition for genocide and mass atrocity. Violence itself can thus
function to radicalise mundane social and political divisions in patterns which can
escalate given conditions where governments desire greater ethnic division as a
political strategy designed to initiate radical change.
Anti-Tutsi parties, principally the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
(CDR), opposed to any dealings with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), actively used
violence to undermine the Arusha negotiations from which they were excluded in
1992-3, allegedly at the request of the RPF. In the recent events leading up to the
genocide in 1994, many of "these extremists reacted bitterly to the provisions of the
Arusha accords which called for power-sharing and, especially, the [ethnic] integration
of the armed forces" (Jones, 1995: 243; Lemarchand, 2002b: 12). Segments of other
parties that were officially in support of the talks, such as the Democratic Republican
Movement (MDNR), were also caught up in these reactions. The use of violence by
extremist Hutu officials was an effective means at ceasing political power from every
sector of the party structure, which effectively destroyed the party system through the
creation of the "Hutu Power" movement.
Prior to the genocide these ethnically divisive events were based upon the real
historical and present threat of invasion posed by Tutsi commandos and paramilitaries.
In 1963-4, following independence, there were attempts by Tutsi commandos—the so-
called inyenzi, or "cockroaches"6—to fight their way back into the country to which
they were once driven following the revolution (Lemarchand, 2002b: 504). When a
group of armed Tutsi refugees from Burundi nearly captured the capital city in
December 1963, the response by Hutu mobs killed an estimated 5,000 Tutsi civilians in
Gikongoro prefecture. By the late 1980s the Rwandan community in exile had grown
to 600,000 people, most of which were defined as 'Tutsi' by the Rwandan government
and were systematically (politically, juridically and socially) excluded within their
6 This term became attributable to all Tutsi during the genocide. Its origin, Lemarchand reports, is a
deliberative deformation of ingenzi, meaning "brave", which applied to the post-revolutionary Tutsi
guerrillas (2002: 517).
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countries of residence.7 As this IDP situation was seen to be languishing by the exile
community, the RPF decided to return home on its own terms and sought the
overthrow of the Habyarimana regime.
This external threat by exiled 'Tutsi forces' was again realized in October 1,
1990 when RPF forces invaded from Uganda. During the counterattack by government
forces, which succeeded in pushing the RPF forces back towards the border, with the
help of foreign military support from France, Belgium and Zaire, the government
sought to use the invasion to elicit broad base support from the Flutu community at the
expense of the Tutsi principally through the use of force. In a strategy reminiscent of
the 1960s, the government, on October 4, 1990, faked an attack on the capital and
attributed it to RPF infiltrators and Hutu "accomplices"; even through RPF forces were
45 miles north of Kigali. Under the pretext of national security, "the government began
making massive arrests...eventually imprisoning 13,000 people" extrajudically and
without charge, holding many of them for several months (Des Forges, 1999: 49).
Instead of effectively dividing this opposition along ethnic lines, these arrests
reinforced the image of the Habyarimana government as a repressive regime and
served to unite the government's political opposition. Despite this complication, the
government actively supported Hutu extremist elements in other political parties and
the youth militia, known as the Interahamwe, through the military. This strategy of
support and reaction to non-existent domestic threats was only to become fully
implemented later by the Hutu Power movement and the interim government during
the genocide. Even though some of these executive police measures backfired, they
revealed the government's concerted effort to liberate ethnic language in a way that
could be widely used to legitimate violent forms of intervention for the purposes of
societal design.
The assassination of Burundi President Ndadaye at the hands of Tutsi military
officials in his own army and other military operations by the RPF, were significant
developments that greatly influenced the party structure. Many saw these actions as a
7 Tanzania was the only exception to this where the government actively encouraged their integration
into the local population. Cf. Des Forges (199: 48).
8 Not all RPF forces were Tutsi, in fact its leader, Colonel Kanyarengwe, was a Hutu serving under
Habyarimana before defecting after threats that he was plotting against the president.
9 Domestic and international pressure forced the government in June 1991 to ensure political and civil
rights and subsequently made multiple political parties legal that argued for a power sharing coalition
government.
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betrayal of any attempt at uniting Hutu and Tutsi peacefully and democratically, and
which further fuelled the radical elements with the social structure that embraced
violence and genocide as a viable 'solutions' to these divisions. These events were also
evidence that the ethnic divisions emanated and ran through not only sectors of
Rwandan society, but also throughout other countries in the Great Lakes Region. Once
Habyarimana's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994, killing everyone on board
including the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and other senior officials of
Habyarimana's government, the killing of Tutsi and other civilians occurred shortly
after, spearheaded by elite government forces under the command of Bagosora, the
Minister of Defence—a leading supporter of the Hutu Power movement. From this
point the government got support from various sectors of society (for example,
businessmen and clergy) and widened the genocidal violence by eliminating senior
national and local officials opposed to the killing, in an attempt to control the entire
state for the purpose of genocide. This executive and murderous reaction to the
President's assassination served the Hutu Power contention that 'Tutsi unity' with the
RPF was behind the attack. In turn, government forces realised that selective
government atrocity against Tutsi would provoke violent reactions from the RPF. This
kind of violence and counter reaction would add prima facie plausibility to the victim
paradox which claimed that the Tutsi were 'genuine' threats because of their secret
alliance with the RPF, and that when Tutsi were attacked the RPF would rise to their
defence. Once those in control of the government accepted the insolubility of the
'ethnic' problem which they themselves had procured by promoting ethnic divisions
and vilifying the RPF, the imprisonment and ethnic killings under the Habyarimana
Presidency could be seen by the population as 'confirmations' of the existence of Tutsi
and Hutu 'conspirators'. Thus, after the assassination of the President on April 6, 1994,
the strategy of systematic violence was an established pattern that served to confirm
the tenets of the Hutu Power ideology which had consistently predicted that secret
Tutsi forces would seek to violently undermine the Hutu state.
In spite of the genuine threat posed by the organised and disciplined RPF forces
in Northern Rwanda and Uganda, Rwandan Tutsis were a well-integrated part ofmany
local communities and possessed distant or no actual connections with these military
forces. This is to say that the RPF did not represent the 'Tutsi community' as the Hutu
Power propaganda of "Tutsi unity" had openly proclaimed, and thus acted in terms of
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this ethnic division as a whole (Des Forges, 1999: 73). Yet, the genocide was
conducted and based upon the language that viewed Tutsi as a serious threat should
Tutsi rule return in the wake of an RPF invasion. This expectation meant that the
genocide targeted those socially powerless sectors of society to challenge the
clandestine threats which would align with the invading RPF. The victim paradox in
this case was represented in a narrative based upon the retributive notion of 'the return
of the repressed', and was a central tenet of the Hutu Power movement that enabled the
strategic implementation of genocide. Fuelled largely by the external military force
posed by the RPF, the acts of violence against Tutsi before and during the genocide
were in part acts of clarification that functioned to divide people along the prophecy of
'Tutsi unity' that could be only addressed by genocidal violence guised as 'self-
defense'.
The Myth of 'Tribal Conflict' and 'Tutsi Unity'
The concept of retributive genocide, used by many genocide scholars to describe this
event, has the effect of characterizing the Rwandan genocide as one of mutual conflict
between ethnic groups. Yet, the fact remains that the majority of Tutsi killed in the
1994 genocide were rural villagers almost indistinguishable from their Hutu
neighbours and with no links to rebel groups and other recalcitrant political
organizations10. Like the majority of victims in other genocides, common Tutsi and
their 'Hutu accomplices' were politically powerless in relation to the Hutu-dominated
state, even though they were killed under the pretext that they were or would be
aligned with the 'Tutsi invaders'. The reason why Rwanda is considered by some to be
an exemplar of a 'retributive' genocide is to suggest that genuine and pervasive group
conflict caused the policy of genocide. By positing this adversarial premise at the
centre of such descriptions one is straying dangerously close to representing and
legitimating the 'civil defense' discourse employed by the Hutu Power movement:
In the case of Rwanda, to embrace the idea that the civil war was a free-for-all—in
which everyone is at once equally legitimate and equally illegitimate—is to ally with
Hutu Power's ideology of genocide as self-defense (Gourevitch, 2000: 182-3)
As retributive genocide means "to eliminate a real or potential threat", one must
assume that ethnic Tutsi were also out for mutual revenge as they realistically
10 The RPF was not a domestic mass movement and had only 600 'cells' of 6 to 12 people throughout
the country that declared their support of the party, most were based in Kigali.
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constituted a threat to other groups (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990). For this reason, the
Hutu movement, echoing the positions of many in the government, had to portray the
notion of 'Tutsi Unity' as being constitutive of Tutsi civilian life. This propaganda
posited the myth of Tutsi unity as a clannishness that "facilitated their conquests in the
past" and enabled them to influence the present political situation (Des Forges, 1999:
73). The Hutu propagandists referred to these clannish relations interchangeably,
associating them with Tutsi ethnicity, the RPF and past colonial rule. This 'unity'
propaganda also appeared in educational, national-economic and even military matters,
where it proclaimed that the Tutsi 'infiltrators' have conspired to monopolise profitable
trade licences and sell-out military secrets to the invaders—the latter accounting for the
military success of the RPF in the North. The Hutu Power movement and the
government would have no justification for a concerted ethnic policy without the
image of 'Tutsi unity' extending from colonial history and across national boarders.
Although I have little space to address the diversity of the anti-Tutsi propaganda, what
I have documented here is that there existed a clear strategic desire and ideological
need to describe the Tutsi as a unified 'ethnicity' inhabiting the clandestine social
networks that are said to have political and ethnic goals which run against the existence
of a Hutu state.
Unfortunately, there are shortfalls associated with classifying Rwanda as a
retributive genocide that concerns the manner in which the other is classified. Despite
the laudable effort to describe the kind of genocidal motive employed by perpetrators,
the concept of "retributive genocide" employs the tenets of'Tutsi unity' uncritically by
suggesting that this category involves an effort "to eliminate a real or potential threat"
(Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 29). By uncritically accepting the existence of unified and
pervasive ethnic divisions within their category, the 'retributive genocide'
performative contradicts the effort to explain and prevent genocide since it adds
validity to an ideological tenet of the perpetrators which was used to facilitate the
extermination of the victims. Thus, those who claim that Rwanda was a 'retributive
genocide' effectively repeat a fundamental tenet of Hutu Power—that Tutsi unity with
the RPF genuinely constituted a real or potential threat to Hutu-Rwandan society. In
other words, the point in need of emphasis here is that civilian Tutsi and other Hutus
that were labelled as 'conspirators' were never potential or actual threats to the
Rwandan state and had no universal affiliation with the invading RPF.
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Retributive genocide, as Chalk and Jonassohn and others have used this
typological concept, harbours the perpetrators narrow motivational characterization of
the situation. Yet, recent evidence has suggested that motivation in the Rwandan
genocide, as with Nazi Germany, was highly stratified according to where the
perpetrator stood in the social order of destruction, whether as common citizens or
senior government officials. In other words, there is not one single identifiable motive
behind the killings. As Lemarchand reports,
The killings cannot be reduced to any single motive. The circumstances that caused
Hutu to become killers differed from prefecture to prefecture, sometimes from
commune to commune...What remained constant throughout the killings were the
sustained efforts made by prefects and burgomasters to mobilize the masses behind the
killing machine...(Lemarchand, 2002b: 514).
Recent empirical evidence by Verwimp seems to confirm Lemarchand's hypothesis
that personal motivations were diversified, but in a politically economic manner
characteristic of certain regions in Rwanda. Amongst the peasantry, those most likely
to become perpetrators in the genocide were males who resided in rural areas and made
their living from non-agricultural means (renting land) and who had a female to run the
household (Verwimp, 2005: 317). In socio-economic terms, it was more likely that
households who made their living as employers/landlords and those quasi-landless
employees had higher participation rates than did middle-sized farmer households.
This indicates that two personal motivational logics were operating in regions where
the government mobilized the killings: the landlords "had something to defend" in
their economic wealth, whilst the poorer landless workers "could expect to gain from
participation" by acquiring Tutsi property (2005: 319). In a greatly overpopulated
nation, land was a much desired asset by those in the "rank and file" genocidaires
(2005: 319).
Articulating the issues of security (for the propertied class) and property (for
the un-propertied) relinquishes the presumption that perpetrator motivations are always
attributable to ideological goals and opens the way for a critical examination of the
sociology of motivation—how motives are employed and function in relation to
collective action." As I will discuss later, these vocabularies of motive have a very
'1 Recent evidence from Berschel's (2001) study of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) indicated
that "mid-level facilitators and those of Wehrmacht and other "shooters" show an inverse proportion of
ideological commitment as one moves down the levels of involvement" indicating amongst the lower
ranks an "increased proportion ofmotivational complexity" (Browder, 2003: 495). This recent evidence
73
important function in securing consensus for situated actions. The Hutu ideology of
'self-defence' may be seen as a motive attributable to the senior officials of the
Rwandan government and other specific sectors of society, but cannot be attributed
categorically to Rwandan society with any empirical certainty.
To uncover an underlying logic of motivation for genocide demands that the
typological characterisations like retributive genocide must be critically qualified to
specific sectors of Rwandan society. The error of such concepts derives from an
assumption of a single monopoly of motivation which is preserved by concepts such as
"retributive genocide". As I have shown, social motivations towards genocide are
highly stratified according to one's position in the organizational structure of
government and place in the economic division of labour. Whilst revealing the political
economy of motivation is only one way of uncovering the motivational diversity, it is
sufficient to show that such typological categories harbour fallacious presuppositions
of 'Tutsi unity' or 'tribal conflict' that are performatively contradictory as they repeat
the discourse of the perpetrators. Now that these contentions have been preliminarily
identified in the case of Rwanda, I can detail the paradoxes of this specific genocide.
Paradoxes of the Hutu State
The Hutu Power movement was a stratified national conglomerate of party politicians,
military leaders, intellectuals, and civilians who sought the ethnic division of Hutu and
Tutsi in political affairs. For this perspective, a cooperative relationship between
ethnicities always harboured and masked the "age-old" potential of Tutsi domination
that could never be fully relinquished even by democracy and political power-sharing
(Des Forges, 1999: 105). This perspective surmised that there would always exist the
potential for a violent return of Tutsi domination. This was why the movement gained
one of its greatest ideological confirmations after the killing of Burundi President
Ndadaye by Tutsi army officers in 1993. As a democratically elected President,
Ndadaye was seen by many Hutu as a moderate-unifier who appointed both Hutu and
Tutsi to government posts. To some fervently pro-Hutu parties in Rwanda, Ndadaye's
death signified and reinforced the expectation that that no genuine peace could ever be
secured between Hutu and Tutsi. The assassination was taken as a sign that what has
happened in Burundi (allegedly at the hands of the RPF) could also happen in Rwanda.
can be seen to complement an existing body of research on Nazi battalions that conducted the genocide
for personal utilitarian reasons.
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Only days after Ndadaye's assassination, the movement drew widespread support and
urged citizens to search for the "enemy among us here" to prevent any
counterinsurgency from the Tutsi dominated RPF that had invaded from the North the
previous year (Des Forges, 1999: 138). Thus, the raison d'etre of this stratified
conglomerate of 'Hutu unity' was based upon the fear of Tutsi domination posed by
the RPF. Whilst Rwandan President Habyarimana had hoped such an ethnic division
i j
would add to his support, ~ it was never certain that this would be the case. As the
government sought to further radicalise the political situation along ethnic lines, many
in the movement thought that any negotiations with the RPF were disingenuous to the
idea of 'Hutu ethnicity'. Amid the threat posed by the RPF and the languishing Arusha
negotiations, the movement began to consolidate its power from across the party
spectrum, essentially reorganizing the entire party structure "around the two opposing
poles ofHutu and Tutsi" (1999: 139). The movement's organizational capabilities also
extended well beyond political activities and (secretly before the genocide) supported
the civilian para-military organisation called the interhamwe. Sponsored and organized
by anti-Tutsi segments within the military and by Colonel Bagosora, the Minister of
Defence, the movement began to organise the bureaucratic and technical
responsibilities for what became known as the "civilian" or "popular self-defense" that
was to conduct the genocide (1999: 140). These efforts reflected its desire not to gain
1 T
control of the state, as many scholars have assumed , but to amalgamate the
movement and state14 so that they became part of a single organization dedicated to
one cause—the creation of a Hutu society.
Despite all its support from the radical-right and its prominent place in
Rwandan politics, the movement's core contention rested on the victim paradox—the
'threatening', yet weak and ill-constituted subject who used these traits to secretly
undermine the possibility of a Hutu state. One of the central tenets of the Hutu Power
movement under the banner of 'Tutsi unity' was that the internal 'threat' of domestic
Tutsi conspirators—like those who assassinated President Ndadaye—posed a serious
security risk that undermined the economic and political standing of the nation. These
12 In late 1993, Habyarimana "sought to assure ministerial posts for representatives of the PL Power and
MDR Power wings and to get a seat in the transitional assembly for the CDR"—all radical anti-Tutsi
parties (Des Forges, 1999: 141).
13 Cf. Harffand Gurr(1998).
14 This amalgamation between party and state or movement and state is characteristic ofmost totalitarian
governments. Cf. Arendt (1968: 419).
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"accomplices" were considered by many in the movement to be aligned with the RPF
and would take military action to undermine the predominately Hutu government. It
was this powerless disposition which, they claimed, masked the 'fact' that Tutsi would
seek to dominate Rwanda and other states along racial lines. The paradox was that the
Tutsi's de facto powerlessness gave rise to this ideology which depicted Tutsi as the
Other with a powerful advantage since it allowed them to secretly organise and strike
at the society when it would be most successful at securing Tutsi rule. I will later
explore the methods which were alleged to bring back Tutsi domination. However, it is
important to clarify that in positing such a secret unity amongst ethnic Tutsi and the
RPF, the movement's entire ideological contention rested upon the portrayal of this
paradoxical notion of 'Tutsi unity' and actively sought to interpret any anti-
government action within this 'ethnic' paradigm. This paradox helped to inform not
only Hutu ideology to acquire a firm public foothold, but also influenced the shape of
tactics that would enable the genocide along these ideological lines.
To prompt another RPF invasion and to convince the international community
that the troubles were ethnic in nature, organised killings of Tutsi civilians by segments
of the military was seen as a key strategy that could form the pretext to the genocide.
The expected reaction from the RPF would signify a 'unity' between a genuinely
threatening military force and a secretly ill-constituted ethnicity poised to unite with
them, thus legitimating the prophecy of 'Tutsi unity' and the threat of the RPF. On
December 3, 1993, senior officers from the Rwandan Armed Forces wrote to General
Dallaire, commander of UN troops, informing him of this strategy (1999: 145). The
notion of the domestic 'Tutsi accomplice' provided the vision which guided these
kinds of tactics that were influential in disguising the genocide under the cloak of war
by making the genocide appear like a 'legitimate' military action in a country divided
by an 'ethnic' civil war. In a chilling forecast of the genocide on April 4, 1994,
Bagosora told people that "the only possible solution for Rwanda would be the
elimination of the Tutsi" and that "if the RPF attacked successfully, the Rwandan
forces had plans for guerrilla warfare against them" (1999: 172). Reminiscent of Nazi
and Stalinist 'prophecies' about expected enemy provocations, Bagosora's statements
reflected a concerted governmental strategy to create their own 'legitimate' grounds for
genocide as 'self-defence'. When the President's plane was shot down on April 6,
1994, Bagosora and other senior officials, in favour of 'elimination', used the event as
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an excuse to legitimate their policy of systematic killings in a declared state of
emergency imposed immediately following the assassination. Even though the
assassination of the two Presidents has never been properly investigated or solved it
was assumed by many that the RPF was behind the attack. As I will examine in detail
later, this constant effort to relate all anti-government action against the 'Tutsi
conspirator' contributed to a general strategy the propagandists called "accusation in a
mirror", meaning that the perpetrators "should impute to enemies exactly what they
and their own party are planning to do" (1999: 66). With a strategy that sought to
manipulate the expectations of their mass audience, the movement created the
groundwork to legitimate the organisational measures of 'self-defense' which used the
powerlessness condition of 'the Tutsi' to depict them as enemy infiltrators in unity
with the invading RPF.
The second paradox of the genocide derived from the efforts to eliminate a
nonexistent domestic enemy whilst the genuine threat to the Rwandan state derived
from the invading RPF. Whilst the RPF invaded, the Rwandan military fought, in its
own view, a divided conflict. On the one hand, its forces were conducting and
supporting mass killings of Tutsi across the country and targeting specific influential
authorities that were opposed to the internal 'self-defence' operation. These included
leaders of the various parties who rejected Hutu Power, members of the judiciary,
human rights activists, clergy, journalists and other leaders of civic society. Ordered by
Bagosora, and aided by detailed information of names, addresses and by the general
broadcasts on national radio, elite battalions and recruited civilians sought out these
individuals throughout the country with lists in hand. The military, national police and
militia all manned barriers and undertook patrols to restrict the movement of fleeing
Tutsi. Once tactics of internal security, these barriers and patrols were used to restrict
free movement for the purposes of conducting genocide, which made it easier to
organise the Tutsi population and apprehending those they sought. Under these
conditions, every aspect of civilian life was scrutinized: regular patrols searched homes
and had contacts with informers "who had noticed suspicious indications, such as
unfamiliar clothes hung out to dry in a backyard or unusual kinds or quantities of food
being purchased" (1999: 214). This network demanded considerable effort from
military and paramilitary forces that directed much of the killing. Documents from the
Minister of the Interior, obtained by Des Forges, indicate that the demands of the
77
genocide were not being met by the military concerning particular areas as
reinforcements were needed (1999: 219-220). This indicates the efforts of the military
and police in aiding the killings were placing great demands upon the war effort in the
East of the country. It also signified that these operations were centrally organised by
the new interim government under the command of Bagosora. Whilst the government
forces and militia were conducting domestic genocide, the army was also contending
with an invading army from the North.
On the other genuine end of the conflict, the Rwandan government faced a
well-trained and experienced Rwandan Patriotic Army that made great advances in the
end ofApril 1994, taking Byumba in the northeast on the 21st, Rwamagana on the 27th
and Rusumo on the 29th. Paradoxically, it was following these great losses that
authorities ordered a new large-scale wave of killings against Tutsi at Bisesero and
other cites. More tragically, those who were spared during the early days of the
genocide, such as women and children, were now targeted in mid-May. Yet, the RPA
faced poorly organised resistance, except around Kigali, and routed government forces
by July 1994. This invasion ended the genocide and in some cases prevented and
interrupted killings15 as they advanced south down the eastern side of the country and
then swept westward. These dramatic advances by the RPF in securing the entire
country and the organisational effort of the genocide were not coincidental factors that
determined the course of the war and the survival of the Rwandan state. In fact, it was
the conduct of the genocide, undertaken by the government, which posed the greatest
risk to the survival of the state since its conduct instigated a war where its forces were
divided between organising domestic mass killings and confronting an invading army.
Pursuing genocide at the expense of the security of the state proved to be a fatal
paradox which revealed that the priorities of the government were interwoven with its
ideological commitment to the doctrines of Hutu Power. Rather than achieving what
was necessary in order to secure the standing of the state by confronting their actual
threats, the government, taking advantage of the impending security situation, pursued
a genocidal policy that sought to fulfil what they thought was ideologically correct—
that the 'Tutsi' were actually united against the Rwandan-Hutu state. Although
Lemarchand correctly reports that the genocide "came about as a planned, organized
13 The war that ended the genocide saved tens of thousands from certain death, yet the RPF itselfwas
also accused of killing civilians and other violations of human rights.
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and coordinated response of Hutu extremists to the very real threats posed to the Hutu
state by the RPF", this should be qualified with the vital proviso that the genocide was
a perverse and paradoxically fatal reaction that undermined the military reaction to the
genuine threat posed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (Lemarchand, 2002a: 309). In
summary, my argument is that the genocide had a direct and fatal effect upon the war
effort which paradoxically secured the fate of the interim government.
Ukraine, 1930-1933
Largely beginning in late 1929 and becoming acute in 1933, at least 10-15 million
people (mostly rural peasants and other 'recalcitrant' individuals) perished by
starvation, disease or execution in rural regions and in the vast gulag archipelago—5
million in the Ukraine alone, or as much as 25% of the rural population (Gouldner,
1980: 229; Conquest, 1986: 249). In a country of "2.5 million industrial workers, 1.5
million soldiers, 1 million bureaucrats...and 100 million peasants", attempts to
reorganize Soviet society following the revolution against the Whites, which as
Trotsky noted, forced the Reds to "plunder all Russia" to ensure (and quite literally
feed) its survival, meant that the new government fought for its existence "in a
countryside ever more denude of sympathy for it" (Gouldner, 1980: 215). As a
consequence of the civil war, "the Soviet regime rapidly lost most of the good-will it
enjoyed among the peasant masses" due to the ravages of the war itself and the
"inexorable necessities of food procurement" (1980: 215).
The divide between the rural population and the party leadership was also
intensified by the composition of the party structure. This cleavage between the party
leadership, composed of mostly highly educated revolutionary intellectuals from urban
origins, and the peasant rural majority, was viewed by the urban elites as something
akin to a colonial situation. This "internal colonialism", as Gouldner suggests,
witnessed the mobilisation of the resources of state authority "against colonial
tributaries in rural territories" and imposed unfavourable and unequal demands upon
this sector of society in terms of capital allocations, price controls, taxes, access by
visitors, military conscription, and access to education (1980: 216). These conditions
were so unpopular that three successive Soviet governments were installed in the
Ukraine between 1918-20, "each of them arriving in the wake of a Red Army
invasion" (Conquest, 1986: 42). The first two governments were expelled by rival
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forces only after they had shown a total incapacity to gain local support. Significant
Ukrainian resistance to Soviet authority was a sign to Lenin that "without serious, or
serious-looking concessions to Ukrainian national feeling, their rule would remain
rootless and precarious", particularly in the countryside where such sentiments were
strongest (1986: 42).
Much of this unpopular sentiment arose not long after the revolution. On 11
February 1919, Lenin began the forced requisition of grain surpluses in the Ukraine as
a way to transfer the burden of even more excessive requisitions from Russian
peasantry. Yet, it soon became apparent that such actions were counterproductive as
they created mass revolts16 in areas where national sentiment was strongest. The failure
of this policy was evaluated and attributed to a disregard of Ukrainian nationalism and
language, and it was recognised that any intervention "which ignored this too
ostentatiously was doomed to be considered by the population as a mere imposition" of
Russian domination (1986: 39). However, following Stalin's assent to power, the
course of this policy to communicate to regional sentiments would be fundamentally
reversed. Lenin's vision of an abandonment of national divisions and a merger of
socialist regions—in line with Marx's idea of the "dissolution of all classes,
nationalities...within present society"—took on a radically new form under Stalin
(Marx and Engels quoted in Conquest, 1986: 31).
Throughout its history, the party sought to paradoxically achieve 'classlessness'
in rural areas by encouraging class conflict. They attempted to align the rural peasantry
with revolutionary ideals by encouraging class warfare against the old capitalist
hierarchies in the countryside by attempting to mobilize rural poor and middle peasants
against the property owners known as the Kulaks.17 When this failed, attempts were
made to ally these segments of rural society under the hegemony of the proletariat and
thus, under Lenin, "enlarge the peasantry's importance in the theory and practice of
Bolshevism" (Gouldner, 1980: 216). Under Stalin, however, this policy was reversed
to the extent that it treated and systematically transformed "the whole peasantry into a
16
Conquest reports that "the result was 93 Ukrainian revolts in April 1919, and 29 in the first halfof
May.. .In all some 300 seem to have occurred in the short period from April-July" (Conquest, 1986: 38).
17 The local rural "Committees ofUnwealthy Peasants" in the Ukraine created by the Soviets to recruit
domestic support, described the Kulak as follows: "in the Ukrainian villages power really resides in the
hands of the wealthy peasants, the kulaks, who by their very nature are implacable foes of the proletarian
revolution' and who were 'organized and armed to the teeth'" (Committee quoted in Conquest, 1986:
40).
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legally and factually discriminated class, the lowest in the social order" (Moishe Lewin
quoted in Gouldner, 1980: 217). When forced agricultural collectivisation began in
1929, it also coincided with Stalin's declaration on 27 December 1929 that their aim of
"the liquidation of the kulaks as a class" would be a necessary element in creating this
new 'agricultural' system that would fuel the great industrial expansion (Stalin quoted
in Conquest, 1986: 117). As I shall now show, the Kulak, as represented by their
backwardness and ill-constituted agricultural production, formed the point de capiton
which inspired the drive to 'modernise' rural society.
Kulak as 'villain'
The imposition of the new universality of class consciousness in the Soviet agricultural
system meant the positing of class divisions in a segment of society where there was
little stratification. This daunting and recalcitrant mythical figure of the Kulak was a
clear fabrication and "was essential to the Party's view of the villages" as it signified
subjects who richly profited from small forms of privatisation who actively subverted
the attempts to collectivise the agricultural system through destroying or hiding grain
and other acts of revolt or sabotage (1986: 74). The term was first deployed by Lenin,
as a strategy to 'proletarianise' the countryside by characterising an alleged rural
'class' of peasants that was assumed to be the source of discontent expressed towards
the urban-dominated Party. Early on attempts were made to clarify or correct this
semantic distortion by Lenin. The Commissar for Agriculture, A. P. Smirnov, pointed
out "that the kulak was...a pre-revolutionary exploiting type which had now virtually
disappeared" (1986: 74). Nevertheless, it was determined in the official Statistical
Handbook USSR 1928 that 5.2% of the rural population could be characterised by this
term. A year later the Council of the People's Commissars produced a formal
definition of the kulak farm:
it required hired labour; or had a mill or...similar establishment; or hired out
agricultural machinery or premises; or had members engaged in commercial activities
or...other income not from work -specifically including the priesthood (1986: 100).
Under these definitions "almost any peasant could have been penalized" by this
classification and hence became a target for repression and elimination (1986: 100).
These nationally determined rules were "activated by the most eager Stalinist at the
provincial level" who could also modify these definitions to suit local conditions
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(1986: 101). This gave local authorities the ability to act within the general principles
of Stalin's orders to "liquidate" the kulak class. The facts of the situation, however,
proved to be quite different to a 'class' situation described by the party. This 'class
character' of the countryside, where the 'rich kulak' exploiter made a profitable living
from hired labour simply did not exist. As Conquest reports, "the most prosperous
peasants in 1927 had two or three cows and up to ten hectares of sowing area, for an
average family of seven people", and "the richest peasant group received only 50-56%
1 8
greater income per capita than the lowest" (1986: 75). A key point to be gleaned here
is that those earning this modestly higher income comprised 3-5% of peasant-'Kulak'
households and was responsible for around 20% of the total grain production. This
means that the party sought to liquidate the most productive segment of Ukrainian
agriculture. The elimination of the 'Kulak', the mythical figure that obstructed the
efforts of the new Soviet system by his selfish desire to maintain wealth through the
old ill-constituted class system, principally entertained a view of the Ukrainian
peasantry as being backward—that is, feudally stratified. The kulak was, far from
being a wealthy class-based profiteer, the point de capiton invented by the Soviet state,
which had universal applicability to any rural farmer who was part of the homogeneous
system of traditional agriculture. Unfortunately, these facts about the rural economy
did not signify to the Party that the problem with grain production was with their
policy of 'collectivisation', but rather with recalcitrant groups of 'kulaks' that were
subverting the state's efforts for their own personal aggrandisement. Thus, the first
mass effort to 'dekulakize' the countryside in 1929 directly impacted agricultural
production as this cohort or 'class' had significantly contributed to the economic
production of the time and thus held the greatest potential of increasing the overall
agricultural productive capacity to meet the demands of the state.
Genocide and the Prophecy ofthe Kulak
The methods of kulak liquidation were brutal and economically anti-utilitarian in
nature. The figures from various districts reveal that the majority of those deemed a
'kulak' were "shot, imprisoned or deported" even in the early stages of the campaign.
When the programme expanded to include entire households and their property,
government, the militia and "Party activists were [issued arms and] mobilized to assist
18 In the Ukraine, the situation was even less stratified where "these wealthy exploiters had therefore
averaged 1.4 horses, 1.8 cows, and 1.2 sheep per household!" (Conquest, 1986: 123).
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in the actual deportations" (1986: 122). In the second wave, conducted in 1931, more
secret police measures were employed where government police agents, disguised as
tax investigators, were sent out to gather information on these 'wealthy' peasants. As a
result many began to sell their property or try and flee with their cattle to other regions,
but to little effect. For farmers, the most common method of resistance was self-
destructive: either peasants destroyed their property or themselves. All such self-
destructive action, however, strictly functioned to confirm that the self-interested
'kulak' did in fact exist, although in some clandestine form, which was merely
'revealed' by this form of government intervention. As one farmer in the Ukrainian
village of Pidhorodne said in 1931 "We worked all out lives for our house, you won't
have it. The flames will have it!" (1986: 124). As some 'kulaks' began to flee these
conditions they tried to join the growing urban labour force that resulted from Stalin's
crash industrialization policy. The government attempted to stop this exodus by
common police measures and later by the introduction of internal passports in 1932 to
"purge kulaks, criminals, and other anti-social elements from the cities" (1986: 124).
The clear message of these measures was that the kulak was expected to passively
remain and await their fates in their villages, as a subject who receives directives, but
who is never supposed to initiate them.
In the Ukraine, for example, the inability to meet the grain requirements in
1931-2 meant that there was a failure, not in the new Soviet system of agriculture or its
faulty "biological yield" measurement that exaggerated expected production over 40%,
but in the Ukrainian Communist's ability to solve the 'problem' with the kulak and
other recalcitrant farmers who failed to supply the necessary produce to the Soviet state
(1986: 186). As all grain and cattle became state property under the collectivised
system, anyone who interfered with its production was to be considered 'enemies of
the people.' The decree of 7 August 1932, the "revolutionary legality" as Stalin called
it, clearly states the formal sanctions applied to anyone of this category; most were shot
unless there were extenuating circumstances (1986: 225). In January 1932 Stalin had
ordered the delivery target to be set at 7.7 million tons but was reduced to 6.6 million
tons of grain (out of a total of 14.7 million tons), a level which the Ukrainian
leadership knew was unrealistic (1986: 222). When only 71.8% of the grain was
delivered, after all the Party's terror procurement methods that robbed the peasants of
their food reserves, Stalin and the All-Union Central Committee charged the Ukrainian
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Party with a "lack of class vigilance" against the peasant and proceeded to further
'Bolshevise' the local party.
As the famine spread in the Ukraine in early 1933, the policy of fighting the
class enemy was further extended in the existing collectivised farms and was
accompanied by another grain procurement from rural areas. The agents of the State
and Party, who received good rations and were unaffected by the famine, went from
house to house searching for hidden grain. The lower rank and file 'thug' brigades
often beat peasants and searched their premises with steel rods to search for buried
grain. All tools used by local peasants to mill grain locally were confiscated from
people who were clearly starving. In some areas watchtowers were erected in the fields
and manned by armed guards to prevent theft of state produce.
The confrontation with the reality of the famine conditions meant that those
who represented this perspective were also targeted. Party officials who failed to "fulfil
the plan" were either accused as being the "real thieves" or removed from their posts
and replaced by more 'reliable' men (1986: 229). Even the entire staff of the
Meteorological Office was arrested on a charge of falsifying weather forecasts in order
to damage the harvest. In five months of 1932, 25-30% of the agricultural middle
management was arrested. All failures to meet the quota, including failures in adequate
storage of crops and failure to harvest, which also resulted from incapacities of the
agricultural system itself, were attributed in official reports to acts of 'sabotage'. So
poorly organised was this requisition effort that the seized crops often rotted in the
poor storage facilities under armed guards. Such events did, on occasion, cause local
revolt, but only before the famine spread in early 1933. Those responsible for
supporting these obstructive actions were arrested, then usually deported or shot (1986:
225-36). When the failure to fulfil the expected crop procurement was confronted, the
government purged local officials and elements of the party, while extending the
forced requisition against the rural peasants.
This economically self-destructive genocidal policy directed at the peasantry
sought to fundamentally reorganize Soviet society according to new principles of
socialized production. With the enemy category openly defined by local officials, and
soon to be eliminated, the way to forced collectivisation could begin through a
condition which engendered a totalitarian passive subjectivity. The ideal subject of
Stalinist agriculture, and of the entire state, was the self-sacrificing defendant in the
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show trials—one who would renounce any notion of subjective self-interest in service
of the state. From the Party's perspective, this policy would mean that the
requisitioning of agricultural produce, so vital for industrial growth, would no longer
be mediated by the rich 'kulak' or recalcitrant rural peasants imbued with Ukrainian
national sentiment and selfish capitalist desires. More importantly, it was expected that
this new "intensive Soviet agriculture would produce more effectively than the old, and
thus yield a bigger surplus" due to the reorganisation of labour around the mechanising
of agricultural production (Gouldner, 1980: 221). As Stalin claimed, "the simple
pooling of the peasant implements of production has produced results of which our
practical workers never dreamed" (Stalin quoted in Conquest, 1986: 179). Yet, the new
Soviet system was much less efficient than the one it sought to replace, since it took no
consideration of local planning initiatives and reorganized farms according to
collectivised ideals rather than effective productive values. Efficient farming
communities formed by religious groups, for example, "were rebuffed and reorganized
on Soviet lines, the more religiously active members being excluded and usually
deported" (1986: 173). The efforts to develop a new "primitive socialist accumulation"
resembled more of a system of "internal colonialism" that in a matter of three years
destroyed all agricultural surpluses in various rural regions, particularly in the Ukraine.
The efforts to eliminate the 'kulak' coincided with greater requirements for
grain procurement from the peasantry. The basic principle was that regardless of any
agricultural or economic conditions, "a certain amount of grain must be delivered to
the state" and it was expected that these demands must be satisfied before the needs of
the peasantry could be considered (1986: 174). Conquest reports that:
According to official data, the government's grain procurement rose from 10.8 million
in 1928-29 to 16.1 in 1929-30, to...22.8...in 1931-32. [In] three years after the start of
mass collectivization, the government had more than doubled the amount of grain it
took from the countryside (1986: 174).
The procurement policy itself was economically counterproductive as it meant that
little was left for the peasant to pay for expenses and loans, as well as their well-being.
All these requirements that were structured into traditional agricultural production
meant that peasants were forced to deal with these new burdens and embrace
collectivisation. The state's use of genocide through killing, deportation and starvation
which eliminated the most productive farmers meant that the region would be much
less productive. The system of collective farming was therefore formed under these
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forced conditions, all of which signified that the peasant was subordinated to a new
"revolution carried out from above" (Stalin quoted in Conquest, 1986: 144). As a
consequence, millions of rural peasants, blocked from any access to the outside world
and with no means to attain food, starved to death under this policy or were deported to
gulags where "estimates are that a quarter to a third of the deportees perished" (1986:
142).
Paradoxes ofStalin's Forced Collectivisation
The logic of the perpetrator's paradox in this case operates within the domain of
economic production and Stalin's reasoning about the peasant 'class'. The Party's
professed doctrine that collectivisation would bring greater productivity through
reorganisation and a concentration of resources, was directly contradicted by efforts to
force collectivisation. The genocide was devised as a method to increase production
through forcing farmers to accept 'modern' reorganisation, whilst eliminating those
'class enemies' who where obstructing production. The failure to acknowledge that
'socialist agriculture' and the policy of genocide contradicted their intentions for
greater agricultural productivity is an indication that other motivations are determining
the conduct of genocide. These concerned the contention with other patterns of
agricultural production and their adherents.
The victim paradox also reveals what other motives underpin genocide. The
employment of genocidal methods in these rural areas of the Ukraine was self-
referentially based on the government's point de capiton: the image of the suspicious
and recalcitrant peasant who would never comply with the demands of the new Soviet
system of agriculture due to self-interested individuals who were backwardly adhering
to an ill-constituted form of production. Since the government assumed that direct
control of agricultural production through collectivised farms would prevent the 'rich'
kulak from feeding their selfish desires at the expense of the state and the demands of
the new and expanding industrial sector, a policy of genocide directed at certain
regions could (be assumed to) yield the required resources if it eliminated these
contaminating elements. The paradox was that the kulak inherently (that is
'Historically') adhered to 'primitive' production methods that constituted the weakness
which threatened the successful movement of modernisation represented by socialist
agriculture. The effects of the genocide, as I have documented, were, within the
86
regime's own visions of expected economic production, disastrous and paradoxical
since it eliminated the most capable and productive farmers. As the elimination of the
kulak was a governmental initiative that could be defined by state and local officials,
this meant that this enemy category could be attributed to any 'successful' peasant who
was, generally, the most efficient farmer and produced 20% of the region's total
agricultural output. Thus, the key paradoxical consequence of this policy of kulak
"liquidation" was that those skilled at organizing production were eliminated from all
agricultural enterprise. This was the antecedent of a collectivised policy that resettled
acquiescent and poorly skilled farmers onto large estates which could not be managed
effectively to meet the irrational and poorly calculated demands of the Soviet state.
The greatest contradiction within Stalin's efforts to eliminate the kulak and
reorganise agricultural production was that it treated rural agricultural populations as a
sub-class of industrial production. Far from being a serious threat to a 'classless
society', the rural farmers' resentment grew from the restraints imposed by their
position in the new Soviet hierarchy. In Gouldner's words, this population was
'internally-colonised' for a new-revolutionised system of production by a state that
sought the elimination of all classes like that represented by the mythical image of the
kulak. In the words of an 'activist' who performed these atrocities:
I heard the children...choking, coughing with screams. And I saw the looks of the
men: frightened, pleading, hateful, dully impassive...It was excruciating to see and
hear all this. And even worse to take part in it...And I persuaded myself, explained to
myself. I mustn't give in to debilitating pity. We are realizing historical necessity. We
are performing our revolutionary duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist
fatherland (Conquest, 1986: 232-3; emphasis added).
These words of an activist signify that the reasoning underlying the "historical
necessity", represented by such an antithesis with the kulak, was incapable of
recognizing and changing its paradoxical agricultural policy even while it was
forcefully starving and deporting millions of its most productive parts of the rural
workforce. From the perspective of common sense, the state's inability or refusal to
recognise its own paradoxical failures reveals that there are other motivations at work
outside the logic of utilitarianism that better relate the words of the government with
the deeds of its genocidal policies.
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Genocide and Common Sense
The two paradoxes apparent in the cases of the Ukraine and Rwanda demonstrate that
the government's policy of elimination contradicts fundamental principles of
traditional governance. Arendt once remarked that anti-Semitism was an "outrage to
common sense" because it falsely imbued the Jewish communities of Europe with a
power they did not possess (Arendt, 1968: 5). Likewise, organising the systematic
destruction of a people also betrays common sense, since the central values of the state
are undermined by the struggle against those who are powerless and non-threatening.
The effort to treat the other as the point de capiton, unifying the diversity of the other
into a single subject which is to be destroyed because of their 'powerful-weakness',
defies the premise that serious threats demand powerful responses, a principle of
proportionality fundamental to the notion of common sense. Secondly, the perpetrators
paradox also precludes the self-critical reflex common to judgement-based responses,
which suggests that the failure of an intervention may be due to our own responses to a
perceived crisis. Both paradoxes violate central features of common sense that have
been integral components of governance: the principle of proportionality and the
relationship between cause and effect.
A government operating within this perspective of common sense would
suggest that policies be effectual and target their actual opponents that threaten the
general welfare or standing of the state. The existence of the victim paradox betrays the
essence of common sense because it violates the congruence between strategic policy
measures and the seriousness of the 'problem'. The assumption that extreme violence
always arises out of great power where the attack against the other can only be a
reaction to this power is violated. This deviation from proportionality becomes
revealed by exposing the victim paradox present in cases of genocide.
Yet, the outrage to common sense does not end with this paradox alone. The
cases ofRwanda and the Ukraine suggest that genocide contravenes another dimension
of common sense in relation to governance. Specifically, the methods of terror and
atrocity that constitute genocide were shown to contradict the professed desires of
government, which was dependant upon developing effective interventions to face the
real causes of societal problems. For Stalin, the genocide in the rural Ukraine, seen as a
response to the victim paradox, created a production crisis in agriculture that directly
undermined the intention to supply the demands of the expanding industrial sector and
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seriously damaged future agricultural production. In Rwanda the perpetrator's paradox
proved to contribute to the state's demise by neglecting the actual cause of their
insecurity. The government's domestic genocide directly undermined the efforts to
combat the invading RPF, which defeated the interim government, bringing to an end
the genocide and the vision and reality of a Hutu nation-state. By performing such
paradoxes, governments abandon the principle of common sense and thus jeopardise
the basis of their own policies and the standing of government itself through
developing and attacking a paradoxical notion of the other who does not threaten the
state.
These paradoxes reveal that authorities who commit genocide are in direct
contention with the precepts of common sense as they apply to coherent government
policy. The question that now is to be considered must focus upon what forces promote
the decision to forgo a government's basis in common sense. This means addressing
two questions raised by the discovery of these paradoxes: why is power (in economic
and military terms) sacrificed for a policy of genocide? And what interests and patterns
of coherent thinking are served by the targeting of groups that are weak and ill-
constituted? These questions lead to the larger issue of the kind of governmental
thinking that informs the coherent self-image of rule necessary for the policy of
genocide. This means that the paradoxes reveal that the governments desire something
beyond their own power and self-preservation, which is substantiated by a pattern of
reasoning which influences their decisions that does not sanctify the power of rule as
the primary principle of the state. With common sense no longer occupying a central
position of state decision-making, the question arises as to what kinds of concerns form
the basis of government rule. To make better sense of this hypothesis it is necessary to
examine the empirical evidence that associates genocide with other observable factors.
II. Empirical Regularities of Genocide
In two separate pioneering works of empirical sociology, R J Rummel (1994), and
Harff and Gurr (1998) have measured and documented specific empirical variables that
highlight the relationships between different social and political practices correlated
with the occurrence of genocide. These authors have sought to reveal not only
empirical regularities, but also the scope of government killings (including genocide)
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during the 20th Century. Their results, summarised below, will serve to inform the
following discussion:
1. The total number of victims killed in genocides within states (120 million) during the
past century exceeds the amount killed in war (35 million) (Rummel, 1994).
2. There have been 48 documented episodes of genocide and politicide from 1945-1995
directly involving state authority (Harff and Gurr, 1998: 157).
3. The estimated number of people killed by their own governments (defined by Rummel
as "democide") approached 170 million (Rummel, 1994 and 1995).
4. Totalitarian governance (motivated by an elite-directed ideological outlook) is strongly
correlated with the numbers of people killed in incidents of genocide and domestic
state killings (Rummel, 1995: 15, 17; Harff, 2003: 62).
5. There is evidence to suggest that genocide is not directly associated with other forms
of domestic killing (torture, massacre, assassination, etc.) by state authorities
(Rummel, 1995: 11).
6. Warfare and Rebellion correlate with forms of domestic killing by governments, but
neither variables correlate with genocide. This indicates that "regimes generally plan
and implement their genocidal policies independent of the characteristic occurrence
and intensity of their wars" (Rummel, 1995: 20).
7. Larger states (measured by a regime's population) have higher rates of foreign
democide (deaths by governments). Rummel suggests this may indicate that since
"powerful nations have the capacity...to make war" they use this opportunity to do so
(Rummel, 1995: 21).
8. The violent history of a state, as expressed in the abuse of opponents or minority
groups, features prominently in the genesis of future genocides/politicides (Harff and
Gurr, 1998: 159).
The first three points reflect the scope of genocide, whilst the others highlight
significant regularities between patterns of government killing and genocide. Despite
the clarity of these empirical correlations, a closer examination of these relationships
reveals some questionable presuppositions about the theories which employ these
findings. Nevertheless, in this section I suggest that these empirical correlations pose
important questions for further study.
The work of Harff and Gurr examines variables relating to genocide which are
associated with trends of social and political practice, rather than general notions of
government. They ask, for example, "what is it about the state, and the victims, that
makes some kinds of groups targets of the most severe kinds of repression and
violence?" (Harff and Gurr, 1998: 147). Contrary to other scholars, such as Dadrian
(1974) and Arendt (1968) who argue that victims of genocide can become greater
targets of genocidal policy by their own action or inaction, Harff and Gurr suggest that
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genocide occurs irrespective of what the victims as a group do prior to atrocities. They
claim that "genocides and politicides are not primarily consequences of the victims'
behaviour ... [but] are first and foremost consequences of the policies of states and
their political leaders" (1998: 159). They suggest that one reason may be due simply to
the "state's capacity for committing such crimes", a point which is also raised by
Rummers findings—that if states posses the advantage and capacity to wage war they
are more likely to enact this capacity (point 7 above) (1998: 159; emphasis added).
Yet, Harff and Gurr also present evidence contrary to this point by saying that "the
generic state has no inherent qualities which over time induce it to engage in genocides
or politicides" (1998: 159). Their point is simply that the content of the state's policies
and their circumstances, rather than the structure of states, are the essential determining
factors involved in committing genocide.
In Harff and Gurr's view, the state's potential to commit genocide lies not in
any inherent capacity of state authority as such, but in the power and desire of their
elites to carry out a policy of genocide. This point is made so as not to critique state
practice itself in relation to genocide. Thus, they emphasise that the state, as a form of
authority, holds the greatest potential for both committing and preventing future
genocides. The conservative acceptance of the state as the primary political
organisation enables them to preclude an examination of any inherent traits of
sovereign authority that may be associated with genocide. In their divergence with
these kinds of structural theories, Harff and Gurr emphasize that the focus of genocide
research should really be placed upon the content of the state's membership and those
who influence it. This means that one should examine the groups and forces that
influence the state as it possesses a monopoly on the means of violence. They suggest
that
elites can respond to a variety of imperatives. In democratic theory the ideal state is a
manager of conflicting interests, striving to serve all its citizens in an impartial role. At
worst, state power is held by a rapacious elite which engages in predatory behavior
and widespread killings of all who might oppose it (Harff and Gurr, 1998: 159).
In this view, the nation state is understood along Weberian lines, as a sovereign
possessing the means of violence where, at best, "the ideal state is a manager of
conflicting interests" (Harff and Gurr, 1998: 159). The violent history of a state (Point
8), as indicated by outbreaks of genocide and politicide, suggests by definition that the
state has failed as a power-broker between competing interests. They argue that
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genocide occurs because one group dominates the means of violence and imposes a
hegemonic or xenophobic order that mostly benefits the ruling elite and their
supporters. Under these conditions, elites "become habituated to mass killings as a
strategic response to challenges of security" and as method of ending disputes where
the demands of other groups may limit the power of the state (Harff, 2003: 62). This
perspective suggests that when governments act as a power enforcer on behalf of elites,
rather than as a power broker, such states have a higher incidence of violence as they
ideologically impose an unfavourable order upon those groups seeking state
recognition. This situation, therefore, fosters a view of the state relative to winning
communal disputes through the colonisation of the means of violence and the control
of government apparatus.
In Harff and Gurr's position it is the role of the state to demonstrate that it is in
every group's interest that the state should act as a 'power broker', which should
impartially manage, yet also represent the interests of the entire society. Their
approach thus pivots on the practical ability to build a liberal-democratic state, which
is accepting of cultural differences and which is less likely to commit acts of politicide
or genocide. Their approach, however, fails to question the structure of states per se, in
that there may be inherent organisational defects of why states as organisations
commit genocide. This may also entail that sovereign authority itself might be a source
of conflict as it creates an asymmetrical position of authority which is sought by rival
groups. Their position thus advocates a specific liberal vision of the state which,
according to their research, reduces the risks that minority populations become subject
to repression and genocide. Even though, as Leo Kuper suggested, there is evidence to
show that state sovereignty (explicitly guarded by the UN Charter) is used by states to
prevent intervention in cases of genocide, Harff and Gurr argue that avoiding genocide
depends upon ensuring the state's actions and specific influences in promoting the
state's role as 'interest manager', thereby acting independently according to the
standards of human rights (Kuper, 1985). In sum, Harff and Gurr's approach sheds
light on the "circumstances in which the powers of the modern state are deliberately
used to suppress or systematically eliminate members of distinct... groups", rather than
any inherent structures of states themselves (1995: 147; emphasis added). The forces




Harff and Gurr recognise that states are primarily responsible for conducting genocide,
yet they suggest the factors that lead to such actions derive largely from their elites.
Under this view,
geno/politicide is defined as the promotion, execution and/or implied consent of
sustainedpolicies by governing elites or their agents—or in the case ofcivil war either
of the contending authorities—that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a
communal, political, orpoliticized communal group (1998: 148).
Paralleling a presumption underlying the United Nations definition of genocide, Harff
and Gurr suggest that the possibility of genocide occurs where the "victimized groups
are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics" (1998: 148).
Politicide, on the other hand, exists where groups are defined by their political
opposition to "the regime and dominant groups" (1998: 148). They further distinguish
between two types of genocide: hegemonic and xenophobic. In the former category
...the primary motive of the ruling group is to subordinate a communal group
by killing enough of its members that the survivors have no will or capacity to
resist, whereas in the latter, elite ideology calls for the eliminitation of the
'offending' communal group (1998: 36).
They note that in xenophobic cases the state itself does not enact a "deliberate
sustained policy of extermination dictated and organized by ruling groups," rather
government authorities 'outsource' these desires by encouraging genocidal actions
initiated by another group's "private animosities" (1998: 150). This category reveals
the influence of state authorities in tacitly supporting, by material or logistical means,
the action of paramilitary groups that serve both regional and national interests. The
recent case of the Sudan is illustrative of this point, where militias supported by the
state have been conducting genocide in the region of Darfur. In this case, as with others
like the rural-indigenous peoples of Paraguay, Northern Nigeria and the Muslims in
Burma, their theory concerns threatened minority groups.
A limitation of this concept of xenophobic genocide is that it excludes cases of
genocide where the state has organised a policy of destruction based on xenophobic
principles that are distinct from 'private animosities'. Instead, xenophobia (the fear of
the foreign other) can also be a viable motivating principle that is involved in cases
where the state is directly complicit. The case of Rwanda demonstrates this point
exactly. The general fear of the 'outside enemy other', in the form of the Tutsi-
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dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that directly threatened the state, served as a
significant strategy that enabled the Hutu Power movement to create the image of
'Tutsi unity'—a principle factor that made the genocide believable to the thousands of
perpetrators (Lemarchand, 2002b; Hintjens, 2001).
The concept of hegemonic genocide, on the other hand, is the weakest
hypothesis of their theory as it applies to the cases of Rwanda and the Ukraine. The
concept of hegemonic genocide presupposes that the policies of genocide and mass
atrocity have a 'positive' influence upon the standing of a state and supporting the
power of the ruling elite; that genocide in a utilitarian way 'resolves', however
horrifically, the questions surrounding the problems and demands ofminority groups.
This is most apparent when they depict the image of the typical victim of genocide. In
their view, victims are most often "minorities whose cultures are sharply distinct from
the dominant group," whereas victims of politicides "have long-standing aspirations of
independent nationhood or are members of groups actively opposing existing regimes"
(1998: 151). Destroying the other would thus serve to culturally unify the nation and
limit the actual threat that the state would be divided by rival cultures or even minority
claims of nationhood. Yet, in the cases of Rwanda and the Ukraine, I showed that the
policy of genocide contradicted these basic self-interested desires and undermined the
basic ideals of traditional government—that their policies are useful and should
preserve the government which crafted them. The limitation of their theory is that
hegemony is presumed to be an end in itself, rather than a means to a greater
ideological end that transcends the concerns of a single nation. The failure to
understand this point means that the links with other paradigms of thought that enable
genocide remain unexplored, since there is no acknowledgement that the limits of
traditional government have been put in question or even transcended by the existence
of practices which contradict the foundations of government.
The contribution of Harff and Gurr to the understanding of genocide derives
from their empirical analysis of the immanent factors within genocidal states. A
common characteristic highlighted by their research suggested that one prominent
feature in the genesis of genocidal violence is the "violent history of a state, i.e., its
recurrent abusive treatment of opponents and minorities" (1998: 159). The more
violent a state's history concerning the use of force against minorities, the stronger
likelihood of genocide. The reason for this, according to Harff and Gurr, is that "a
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cultural disposition to accept violence as a means to maintain power and to settle
disputes" is an established or normative feature of government (1998: 159). Such
factors are activated by "particular political circumstances" which they broadly cite as
"struggles for power" (1998: 160). Under these conditions "racist doctrines of national
protection or social purification" become more politically palatable and "help justify
the destruction of victim groups by blaming and dehumanising them" (1998: 159-60).
This important observation reveals that patterns of public violence have their
basis in moral standards of acceptability and are linked to the assumption that patterns
of violence, including genocide, are serious, yet viable temptations for governments
when such patterns are established features of political history. Thus, one may assume
that patterns of normalisation concerning violence against minorities establish the
possibility of greater acts of violence which come about by a decaying moral climate.
The other important factor that this research highlights is that the ideology and type of
regime are strong indicators of genocide. Harff recently revealed that "countries in
which the ruling elite adhered to an exclusionary ideology were two and a half times
more likely to have state failures leading to geno-/politicide as those with no such
ideology" (Harff, 2003: 66). Unfortunately, Harff and Gurr do not explore any of the
specific forms of normalisation or moral changes which may correlate with more
violent acts like genocide. Even though this is a minor shortfall, other theorists have
questioned the assumption underlining their approach which suggests that the sources
of genocide derive from "sheer ethnic diversity": the greater the diversity the greater
the likelihood of genocide when "conflict is protracted" (2003: 64).
There is recent evidence to suggest that this correlation hypothesis between
diversity-genocide cannot be universally qualified amongst all cases of genocide.
Harff s own recent research has indicated that only two factors of diversity are
correlated with genocide: "active ethnic discrimination and elite ethnicity" (2003: 68).
However, the only strong correlation with genocide occurs when "an ethnic minority
dominates the elite" (2003: 68). This suggests that heterogeneity is only a factor when
one group controls the power the state and does not suggest that diversity itself leads to
genocide. Also, David Laitin's research has suggested that conflict over language
grievances can paradoxically have an ameliorative effect for the potential of rebellion
and violence in certain situations (Laitin, 2000). This point has relevance for
understanding genocide, since it challenges the "standard literature on ethnic conflict
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that often conflates all forms of ethnic contestation" and dismisses their 'positive'
significance in mitigating greater forms of violence (2000: 102). One conclusion to be
drawn here is that stratified cultural or moral differences between dominant and
subjugated groups do not always increase the probability of violent conflict. Laitin's
research actually reveals that "greater linguistic similarity raises the probability of
violence" (Laitin, 2000: 103). This may be an indication that groups similar in nature
are actively seeking ways to distinguish themselves from one another, including
employing strategies of violence to make this distinction more apparent. Although this
evidence does not contradict all of Harff and Gurr's important claims (for example,
that past violence is a good predictor of future genocide/politicide), it does force
greater substantive speculation into the relational features of a political situation that
might account for an increase in specific kinds of conflict. Thus, Laitin's results forces
us to abandon the general claim that conflict is always a pejorative indication of a
greater likelihood of genocidal violence, an assumption which is featured in Harff and
Gurr's view of the state and society. Despite the contribution of Harff and Gurr's
research into the immanent influences of the state which result in genocide, Laitin's
research suggests that one must carry forth more substantive investigations into the
influence of specific features of cultural difference and patterns of conflict that are
related to genocide. In other words, one needs to better qualify which kinds of conflict
and political ideals lead to genocide. In order to try to better isolate the kinds of
political ideals and patterns of conflict, I will explore the empirical evidence linking
the forms of government most associated with genocide.
Power and the General Theory ofGovernment Killing
The distinctiveness of Rummel's (1995) theory derives from his effort to account for
the causes of genocide via a general theory of government and power. He has
developed a theory of democide—death by government—founded on a variation of an
old maxim, claiming that "Power kills, and absolute Power kills absolutely" (Rummel,
1995: 19). Unlike Harff and Gurr, the content and intentions of governmental authority
feature centrally only to the extent that they control the means of violence. In
accounting for democide, what is novel about this approach is that for Rummel
motivations of government are secondary when considering the possession and
exercise of power. The ability to achieve an end through the use of violence is the
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central concern of this theory. This theory focuses on the form ofkilling—under which
the perpetrator exercises violence—and the types ofgovernment where power is most
concentrated.
Like many others in the field, Rummel sees himself as part of a conceptual
tradition addressing the modern horrors of our time. To confront these horrors, he
suggests one must include various forms of state murder under a single, measurable
term, which he calls "democide." Rummel argues that the conceptual coverage of
killings by governments understood in this way "extends beyond" the limitations of the
term "genocide" (Rummel, 1994: 3). In constructing his new concept, Rummel reflects
back to Raphael Lemkin's well-known definition of genocide, a term which he sees as
addressing the ruthless killings of a particular age, but yet one which has lost its central
importance at representing the entire spectrum of government killing. Consequently,
the reason social science demands a new term "democide" is to account for those killed
by the diverse methods of state murder:
...scholars increasingly have come to realize that restricting the killing aspect of the
concept [of genocide] to those murdered by virtue of their indelible group membership
does not completely account for the millions wiped out by the Nazis...The linking of
such diverse acts or deaths under one label [of genocide] created an acute conceptual
problem that begged for the invention of a new concept that covers and is limited to
intentional government murder (1994: 33-4).
The term democide is thus intended to measure and acknowledge the actual amount of
human destruction conducted by state governments. To avoid the restrictions posed by
the term genocide when facing the vast scale of government killing, Rummel proposes
reconfiguring the term genocide (an attempt characteristic of most scholars in the
field). His remedy invented an even broader concept that would apply to all forms of
governmental murder, while still preserving (or reclaiming) the UN version of the term
genocide as part of this grand spectrum of democide. Rummel's intention is to not only
conceptualise a broader concept that covers specifically government killing, but also
employ other, more specific, concepts (e.g. politicide, mass murder, etc.) that
recognize the patterns of government murder as qualified by the kinds of targets
involved in both intentional and unintentional governmental killing. These are defined
as:
Genocide: among other things, the killing of people by a government because of their
indelible group membership (race, ethnicity, religion, language).
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Politicide: the murder of any person or people by a government because of their
politics or for political purposes.
Mass Murder: the indiscriminate killing of any person or people by a government.
Democide: The murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide,
politicide, and mass murder (1994: 31).
Like Horowitz, Rummel's explicit concern in creating this term is with the recognition
of unjust killing as the core ethical indicator and defining characteristic of types of
society and governmental authority. In his view, the term "democide" includes
examples of "intentional killing of people because of their politics," "mass murder by
government," and "the unintentional spread of disease to indigenous populations
during European colonization" (1994: 34).
Whilst Rummel has compiled the most extensive empirical evidence relating to
genocide and state murder, this approach is coupled with the attempts to moralise the
analysis of governmental forms, thereby privileging certain forms of government over
others. One of Rummel's central conclusions is that totalitarian government, with its
high score of total concentrated power, is strongly associated with genocide.
Governments which scored lower on this scale were democracies where centralised
power was checked by other institutions of government. His evidence suggests that
democracy fails to correlate with genocide because it lacks an unchecked-centralised
authority. This measurement is solely referenced by the amount of killing conducted by
these forms of government. This moralising of governmental categories is thus based
upon the empirical finding that genocide (and government killing in general) is
negatively correlated related with the divisibility ofauthority. Democracies are 'better'
because they tend to divide power separating branches of government and thus kill less
people. His view of the "modern Black Plague" of state killing is one of a "plague of
Power" that relates specifically to the ability of governments to exact force through a
lack of institutional restraints (1994: 9). He claims that checks function to restrain
power and create a society that accepts non-violence as a political strategy where "the
ballot replaces the bullet" (1994: 23). To prevent democide it is thus necessary to foster
"democratic freedom'" that divides power and restrains the means of violence (1994:
27).19
19 Rummel uses the terms "democracy" and "totalitarianism" with little concern over how they are
elsewhere defined other than through their relation to the divisibility of authority through civic
institutions.
This moralisation of government forms means that no concern is given to the
possibility that democratic states may actually advocate or sustain horrific
circumstances (poverty, unemployment, disease) that create the murderous or
degenerative conditions that cost human life. Moreover, this approach neglects the
potential that such degenerative conditions may even establish the grounds to
transform democratic governments into more autocratic states. Rummel thus neglects
to consider the state's power to control the conditions under which people live and die,
and that even some 'democratic' governments will support and directly establish
degenerative conditions which will ensure a strategic advantage for their state. There
are also other problems associated with this theory. Whilst Rummel reveals that
government killing is directly related to an undivided authority, his claim is not that
democide is possible because power is absolute, but that "power is a necessary cause
for war or democide" (1994: 20). This causal conclusion is far fetched because it
neglects to consider not only the nature of correlation research, but also the internal
anti-democratic political developments within states that actually may mitigate
20
government killing.
A concern for this theory is that it is not clear how the possession of absolute
power itself "causes" genocide, even though one may agree that a monopoly of
violence is functionally necessary for mass atrocities. Rummel's statement thus
conflates two distinct claims, one of necessary conditions leading to government
killing and the other that the possession of these forces 'causes' genocide. Despite the
misleading implication that one can infer causality from correlation data, the valid
hypothesis of this theory is that absolute domination is a primary condition, but not the
cause, of genocide. To say that absolute or undivided power is a condition necessary
for genocide means that genocide is a crime that is possible under conditions of total
domination—one of the common assumptions within the field of genocide studies.
Without relinquishing this important evidence I would, however, like to build upon his
conclusion by offering a different explanation for the relationship between
totalitarianism and genocide, one that questions the causal nature of power. I want to
argue that within the category of 'totalitarianism' are variables that confound
20 It is worth noting that no attention is paid to the fact that even anti-democratic positions taken by
government officials are morally desirable and which may even lessen government murder. The death
penalty imposed by governments is one such an example; the British government and some US states
refuse to consider such measures even though democratically the majority of people in the United
Kingdom and the United States support capital punishment.
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Rummel's evidence and that one such variable is a self-referential motivational logic
prevalent in what Rummel has called 'totalitarian' forms of government. In the next
section, I will show that such a hypothesis, unlike Rummel's causal speculations, is in
keeping with existence of the paradoxes of genocide.
Consequences of the Paradoxes ofGenocide
The paradoxes of genocide have important consequences for establishing the direction
inquiry. Like the empirical theories evaluated in this chapter, these paradoxes help one
understand the decision to enact a policy of genocide by excluding certain variables
while privileging others. The point of this section is to compile and resolve any
tensions within this evidence that will inform and direct the subsequent investigations
in the following three chapters.
One paradox of genocide was demonstrated by the conduct of genocide itself
which consistently undermined the self-identity and power of the state. One important
lesson to be gleaned from the perpetrator's paradox is that the self-negation of the
power and standing of a government means that a policy of genocide is motivated for
purposes other than the desires to aggrandise power and influence. This conclusion
puts into question part of Rummel's theory that the lust for undivided power is a cause
of government killing and genocidal policy. Since the policy of genocide undercuts the
power possessed by the state, this precludes one from claiming that undivided power
causes genocide and entails that more radical motives may underlie this form of
violence. In other words, this observation of the perpetrator's paradox suggests at the
existence of a different set of influences which bears upon the decisions to enact a
policy of genocide than those suggested by Rummel. Thus, his approach explains
nothing about what rationally motivates governments to commit genocide when they
posses a monopoly of unchecked violence.
The conclusion one can draw from Rummel's empirical findings is that states
have a greater opportunity to commit genocide because their authority is unrestrained.
This is a result of the condition that genocide is only possible where total domination is
secured. Thus, the will to conduct such a policy is not a feature of this condition of
total power and it is this decision to implement genocide that demands explanation. My
position suggests that total power is an essential means of a certain kind of
motivational scheme, since governments that enact genocide actually undercut the
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likelihood that their domination of society would bring about their vision of a new
social order. In the following chapters of this thesis, I will explore the possibility that
there are immanent influences within governments which incline them towards
genocidal policies. Unlike Rummel, I want to suggest that the motives to enact
genocide derive from a narcissistic or self-centred desire to make such radical
ideological desires a reality—a desire which is possible only when governments posses
total domination over society. I am arguing here that genocide derives from the
perverse and intense contention with the other that reorders society according to
principles that are distinct from, yet also performatively dependant upon the total
domination of society. An explanation I want to explore derives from the identification
of a self-referential ability to create a new order based upon an antithesis, which is
independent of worldly considerations. It is in this sense in which I am in agreement
with Zizek when he describes Adolf "Hitler as his own 'revisionist', that is, an ironist
almost in the Rortyan sense, for whom the 'final solution' was a cruel joke
accomplishedjustfor the sake of it, [and] not for any external goal like power" (Zizek,
2002a: 64; emphasis added). Thus, there is a kind of narcissistic grammar integral to
some governments which, I will argue, inclines them to commit genocide. What
inclines my argument to espouse a self-referential hypothesis in explaining the decision
to conduct genocide against the theory advocated by Rummel is based upon the
paradoxical nature of genocide.
The victim paradox, like the perpetrators paradox, challenges some
fundamental assumptions about genocide. Firstly, it contradicts the hypothesis which
claims that genocide resembles a situation of conflict where rival groups compete for
domination through exterminating one's opponent. In one sense, the prevalence of this
paradox suggests that the structural power differentials within society necessarily
contribute to the possibility of genocide because the 'other-as-threat' is signified by
their de facto powerlessness. This means that dominant groups use their position to
redesign the living constitution of a society by eradicating 'weak' peoples because
their position is seen as threatening. To eliminate the 'power' of the powerless,
authorities employ genocide in an aggressive, rather than competitive manner which is
designed to reconstitute society.
A central reason why genocide diverges from competitive conflict is that the
genuine enemy—one that constitutes a threat—is not the prime target of genocidal
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violence. As I discussed in chapter Two, Carl Schmitt suggested that politics is
animated by a friend-enemy antithesis. Schmitt recognized that politics can be reduced
to the friend-enemy antithesis because what underpins polemical dealings is the
possibility of extreme conflict. The essential point here is that politics is only possible
where one is able to distinguish between "the real friend and the real enemy" (Schmitt,
1996: 37). For Schmitt, what characterised the enemy is their possibility to realise
violence: "an enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of
people confronts a similar collectivity" (1996:28). However, in cases of genocide the
presence of the victim paradox means that there is no threatening other that can
challenge the power of other dominant positions. In fact, the victim paradox actually
occludes the ability to identify the genuine enemy capable of violence due to the
creation of the 'threatening other' as a point de capiton that unties the field of
opponents under a single banner. Genocide, even prior to actual violence, is a policy
that represents an effort to transcend the friend-enemy antithesis by targeting not the
powerful, but by vilifying and targeting the 'weak-as-powerful', and in doing so
attempts to uphold the appearance of adversarialism in public life.
Since the enemy is one who constitutes a real threat, the victim paradox
indicates that a new kind of antithesis is operating in contrast to the one that animates
politics. The victim paradox, as it has existed in cases of genocide, suggests that the
'foe' is not, under Schmitt's definition, a genuine adversary, but a non-political 'group'
that does not have the capacity for real conflict. Schmitt did indicate that there are
kinds of conflict that transcend "the limits of the political framework" because they
inflict violence designed to "degrade the enemy into moral and other categories" which
requires that groups are "not only [to] be defeated but also utterly destroyed" (1996:
36). Thus, the non-political enemy is one "who no longer must be compelled to retreat
into his boarders", but is susceptible to forms of total destruction (1996: 36). As I will
examine in the next chapter, this kind of non-political vocabulary is open to critical
examination and does exist within what one can call 'totalitarian' government.
As a result of these findings following from the analysis of the paradoxes of
genocide and the work of Rummel, greater detail will be paid to the relationship
between the unique tenets and practices of totalitarian government and its relationship
to genocide. By investigating the substantive processes that may better account for this
correlation, I will be in a better position to highlight the genuine variables that
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influence this relationship. To build a new understanding of genocide I have argued in
this chapter that it is necessary to abandon the fallacious presupposition that genocide
as a form of violence that requires genuine conflictual divisions, and one should think
of the relation between the state and society in a more dynamic-constructivist fashion
that examines the motivational decisions of state authorities. Although the theories
based upon these empirical findings share significant limitations, the empirical
correlations they rely upon do suggest that there is something internal to totalitarian
governments that more often leads them to enact genocide. In the next chapter I will
seek to qualify their findings in a fundamentally new way through the pioneering work
of Hannah Arendt's theory of totalitarianism in an effort to explain what exactly
constitutes the association with genocide and totalitarianism.
Chapter Four
Genocide, Politics and Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism
Totalitarian government does not just curtail liberties or abolish essential freedoms;
nor does it, at least to our limited knowledge, succeed in eradicating the love for
freedom from the hearts of men. It destroys the one essential prerequisite of all
freedom which is simply the capacity ofmotion which cannot exist without space.
Hannah Arendt1
They crowd my memory with theirfaceless presences, and ifI could enclose all the evil
of our time in one image, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an
emaciated man, with head dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose
eyes not a trace ofa thought is to be seen.
Primo Levi2
Introduction
In this chapter I will explore the kind of government organisation most associated with
what I have described as modern total genocide: totalitarianism. Of all the theories to
have explored this form of government it is Hannah Arendt's (1968) theory of
totalitarianism that is by far the most historically detailed and theoretically insightful. 1
shall explore Arendt's theory in much the same way as she judged and formulated her
own concepts: as living opposites. To comprehend the nature of a form of government
called 'totalitarianism', entails not only describing what characterises this system, but
also means identifying the kind of world it actually seeks to destroy. Thus, I will put
forth a new understanding of genocide by revealing how genocide is linked with
totalitarian government.
I will begin this chapter by examining the distinction between politics and
genocide through the work of Carl Schmitt (1985) as initiated in the previous chapter. I
argue that Schmitt's perspective of the political does help us to see clearly the
distinction between politics and genocide. However, Schmitt's vision of politics
1 The Origins ofTotalitarianism (1968: 466).
2 Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity (1996: 90).
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contains an inherent limitation which cannot help us understand the extent to which
politics further diverges immanently from genocide. I propose that Arendt's political
philosophy and the theory of totalitarianism can remedy this limitation and better
reveal the immanent divergences between genocide and the political.
To explore this distinction in greater depth I examine Arendt's theory of
politics first through her distinction of power and force, and then in comparison to her
theory of totalitarianism. From Arendt's perspective I argue that genocide should be
understood 'topographically'. I suggest that genocide is a policy which is based upon a
language of design which treats society as a living space for growth. This kind of
ideological language is only possible if genocide can collapse the distinctive spaces
that challenge this language of design. This means examining how a policy of genocide
collapses the spaces around individuals to the point where individuality is itself
diminished and then eradicated. To collapse political space the policy of genocide
institutes the technical measures which suspend traditional law and replace law's
normal functioning with a dynamic movement of violence that is dedicated to realise
the universal principles ofNature or History.
I shall argue that genocide is the force that effectively realises this kind of
movement and represents a form of 'law' without legality. 1 explore the functional and
immanent divergences between this law-as-movement enacted by genocide and
positive law-as-boundary. I also reveal from within Arendt's theory that genocide, as a
Taw' governed movement, is the core policy that defines the distinctiveness of
totalitarianism as a unique form of government distinct from tyrannical rule. Overall, I
suggest that genocidal governments are not lawless, but rather operate under a distinct
kind of law void of traditional legality.
Through this discussion of law, 1 argue for a new understanding of genocide as
a collapse of space. I then explore the details of this collapse with reference to cases of
genocide. Finally, I discuss the limitations of Arendt's theory of totalitarianism for the
study of genocide. I argue for a departure from Arendt's historical-structural
methodology in favour of a greater comparative exploration of the grammar of
genocide.
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I. The Politics-Genocide Distinction
In this first section I will briefly lay the groundwork for the exploration into the aspects
of genocide that will be examined in greater detail throughout the chapter. In the
previous chapter I showed that the image of the other in cases of genocide serves an
important function for enabling not only their destruction, but also the reconstitution of
society along a single contention. In the last chapter I suggested, through the work of
Bauman (1991) and Hilberg (1983), that a necessary condition of the complete
destruction of the other also entails an organised and logical path of evacuation from
what Fein (1993) first termed the sphere of moral obligations. The pattern of moral
eviction, from a space mediated by the rights and obligations of law into a category of
vice is the point where the other becomes subject to the logic of distancing that
removes the victim from all moral concerns and situates the other as an object of
technical considerations where they become the exclusive objects of bureaucracies.
The argument I want to put forth here is that a similar process is occurring within the
political sphere, one that resembles not simply an evacuation from moral duty, but a
collapse of the political itself. The hypothesis I propose to examine is that the political
opinions and obligations that mediate between the other and state, begin to collapse as
the contention with the other becomes genocidal. This indicates that the policy of
genocide is at odds with the central aspects of political action. In the following section
of this chapter I will explore this distinction between genocide and politics through the
work of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt.
Schmitt on Politics
As I discussed in chapter Two, Carl Schmitt suggested that politics is characterised by
a friend-enemy antithesis which is animated by its degenerative or extreme outside—
the possibility of warfare (as physical killing). For Schmitt, what characterises the
enemy is their possibility to realise violence: "an enemy exists only when, at least
potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity"
(1996:28). Schmitt recognized that politics can be reduced to the friend-enemy
antithesis because what underpins polemical dealings is the possibility of extreme
conflict and the desire to avoid it. Only with this violent potential does political
deliberation become fully animate. Schmitt based this interpretation of the political not
on cultural or ideological concerns, but rather within the confines of realpolitik which
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assumed that one is able to distinguish between "the real friend and the real enemy"
(Schmitt, 1996: 37). This means that the determination of actual opponents who
threaten a political standpoint is a fundamental aspect that constitutes authentic
political action. What demarcates the policy of genocide from this interpretation of
political action is the presence of an opponent that is powerlessly 'threatening'.
As I explored in the last chapter, the victim in cases of genocide is a deeply
paradoxical category that identifies the threat of the other by virtue of the
powerlessness of the group. Because the victims of genocide do not posses the means
of violence that could undermine or threaten the political survival of a rival group, a
policy of extermination does not fall under Schmitt's friend-enemy antithesis that is
necessary to animate political action. Schmitt's politics, as an exemplar of realpolitik,
requires an identifiable opponent that is actually threatening to the existence of another
political position. This genuine enemy must at least hold the potential to resort to
violence that would destroy an opponent's power to forge agreements. In cases of
genocide, however, the presence of the victim paradox, as a characteristic of victim
selection, disqualifies the victims of genocide as an 'enemy' in the Schmittian sense,
since they do not represent a genuine threat to the social or political order. Even though
a policy of genocide may still give the appearance of adversarialism in public life by
exposing new 'threats' to the public order, the kind of contention within which this
conflict is expressed has fundamentally changed due to the powerlessness that qualifies
the category of 'enemy'. This indicates that a policy of genocide occupies a different
kind of contention than the friend-enemy antithesis characteristic of Schmitt's vision of
political action.
Identifying the victim paradox as a feature of genocide and contrasting it with
Schmitt's theory of politics suggests that the antithesis underpinning genocidal policy
functions in an anti-political context. In his writings on politics and the friend-enemy
antithesis, Schmitt excludes the total destruction of an enemy as a feature of the
political. Schmitt insisted that this kind of violence derives from a different antithesis
than the one underpinning the political. Schmitt thought that the total destruction of a
group made no political sense since the principal target in the friend-enemy antithesis
was the opponent's power to determine decisions, rather than the existence of an
opponent as such. Although Schmitt never explored this kind of non-political enemy,
he did acknowledge that conflicts of this non-political, genocidal sort transcend "the
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limits of the political framework" and resembled patterns of violence that "degrades
the enemy into moral and other categories" which requires that their targets "not only
be defeated but also utterly destroyed" (1996: 36). Thus, the non-political enemy is one
"who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders", but is subject to other
forms of total annihilation uncharacteristic of traditional warfare and its relation to the
political (1996: 36). Thus, under Schmitt's theory "war is the existential negation of
the enemy" by which violence is employed tactically to undermine their power to
decide, a practice which underpins and conditions politics (Schmitt, 1996: 33).
However, when the enemy becomes subject to another antithesis that degrades their
character to the point where their total destruction appears 'necessary' or even
'advantageous', then one has entered a contention where genocide is the negation of
politics. Thus, the practice of extermination indicates the negation of the political
because the enemy is degraded from being an 'adversary' where their power is
targeted, into another category where their very existence is questioned.
Unfortunately, Schmitt's account of politics is limited as to how far it can help
us visualise the distinction between politics and genocide. This is due to the fact that
there are patterns of violence, such as war, that restrict and influence the political in
detrimental ways. Thus, to better pivot a distinction with the policy of genocide and
envisage the derogatory manners in which violence degrades the political, I need to
identify the specific corrupting aspects of violence and examine its 'collapsing' impact
upon politics. What is thus required is a normative distinction between those actions
which sustain and those which constrain the political. For this I turn to Hannah
Arendt's theory ofpolitics.
Arendt on Power and Force
In this section I will argue that Arendt's vision of the political does not harbour the
limitations of Schmitt's account as it rests upon a different version of the political that
articulates the kinds of immanent action that sustain and constitute politics. A crucial
aspect of this perspective is her distinction between power and force. Unlike Schmitt,
Arendt identifies a normative boundary that clearly defines the kinds of action that
sustain or threaten the political. Power and force are two normative patterns of action
that are defined in relation to attributes of the political sphere. The most important of
these attributes of the political community are that politics is an agonistic place where
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freedom is discursively actualised and is based upon the irreducible condition of
plurality (the distinctiveness of individuals).
Arendt employed the term 'force' to describe patterns of instrumental action
that undermine and threaten the political sphere. These kinds of action are designed to
multiply the attributes of strength possessed by a segment of individuals over and
against others in a community. By monopolising the means of violence, for example,
one person could exact their will over others in the community. This detracts from
certain essential conditions of the political, namely its discursive foundations and
plurality. This aspiration towards a monopoly of violence constitutes, for example, "the
destruction of plurality" as it treats members as reducible categories that constrain their
individuality by subjecting them to a means-end reasoning that prevents the discursive
expression of their opinions (Arendt, 1958: 202). By treating others as malleable
categories, for example, their individually distinctive voices in public become
diminished. Force is an instrumental form of domination over and in spite of another's
will. Force is analogous to physical strength as it is a measurable and reliable entity
that can be mechanically exacted and organised in secrecy or isolation from the wider
community. Its existence is not dependant upon common consent or participation, but
on the material means to procure compliance through coercion or violence.
Physical strength and its use to dominate human objects in its territory are
"forces of nature" or "the force of circumstances" which are indicative of an energy of
constraint (Arendt, 1970: 45). These circumstances are open to manipulation by those
who possess the means of violence. Violence is thus an instrumental implementation or
tool-like artefact that is designed to amplify the natural strength of the few. In a
political circumstance this entails the dominance of the few over the many. The use of
violence rests upon the fear of death or injury to human physicality. This means that
force is devoid of any reliance upon communication and resembles the asymmetrical
acts of nature that do not require negotiation or consent. The most destructive effect
that force can have is upon its rival pattern of action: the power underlying common
consent.
Arendt's unconventional understanding of power is based upon describing the
strength of those public bonds that keep people together in an on-going process of
"actualization" in which politics is constituted through proper political action (1958:
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200). When it is said that someone is "in power", Arendt understands this to mean that
the person is supported by the communicative consent of a community. Arendt writes:
When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually refer to his being
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group,
from which the power originated to being with (potestas in populo, without a people
or group there is no power), disappears, "his power" also vanishes (Arendt, 1970: 44).
Under this vision, power is not the property of an individual or an aggregate of
individuals, but derives from the common ability to communicatively interact by
forging words and deeds. In "the potential space of appearance between acting and
speaking men"—that is, the space of politics—power is the common bond sustaining
politics by people living together (1958: 200). As power is only what is held in
common, it exists only so long as men interact and actualise old and new covenants.
These variable and unquantifiable bonds are what keep people from fleeting moments
of interaction, and thereby serve to stabilise political freedom. Yet, power is
fundamentally dependant upon its future potential of actualising "new realities" and
establishing new relations (1958: 200). Unlike force, power is not something that can
be stored or measured, but is a continually variable bond that helps constitute the
political activities ofmen.
It is helpful to understand power as an engendered expectation of togetherness
that constitutes the potential of future accomplishments in a community. Power deals
with the relations between men, which may be continually changed in innumerable
ways as it possesses no material limitations (aside from its living members). It is in this
sense that "power...is boundless" as it possesses no physical limitation (1958: 201). So
long as relations between word and deed exist, power can be divided, checked and
organised in patterns that can increase its potential for greater achievements between
members. Thus, unlike force, power does not reduce segments of the community to
manipulative means in the service of a sovereign's will and cannot be employed by a
single person. Instead, this pattern of power can only be conducted by the mutual co¬
operation of its members, who enjoy some form of equal entitlement and access to
public space.
Arendt's vision of the political does not inherit the limitations of Schmitt's
account because it clearly excludes force from the realm of politics. In this sense
politics is not dependant upon the struggle against an enemy, even though for Arendt
the space of politics is still profoundly agonistic. Arendt not only gives a fuller (and
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more detailed historical) account of the political, but does so by giving politics a
normative content that is premised upon communication and opposed to the elements
of force that can disrupt and corrupt these common bonds. What constitutes the
political is never the rule over others, but the new rules and realities developed from a
common existence with others—"in sheer human togetherness" (1958: 180). Unlike
Schmitt's account that describes politics as animated by an antithesis that both sustains
and potentially undermines the political, Arendt suggested that the agonistic space of
politics is sustained by the power of a specific kind of cooperative bond where
togetherness rather than manipulation and force are the elements that constitute the
political. The political is thus undermined by a rival normative pattern that employs
violence at the expense of plurality and communication. Thus, force can never be
authentically political as it possesses no genuine linguistic basis in human affairs and
can only undermine equitable cooperation. The entry of force into the political sphere
is always a corrupting influence that signals the end of political action and the
digression into another form of authority that mitigates the power of common consent.
The moment force is employed in determining the contours of the public realm the
political community becomes a sphere of administration to be managed by more or less
benign forms of tyranny. Under these conditions plurality and communication that
constitutes the "web of relationships"—the speech and action that constitutes the
binding in-between of human affairs—are eroded into spaces of isolation where
opinions can be forcefully excluded (1958: 181). Thus, force can never be an adequate
substitute for power because equitable togetherness and communication (the
foundations of the political) are antithetical to fear and isolation. The "isolation of the
tyrant from his subjects and the isolation of the subjects from each other through
mutual fear and suspicion" is not an environment that can sustain genuine
communication (that is, non-deceptive speech) and consequently politics (Arendt,
1958: 202).
For my investigation of genocide the important distinction between Schmittian
and Arendtian politics concerns the depth at which the normative patterns of political
action are theoretically clarified. Arendt's account of the immanent elements of the
political reveals that governments which conduct a policy based upon force can never
adequately replace an authentic political community that rests upon power. In
summary, I would like to clarify at this early stage why genocide resembles the
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expression of force par excellence from the perspective of Arendt's theory of power
and force. Firstly, genocide, like force, destroys the distinctiveness of individuals by
compressing the categories of people it seeks to destroy in line with Universal
ideological laws of'History' or 'Nature'. Secondly, genocide is a form of violence that
is decisively monological and hence non-communicative as it excludes the voices of all
those who are forced into two roles: the victim and executioner. Arendt's distinction
between power and force offers us a unique vantage point for witnessing how politics,
as a democratic space formed by the power of common bonds, is contrary to an
understanding of genocide that systematises the elimination of parts of a community.
This democratic perspective is valuable not only for its own merits as a unique political
theory, but also, as I shall argue below, because it was inspired by an investigation into
the elements which crystallised into its living opposite: totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism vis-a-vis Politics
The question that Arendt poses for the content of authentic action in political space
was in part answered for by the system of terror developed by totalitarian government.
Arendt developed her understanding of politics by examining the system of
government that took the category of force to a perverse extreme in the development of
the extermination camps and the creation of superfluous human beings. Arendt's vision
of politics as the ability of unconstrained freedom to act communicatively in public
with others was inspired by her experiences as a stateless person in flight from Nazi
persecution. This experience of statelessness made an impression upon Arendt that was
contended with in a political, rather than religious or social manner. The state of
emergency which suspended civic and political rights following the burning of the
Reichstag in 1933 was the beginning of an attack on the right to have rights, which
excluded Jews and others from any authentic public standing first in Germany and then
throughout occupied Europe. Arendt interpreted these actions not merely as an attack
on pariah groups but on the condition that people should have "a place in the world
which makes opinions significant and actions effective" (Arendt, 1968: 296).
This "world" is a condition of genuine human experience that represents the
things located in-between all of us—"the world, like every in-between, relates and
3
Reflecting on her own, work Arendt wrote: "I do not believe that there is any thought process possible
without personal experience. Every thought is an afterthought, that is, a reflection on some matter or
event" (Arendt quoted in Bernstein, 1996: 71).
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separates men at the same time" (Arendt, 1958: 52). For Arendt, "world" means the
capacities, such as the right to have rights, which are the human institutions that exist
between us that we hold in common. She writes:
This world...is not identical with the earth or with nature...It is related, rather, to the
human artefact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on
among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in the world
essentially means that a world of things is between those who sit around it; the world,
like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time (Arendt, 1958: 52).
The human creations that constitute the world both divide and relate us together,
distinguishing us from other forces in our environment. The terror of totalitarianism, as
expressed by the perpetrator's policy of extermination, is a method that seeks to
destroy the constitutive and protective spaces between people. The violent process of
genocide accomplishes this collapse by levelling the protective distances that allow
people to distinguish themselves.
Positive law is, in this sense, a public artefact that is part of the world which
functions to separate and relate institutions and people in a public forum, by defining
the rights and procedures which restrain and relate both the subject and the state. This
world-as-artefact is unlike the natural world, since we can only share these things in
common with a plurality of men. This plurality is a condition of the public world
which represents our unique individuality "that nobody is ever the same as anyone else
who ever lived" (1958: 8). The state of emergency which suspended the rights of
people was an attack on a much deeper aspect of human life, namely our capacity to
have rights that ensures our place in a political world. Without these kinds of
components (such as law) that contribute to our notion of world, our plurality,
characteristic of the human condition, can never fully be actualised to reveal our
genuine distinctiveness. Thus for Arendt, the greatest danger of totalitarianism is not
that it uses terror to destroy millions of people, but that these governments employ a
system of terror that uses forms of violence to undermine our potential to become fully
human in the world.
For Arendt, the greatest accomplishment of totalitarian government was to
show that humans can become "superfluous" to universal and impersonal forces that
supposedly run through Nature or History (1968: 457). "Power, as conceived by
totalitarianism, lies exclusively in the force produced through organization" as
exemplified by its fundamental institution: the concentration camp (1968: 418). The
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camps organised a system that made human subjects superfluous to a kind of
"ideological superstition" that was logical and "sensible" (1968: 457). Arendt writes:
.. .within the framework of the totalitarian ideology, nothing could be more sensible
and logical; if the inmates are vermin, it is logical that they should be killed by poison
gas; if they are degenerate, they should not be allowed to contaminate the population;
if they have "slave-like souls" (Himmler), no one should waste his time trying to re¬
educate them. Seen through the eyes of the ideology, the trouble with the camps is
almost that they make too much sense, that the execution of the doctrine is too
consistent (1968: 457).
The destruction and useless torture of countless victims creates superfluousness by
unleashing totalitarian ideology through violence, making all their victims' efforts to
resist their suffering seem senseless in light of the organisational forces of Nature or
History that are being realised. In this sense, totalitarianism does not merely deprive
people of their freedom, but undermines the world where action and opinion can
resonate. Totalitarianism revealed that the conditions of the world and human plurality
can be destroyed by an organisation of force that creates a milieu where elites express
the expectation that "everything is possible" (1968: 440). The universal pseudo-
scientific doctrines destroyed the possibility of a world by reducing the plurality of
their victims by creating the conditions that supposedly defined what humans 'really'
are.
Arendt thought that humans can only be fully expelled from humanity if there
is a "loss of a polity itself', that is, a place where human distinctiveness can be
discursively demonstrated (Arendt, 1958: 10). To possess access to a polity, therefore,
entails the possibility of distinguishing who one is through deliberation within a
community of others. Politics, contrary to totalitarian government, is an agonistic space
where character is developed, revealed and shared. To represent 'worldliness' means
performing the desire to live a shared, yet agonistic public life that shuns any retreat
into a life lived in private. Sharing, as an essential element of politics, demands that
action must be conducted in a "space of appearance" visible to others; a place that is
essentially opposed to the clandestine operations of the camps which exterminate
people for what they are (1958: 199). This political vision should be read in contrast to
the secrecy or privacy of death in the camps. Arendt's political theory was a direct
reaction to the totalitarian attempt to destroy the potential for a common world. As
Mary Dietz has written, Arendt's political theory in The Human Condition is a
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"profound response to the trauma inflicted upon humanity by the Nazi regime" (Dietz,
2001: 90).
The central feature often overlooked in Arendt's political vision is that the
agonistic space of the political is dependant upon the communicative disclosure of
one's agency entailing a "phenomenon of self-revelation"—what Arendt called "the
disclosure of the agent in the act" (2001: 100). By having a space of appearance where
people can gather and act spontaneously with and against the opinions of others,
humans have the possibility of clearly distinguishing themselves as independent of
general classifications of strength or ability. Arendt writes:
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world...This disclosure of
"who" in contradistinction to "what" somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents and
shortcomings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything somebody says
and does...This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people
are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human
togetherness...Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific
character and becomes one form of achievement among others (Arendt, 1958: 179,
180).
The space of the political is the topography of appearance where uniqueness is
disclosed in association with others who share the same desires of togetherness and
self-revelation. Should this togetherness degenerate into factions acting against one
another, as in Schmitt's version of politics as warfare where men act to achieve victory
for their vision, speech becomes "mere talk" that serves to deceive an opponent or
dazzle the public gallery with propaganda (1958: 180). The ability to act publicly
ultimately depends upon the unity between what is proposed and what is done, that is
between "word and deed" (1958: 180). The vision of political action as disclosure
without the corrupting behaviour of force and violence between rival factions is an
agonistic arena of persuasion and dissuasion. Political action is thus deliberative
speech as part of a process of deciding about some matter pertaining to the public
good. As soon as opinion is based upon the fear of violence, authentic politics vanishes
into a fog of deception.
Political action is ideally embodied by bold and memorable speech that is
designed to safeguard the central features of humanity and politics itself—plurality,
worldliness, natality and life (1958: 11). By excluding force from the political, Arendt
sought to regulate the content of political action, confining it to deliberations that
preserve its existence. Arendt's vision of the political is, thus, politics for its own sake,
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which entails exploring new kinds of public action and togetherness that is abstracted
from the concerns of private interests (economic, social or religious). Thus, the content
of politics is only geared to the preservation of politics itself in its ability to perpetuate
and create the conditions of its own possibility. This reflexive concern cannot be
intertwined with the interests of necessity or expediency, but must still exceed the
boundaries of the normal into the extraordinary by creating something entirely novel
(natality) in service of the political.
Totalitarianism demonstrated that by destroying the public world through the
creation of superfluousness, it revealed the vulnerability of political action and the
institutions that have preserved the public realm. Arendt's political theory was a quest
to recover the public world by creating a durable political topography capable of
sustaining agonistic freedom. This vision stands as a "rebuke to the living death and
deathly life that is the horrific effect of the extermination camps, and a compelling
counter-memory to the persistent spectre of the Holocaust" (Dietz, 2001: 102).
Arendt's theory is thus a helpful guide in determining not so much the kind of thinking
behind a policy of genocide, but more importantly the social, political and legal
conditions of a form of government that employed genocide as a method of crafting a
society through the destruction of a political world. The following task is to uncover
the kind of human topography that is created by the link between totalitarian
government and the employment of genocide.
II. The Topography of Genocide
The architects of genocide understood that the desire for a more perfect political and
social order was only possible with the knowledge of the organisational principles of
force. What became indispensable for the manipulation of societal circumstances that
enabled a policy of genocide was the strategic use of force designed to expand the
avenues for a contention against the other. This radical and perverse reordering drive
entails by its very imposition an opposite effect upon traditional social and political
institutions, one which collapses the space around individuals in the service of
genocide. As Arendt's theory of totalitarianism suggests, the existence of a system of
genocidal terror is manifested in a kind ofpublic space that destroys the distinctiveness
between people, compressing them into generic categories. Thus, a social order that is
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achieved by systematising terror entails a radical curtailment of the spheres of social
and political life in patterns that would be consistent with a policy of genocide.
My examination of the collapse of space in cases of total domestic genocide
will entail an examination of how the avenues of spontaneous social action of specific
spheres of human experience are constricted. This concern, rather than the actualities
of physical killing or the mere destruction of liberties, is the prime foundation with
which to measure the effects of a policy of genocide. As inspired by Arendt's metaphor
of government classification, a theory of space contains a manner of describing the
possibilities of public interaction by highlighting the effects upon the capacities for
such actions. The design and coordination of genocidal violence can be examined by
analysing the division between genocide's architectural model and material structure or
execution.
Historically, the idea of space, now a familiar notion among architects, once
occupied the world of intellectual exploration in metaphysics. Immanuel Kant, for
instance, looked upon space and time as a priori conditions to human intuition and not
as principles for aesthetic evaluation. The same also holds true for Schopenhauer, who,
a half century later, viewed the idea of space as an artistic ideal applied to history (Ven,
1987). Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, thought of space in political terms; how
governments structured the public topography of politics that shaped and enabled
discursive action.
I want to explore how a new understanding of space can be theoretically
conceived in light of Arendt's topographical conclusions about totalitarianism. I want
to argue here that by characterising genocide in topographical terms 1 will be in a
position to expose the 'grammar' and 'speech' of 'architectural design' that informs
the policy of genocide. My goal is to deploy a vision of space to uncover the
relationship between a grammar of design and a policy of genocide. The antecedents of
a concept of human space are based upon an architectural ideal of being in a place
constructed according to principled ideas that are translated and expressed into
practical design or habitat. Human institutions thus become the 'living materials' or
structures encompassing individuals. The focus of this architectural model is directed
upon the subject under an authority, since genocide is most often a policy of
governments conducted, as I shall discuss, under conditions of emergency. As the
governors of these spaces, states posses the means of violence that can significantly
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determine the conditions of human interaction. The vocabularies of architectural design
are the key variables that can reveal the logic underlying an authority's decision to
exterminate the other. The purpose of this scheme is to envisage a new way of
understanding the relations between populations and forms of authority, given that the
latter has the ability to determine the conditions which underpin the language and
action of societal audiences that can serve to expedite the destruction of groups. In this
manner authority is not viewed only in terms of a "monopolistic possession of non-
human objects", but as a force that retains the possibility of shaping the conduct of
others "due purely to differences in the degree of organization" (Elias, 1976: xviii).
This means that the key to understanding genocide rests not only on the material power
of authorities, but more importantly upon how these governments organise the
conditions and institutions of extermination according to a language of design. My
examination is thus directed at surveying an authority's manipulation of context
through a grammar of design that reorganises and transforms populations.
Architectural Space and Genocide
Those who have discussed the idea of space and architectural design in the context of
genocidal governments have done so merely to examine the expression of political
ideology manifested in architecture. Paul Jaskot, in his book, The Architecture of
Oppression, documents the function architecture fulfilled in inspiring Nazi ideology.
He suggests that the romanticized vision of Eastern Europe, "the soil of an older
German dynastic culture," was expressed through military prowess and architectural
achievement, and thus represented "complementary components in the destiny of the
German people" (Jaskot, 2000: 114). In a historical study of Auschwitz and the Nazi
demographic policy in the East, Robert Pelt and Deborah Dwork, have shown that
National Socialist ideology was influenced by a romantic vision of Eastern Europe and
Scandinavia as being the origin of the German people. The war in Eastern Europe
('Operation Barbarossa') was designed to expand the future Lebensraum (living space)
of a new racial empire. Entire communities of people were resettled in the East
according to the Nazis' ethno-geographic vision, reshaping the complete contours of
cities and towns according to new rules of population density and agricultural design
(Pelt and Dwork, 1996: 151). Population density was to be significantly reduced to
provide for the ideal small one-family farm structure that the Nazis had envisioned for
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rural habitation. In some cases this meant reducing the domestic population by half.
German farmers, resettled onto the land of deported Poles, for example, received
practical architectural suggestions as how to "Germanize a Polish farm with minimal
changes" (1996: 155).
What these historical examinations testify to, but do not examine specifically, is
the existence of an architectural language of genocide. The Nazi vision to reorder
Europe was enacted by an architectural language that linked an organic anthropology
with human geography and habitat. The organic and unchangeable essence of what
constitutes a group is akin to a 'natural force' that demands actual space for habitation
made possible by a societal design based upon expansion and eradication of the 'weak'
and 'ill-constituted'. To effectively theorize a model of this procedure it is essential to
examine the structures influencing the dynamic of expansion and eradication in a
topographical format.
I would like first to examine this language of design through Arendt's
investigation into the political architecture of totalitarian government. In other words, I
will investigate the operational space of genocide and reveal exactly how this policy
transforms the functional meaning of law in a state where law is suspended. This
transformation is one significant representation of the collapse of space that has
disastrous consequences for other societal spheres. Arendt's investigation of
totalitarianism is helpful in this regard because it sheds light on how the function of
law under totalitarian governments has diverged from its traditional roles within the
nation state and served to collapse the political sphere. Thus, the issue I will now
confront concerns the necessary changes to law and politics that express a grammar of
design and make a policy of genocide possible.
The Collapse ofthe Political: Arendt on Totalitarian Law
What distinguishes Hannah Arendt from these literal accounts of architecture and
genocide, and what makes her portrayal so important to this discussion of space and
genocide is the model in which she understands the nature of totalitarianism as a
"novel form of government" (Arendt, 1968: 460). To distinguish the unique character
of this form of governance, she employed a spatial analogy which enabled her to
diametrically contrast totalitarianism with her own view of the political. As some
scholars have suggested, the influence of her investigations into totalitarianism (the
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impact of terror intuitions on their human subjects) inspired her interest in the political,
yet the importance of her analysis of law as a guiding force of totalitarianism has
remained unexamined concerning the study of genocide (Bernstein, 1996; Villa, 1999).
Arendt placed great emphasis upon "Montesquieu's insistence that the laws of a
republic establish not just boundaries between public and private...but also relations
between citizens as well" (Villa, 2001: 15). In this view, the law serves as a mediating
boundary necessary for the political, much like her concept of world. Arendt expanded
upon Montesquieu's perspective by examining the ancient Greek interpretation of law
in the polis, where the function of law served as a hedge or wall (nomos) that both
guarded its internal constituency and protected it from external interference. The law
existed for specific purposes of traditional regulation where the public actions of
citizens could be curtailed, yet still inspire a spirit of action. The law, in determining
the limitations of a person's actions, formed "boundaries and established channels of
communication between men whose community is continually endangered by the new
men born into it" (Arendt, 1968: 465). The law serves to "hedge" the natality of new
members of a community in a continual process of reproduction. To ensure political
stability the law must serve as a protective barrier that translates moral norms thus
defining and dividing private from public. The law is thus not political because it
serves to clearly define the space of politics which was, during 'worldly times', "meant
to attain the highest possibility of human existence" (Arendt, 1958: 64). The law thus
served to define and contain the expansiveness of politics into other realms. Arendt
writes that
...the laws which protect and make political existence, are of such great importance to
the stability of human affairs precisely because no such limiting and protecting
principles rise out of the activities going on in the realm of human affairs itself
(Arendt, 1958: 191).
The law forms a set of rules that both expresses moral traditions and guides meaningful
action in public by setting boundaries for constructive action that is dedicated to
maintaining the continuity between the community's past and future. 'Law-as-
enclosure' formed the public realm not only through a regulation of natality and the
boundlessness of political action, but also by enabling a clear distinction between those
issues that were private and those that were public. Action appropriate to politics could
then have a space that was regulated to ensure its relative stability.
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The positive laws of the polis thus attempted to confront the inherent frailty of
political action, which for Arendt arises from the tendency for action to transcend all
boundaries. Thus, the human condition of natality, the continual birth of something that
is entirely new, means that the function of law is to be a stabilising presence "that
corresponds to the constant motion of human affairs, a motion which can never end as
long as men are born and die" (1968: 465). The law serves to 'hedge in' the continual
stream of new beginnings whilst it also assures the freedom of movement within a
political space. In this sense, law preserves the stability and continuity of the political
as it helps to
guarantee the pre-existence of a common world, the reality of some continuity which
transcends the individual life span of each generation, [and] absorbs all new origins
and is nourished by them (1968: 465).
Arendt attempted to show that the law's restrictions didn't merely serve to curtail
freedoms and preserve a particular form of government, but that this curtailment also
regulates the internal space of politics. Within this theory politics is a space of
appearance that is stabilised by law, where the principle of political action exists as
motion in space. This principle of space, which she adapts from Montesquieu, became
the model upon which Arendt judged governmental forms. This concept of political
space serves to identify a kind of government in terms of the subject's potential for
action in a public environment that is accessible and representative.
However, the function of law for totalitarian government differs inversely and
radically compared to its traditional role as boundary. According to Arendt,
totalitarianism "exploded the very alternative... between lawful and lawless
government" because it fundamentally changed the meaning and function of law
(Arendt, 1968: 461). She insisted that we avoid the temptation that totalitarianism
should be judged as merely another form of tyranny, where the tyrant, unrestricted by
law, governs by the principle of fear, "namely fear of the people by the ruler and fear
of the ruler by the people" (1968: 461). Instead, totalitarianism breaks radically with
this tradition, since it does not exclusively operate just within a space of extrajudicial
lawlessness common to the tradition of tyranny. Although Arendt suggested that
totalitarian governments, like traditional tyrants defy "all positive laws" of the state,
forging them into their fa?ade of stability, the real novelty of totalitarianism is that it
strictly operates under a new set of 'laws' that have supposedly always-already
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underpinned the positive laws of nations (1968: 461). Thus, totalitarian movements
claim to have hit upon the sources of authority from which the law receives its
"ultimate legitimation" (1968: 461).
Arendt describes these sources of law's authority as "supra human forces",
which are never the property of a single tyrant, but yet are still applied with the
ultimate force of authority. As a claim of higher legitimacy, these laws of Nature or
History "can do away with petty legality" by pretending "to have found a way to
establish justice on earth—something which the legality of positive law admittedly
could never attain" (1968: 462). It seeks a 'higher' Universal form of legitimacy which
is said to bring order to chaos and justice to the earth in a manner that breaks with
traditional moral standards. Law, under this view, becomes the "active unfailing
carrier" of a new humanity as its product, rather than a traditional force that relies on
moral judgment and legal punishment to create meaningful action and preserve the
political realm.
What Arendt is arguing here is that totalitarian governments had purported to
uncover the 'real' source of law which had no exception, a form of law which engulfs
all persons including sovereign authority itself. Whereas tyrannical sovereigns could
act without the law, totalitarian authority, under this conception, is equally subject to
the 'real' sources of law and becomes the prime expression or guiding force of these
new universal principles. State authorities thus embody and animate these new laws.
The central rhetorical attraction of totalitarian law was that it claimed that the basis of
governments in traditional positive law had all been masking or holding back the
genuine laws that arise from the organic processes of Nature or History. It is in this
sense which totalitarianism is not a lawless form of government, but rather a devoutly
lawful kind that applies these principles with the force of terror to all its subjects
regardless ofmorality or cultural standards of behaviour.
Yet, there are other reasons why this version of totalitarian law differed
radically from the traditional function of law-as-boundary. As this source of totalitarian
law is derived from the eternal and permanent aspects of the laws ofNature or History,
they are depicted as running through the physical existence of humanity. Whereas
positive law has always remained distinct from its subjects, demanding consent and
obedience, totalitarian laws treat humanity as the embodiment of law itself. Totalitarian
law no longer adapts to the circumstances of man's civic and political existence as it
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did with forms of positive law. Rather, as embodiments of law, all totalitarian subjects
become the grounds for expression and "movement" of the laws themselves (1968:
463). History or Nature cease to be human elements that stabilise authority and instead
become the "laws ofmovement" that inspire governments to be an active manifestation
of law by shaping, in a literal sense, the constitution of the body politic. Governments
and political parties are not just the interpreters ofHistory or Nature, but they also see
themselves as the living embodiments of these laws. The term "law" has thus changed
its basic meaning under totalitarian government: "from expressing the framework of
stability within which human actions and motions can take place, it became the
expression of the motion [of Nature or History] itself' (1968: 464). This function of
law-as-movement means that "there could be no end to this process" of eliminating the
'unnatural elements' of society or 'dying classes' of history, since the categories
themselves are processes undergoing continual evolution. The movement or force of
law is thus constituted by the continual challenges posed to it, by the opposing forces
(as rudimentary classes or the unhealthy) that spring up as law 'advances' throughout
society. Without the confrontation with these elements the force of law's movement
grinds to a halt.
Genocidal violence is thus linked with the demands of exclusion that spring
from the law-as-movement. Genocide as a method of totalitarian 'law enforcement'
persists and expands unlike anything resembling Clausewitz's theory of violence in
wartime. Instead of warlike opponents who continually endeavour to out-perform each
other by the expansion of violence, genocide occurs only when all significant
resistance is quashed, and operates under this new dynamic which possesses in itself
no ultimate end, only strategic objectives in line with the advance of universal laws.
Thus, the need to continually exclude and exterminate populations that organically
spring up or exist in parts of the social body entails a specific kind of policy of
violence. Only in conjunction with this new shape of law-as-movement does genocide
become the central method by which authority enacts the laws ofNature or History.
This pattern of eradication meant for Arendt that the essence of totalitarianism was
systematic terror. She writes that:
If lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the
essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination...Terror is the
realization of the law ofmovement; its chief aim is to make it possible for the force of
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nature or history to race freely through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous
human action (1968: 464, 465).
As the population is continually shaped and reshaped by the laws of movement
implemented in a milieu of terror and through a policy of genocide, the space which
allows motion between subjects becomes severely constricted. This formulation of
law-as-movement under totalitarian rule fundamentally eradicates public space.
According to Arendt, totalitarianism's topography is a place of non-space, where the
plurality of men becomes reduced to a single image designed to realise the laws of
movement. The sole purpose of totalitarian law is the "fabrication of mankind" in its
own image; that is, determining the essence of what humans really are against the
spontaneous diversity of the human condition (1968: 465). This destruction of plurality
through the fabrication of mankind also has topological significance for public space
because it "substitutes" the walls of positive law (the boundaries and channels of
communication between men) with an "iron band" (1968: 465). The iron band of
totalitarianism "holds [its subjects] so tightly together that it is as though their plurality
had disappeared into One Man of gigantic dimensions" (1968: 466).
The Topology ofTyrannical and Genocidal Government
What is unique about the "iron band" of totalitarianism is that the limited room
provided by fear and suspicion under tyranny is replaced by a constant terror that
eradicates the "space between" men, forming them into a single reliable subject that
will serve the demands of universal laws. Tyranny, on the other hand, resembles the
experience of wandering in a dessert, where at least there exists space for "fear-guided"
and "suspicion-ridden" action, even though one is always susceptible to the extreme
storms of terror that seem to appear from nowhere (1968: 466).
Durkheim, in his essay 'The Two Laws of Penal Evolution', sought to account
for the changes in the severity of legal sanctions imposed by a governmental authority.
His central hypothesis was that "the intensity ofpunishment is ...greater ...the more the
central power assumes an absolute character'''' (Durkheim, 1983: 102). An absolute
authority is one that is "not held back by written or by customary law" and exemplifies
a deviation from the normal kinds of state/society relations, where civic and other
social groups mediate between the sovereign and his individual subjects (1983: 103).
Traditional forms of tyrannical rule are thus understood akin to a dominating force as
resembling property relations. Durkheim thought that tyrannical authority was
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characterised best by its unilateral and unmediated relationship over society akin to the
bearer of property: "the owner has rights over his property, which has none over him"
(1983: 104). This analogy supposes that the interests of authority (even a tyrannical
one) exist in guarding its society as property, which recognises the fact that an
authority is only possible to the extent that it can rule over subjects. When
disagreements surface and inspire popular action against tyrannical rule, a situation is
created that challenges the material strength of the ruling authority. Popular revolts
against militarily powerful rulers often employ forms of passive resistance that forgo
the use of violence in the face of a large organisation of force. The great effectiveness
of this method of resistance is revealed by a people's willingness to risk physical
sacrifice that would deny a victor of the prize of ruling over a society. Society as
property, (ifwe follow Durkheim's analogy) means that the victor who 'wins' by mass
slaughter is cheated of his prize since no one can rule over dead men. When the
population is willing to accept death over tyrannical rule, an authority which
systematically destroys its own citizens undercuts the human source of its own
authority.4 Tyranny is thus characterised by a lack of restrictions placed upon
government that signifies its lawless character.
Conversely, governments who systematically employ a policy of genocide no
longer share a 'propertied view' of society that is reminiscent of Durkheim's analogy.
The relationship between a genocidal authority and society is one that cannot be
conceived in terms of property relations. Rather, the society under totalitarian
domination sees itself not unlike the human body that is contaminated by illness where
certain organic parts of society must be totally eliminated. Under this view, the other as
'illness', is systematically eradicated, and not even dignified as a propertied object that
may hold a modicum of potential value as their existence supposedly has perilous
consequences for the body politic. The other is described within a distinct language
game that centrally posits an analogy of contagion derived from their common
weakness as an incorrigible threat. Genocide, as a method of 'treating' society's
4
Durkheim's position foreshadows the core arguments of Helen Fein and Zygmunt Bauman as he
considered mutual obligations as the integrative social forces which mitigate the absolute power of
governments. To exorcise absolute authority governments always situate their victims where these
obligations have less bearing. Only when such forces are absent does the potential exist to deploy any
kind of tyrannical authority. Whilst this is also true of totalitarian governments, tyrannical authorities,
however, are unlikely to commit mass atrocity and genocide when their population in revolt is willing to
accept death over domination.
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weaknesses, defies even the discourse of the other as property, since the victims'
existence threatens the well-being of society. A discourse that speaks of society as its
property cannot make sense of the authority which systematically destroys its own
'subjects'.5
In this section I have argued that a policy of genocide contradicts a fundamental
premise which founds the principle of tyranny. By extirpating victims from within a
juridical discourse of crime and punishment (and also the political language of citizen-
subjects) and situating them within a dynamic of change directed by the design of a
new body politic, genocidal governments defy the traditional classification of tyranny.
Totalitarianism is thus not, as Benhabib has suggested, a form of government without a
topography (Benhabib, 1992: 92-3). Rather, the collapse of space that enables humans
to distinguish themselves is a space of non-space that is now occupied by the forces of
Nature or History. These forces now occupy a space once open to subjective
spontaneity, transforming the once spontaneous and principled actions of a public
space into a mass of convictionless and reliable individuals whose behaviour serves to
generate the law's movement or perpetual manifestation. The terror of the system
continually reforms and compresses its subjects into two kinds of functionary, namely
"the role of executioner and the role of victim" (Arendt, 1968: 468). In place of
individual action, the universal laws ofmovement situate the tenets of an ideology that
is dedicated to eliminating all spontaneous action in the desire to replace common
convictions with a loneliness that prevents people from forming any fervent
convictions. The drive against spontaneous convictions is the totalitarian desire par
excellence that allows the laws of Nature of History to decide the direction and shape
of the society.
Nazism, for example, introduced purely objective 'natural' criteria in the
selective system of the SS where candidates where chosen from photographs according
to purely racial criteria (Kershaw, 2000: 129). In Rwanda, state law before the
genocide required residents to be registered by ethnic group even though the 'natural'
5 The reason why Durkheim's theory could never contemplate the potential that authority could
fundamentally change the basic social constitution of society or "the nature of the social type" was due
to an understanding of morality in which the latter was integral to social and individual life (1993: 107).
This is why he referred to social types by employing a notion of "species": "the same society can no
more change its type in the course of its evolution than can an animal change its species during its own
lifetime" (1983: 106). For Durkheim, even the most powerful governments are always limited as to their
influence, based upon the fundamental shape of society.
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attributes of ethnicity were also supposedly recognisable in one's physical appearance
(Des Forges, 1999: 3). Prior to the genocide school children were divided in classes
according to the ethnic affiliation of their parents as they did not posses identity cards.
Even Hutu whose convictions led them to oppose President Habyarimana and the
tenets ofHutu Power were directly targeted before and during the genocide.
The laws of movement, which embody the radical ideological contention with
the other, seek to manufacture humans into superfluous subjects to become the living
embodiments of the universal laws of Nature or History. This point raises the logical
question as to what is the purpose of such a genocidal system when all significant
opposition has been subdued; is not the apparatus of terror itself merely superfluous?
Arendt answered this question by writing:
if they were capable of telling the truth, the totalitarian rulers would reply: The
apparatus seems superfluous to you only because it serves to make men superfluous
(Arendt, 1968: 457).
To understand the essence of totalitarian government one must comprehend that
genocide is a means of achieving this transformation of the human condition into
superfluous subjects of ideological goals that can be fulfilled only if these subjects
become behaviourally malleable—that is, become the living embodiments of the laws
ofmovement.
The eradication of public space that once enabled humans to distinguish
themselves becomes replaced by a system which employs genocide instrumentally to
achieve a societal design that equates humans with universal forces. This equation is
manifested by the reformulation of law into a force of movement that professes to
realise the elite's principles of societal design, one congruent with the underlying
forces of mankind. Arendt's concept of public space is thus a helpful analogical
measurement with which to gauge the destructive forces of totalitarian government and
the systemisation of terror through genocide. I have shown through Arendt's theory of
totalitarianism that genocide, as it operates in conjunction with the laws ofmovement,
is antithetical to the function of traditional positive law-as-boundary since it enacts the
laws of movement that collapse the walls of political space. As opposed to the above
examination of law's general function for political space, it is now necessary to
demonstrate the immanent political divergence between genocide and positive law.
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Law, Spontaneity and Genocide: A Post-Durkheimian Social Order
Arendt never devoted significant attention to the specific exploration of the key
juridical discrepancies between totalitarian law and positive law. However, in one
specific passage she did touch upon a juridical concept that made this distinction more
significant. She argued that totalitarianism does away with the traditional notion of law
because it fundamentally rejects the principle of consensus iuris. This principle,
according to Cicero, was what constituted "a people" and has served as a cornerstone
for not only domestic, but also international law even during times ofwar (1968: 462).
Traditional criminal law, for example, presupposes a basic background of community
consent—indictments for criminal offences in the United States always begin with the
phrase 'the people of the State of...vs.' Even though the consensus of a community
may disagree with the particular judicial decision, criminal law operates on the grounds
of consensus where the criminal can be judged within a system called Taw'.
Emile Durkheim's sociological theory of criminal law relates closely to this
concept of consensus iuris. Durkheim employed a functional theory to account for the
stability of criminal law in society. He suggested that criminal punishment serves to
reinforce a society's conscience collective—the consensual moral sentiments of a
society. The conscience collective is the moral foundation of a community that is
analogous to a juridical consensus (consensus iuris) in that both are founded upon the
power of basic consent, one on moral and the other juridical grounds. Durkheim saw
that criminal law was not merely a foundationless apparatus of the ruling classes, but a
ritualised procedure that has a strong basis in a consensual society. In this sense, the
conscience collective is the predicate for consensus iuris since the right to judge the
criminal derives its basis from common moral sentiments. When criminal law is
transgressed an offender is prosecuted and sanctioned in line with the codes that
represent these moral sentiments. Punishment thus constitutes "an emotional reaction"
where society seeks "to defend itself' by clarifying and reinforcing the boundaries of
moral sentiment (Durkheim, 1983: 59, 60).
Punishment, however, is not only vengeance for a transgression, but also, more
importantly, an "expiation" of the violation itself (1983: 61). This is demonstrated by
the fact that proportionality of punishment (making the punishment fit the crime) is a
cornerstone of criminal sanctioning. This reveals that the criminal must suffer in equal
measure for the injury he has inflicted upon society. The purpose of sanctioning is thus
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to restore the sanctity of the moral order, rather than destroy transgressors. Thus,
punishment is "an act of vengeance, since it is an expiation. What we are avenging,
and what the criminal is expiating, is the outrage to morality" (1983: 62).
The moral basis of punishment demonstrated by its proportionality and desire
for expiation means that the criminal is therefore not a parasitical element that is to be
eradicated. If he represented such an element, it would make little sense to grade
punishments and give 'criminals' any leeway to operate. Rather, Durkheim insisted
that the criminal is a "normal" aspect of social life in clarifying and reinforcing our
moral consensus. Durkheim writes that
Contrary to current ideas, the criminal no longer appears as an utterly unsociable
creature, a sort of parasitic element, a foreign, inassimilable body introduced into the
bosom of society. He plays a normal role in social life (1983: 75).
Here we can see how this aspect of criminal law differs radically from the genocidal
contention against the other. In cases of genocide, states see themselves embroiled in a
battle not for morality and law, but for the purity of society where the law-as-
movement advances the causes ofNature or History where the goal is not expiation of
sinful action or crime, but the extirpation of vice from a milieu that is susceptible to
contamination. Crimes, as Durkheim has shown, are to be punished and the criminal
expiated for the sake of society's conscience collective, whereas a vice is
representative of an incorrigible nature that can only be exterminated for the purposes
of sanitary purity.
For Arendt, this distinction between crime and vice characterised the kind of
anti-Semitism which enveloped European Jews before the war, and later proved to be
catastrophic as devices ofNazi rule. She writes:
As far as the Jews were concerned, the transformation of the "crime" of Judaism into
the fashionable "vice" of Jewishness was dangerous in the extreme. Jews had been
able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape. A
crime...is met with punishment; a vice can only be exterminated (Arendt, 1968: 87).
Durkheim's argument that criminal law and punishment are largely founded upon
moral sentiments reveals that genocide occupies and arises from a different kind of
social order, one not based upon a consensual "society of his peers" (Durkheim, 1983:
62). When we recognise that crime is normal, expiation of the criminal begins to make
greater sense as a necessary function of a society's moral stature. When Durkheim
wrote that "punishment results from crime and expresses the manner in which it affects
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the public conscience", he was assuming a spontaneous public sphere where there
exists a functional, yet antagonistic confrontation between crime and social sentiments
in which the latter are reinforced and clarified by public sanctions (1983: 121). Thus, a
moral spontaneous discourse of punishment is incompatible with the language of
contamination as it applies to organic groups because any kind of spontaneous public
space that may treat the other as a subject whose actions may be expiated is excluded
under a language of contamination.6 Under this grammar, contamination is void of any
functional value and can only halt the advance of the laws ofmovement.
Thus, a central reason why these discourses are incompatible rests upon the
divergence between the law-as-movement and the law-as-boundary. The law of
movement is a proscriptive enterprise which creates categories where peoples are
determined for what they are, which demands continual modification, whereas the law-
as-boundary is dependant upon forms of contravention which are judged individually
according to subjective action. The procedures and central concepts of criminal law
thus serve for the most part to restrain the power of the state in relation to individual
action, yet still provide a basis for establishing norm of conduct. The state is only
permitted to try the accused for acts which he has committed as they violate
established criminal statute. Mens rea (the mental element of criminal intent) and actus
reus (the material element of transgression) are the two concepts that correspond to this
function of law-as-boundary that restrains and redirects the power of the state.
Genocide, on the other hand, transcends the basis of positive law concerning
the victim and the perpetrator. The victims of genocide are seen as representations of
peoples and/or cultural patterns that contaminate the social body because they are ill-
constituted and perpetuate this ill-constituency. Thus, this grammar of representation is
segregated from individual action by virtue of their origins in Natural or Historical
processes. Mens rea and actus reus are incompatible features of law-as-movement
because they presuppose features of individual action and transgression, whereas
6 Even when Durkheim did speculate that society may be changed at its basis by the means of force
where its own societal "rules [become]...the cause of evil" (Durkheim, 1997: 310), his only warning
was that such a pathological state of affairs may arise in a condition of the "forced division of labor"
(1997: 312). This is where constraint and regulation, "no longer corresponding to the true state of affairs
and consequently without any moral foundation, is only maintained by force" (1997: 312). The division
of labour is forced, as under conditions of class repression, when the congruence is "broken between the
aptitudes of individuals and the kind of activity allocated to them" and where such an incongruent state
of affairs can only be contained by a violent constraint that binds individuals to these positions (1997:
311). Yet, what is experienced by subjects under totalitarian domination barely compares to a division of
labour that is forced, as under conditions of class repression.
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victims of genocide are destroyed not for their actions, but for inherent traits of a
Natural or Historical propensity to behave in ways that cannot be changed. I will
examine this specific grammar in greater political and anthropological detail in the
next chapter, yet what is evident here is that law-as-movement differs radically from
customary criminal law in another additional sense.
Another divergence is also evident when one considers the concept of
proportionality in light of the extreme violence of genocide. What the perpetrators of
genocide fundamentally destroy is the principle of proportionality that underlies the
notion of justice manifest in criminal law. Following Montesquieu, Cesare Beccaria
suggested that "every punishment which does not derive from absolute necessity...is
tyrannical" (Beccaria, 1986: 8). Beccaria argued that there must be "obstacles that
restrain men from committing crimes" and that these barriers "should be stronger
according to the degree that such misdeeds are contrary to the public good and
according to the motives which lead people to crimes" (1986: 14). Punishments,
Beccaria argued, must therefore be proportioned to the seriousness of the offence. In
other words, the state is restrained by the principles of proportionality as to the
application of punishments. However, the extremity of genocidal violence committed
by a state government against a de facto powerless group bypasses the principle of
proportionality contained in criminal law and exemplifies the unbridled exercise of
authority. The states conducting genocide thus betray the law by exacting violence
against a group outside of the realm of law, where proportionality once functioned as a
mitigating feature of state authority. These 'man made' restraints, such as the
proportionality principle in criminal law, run contrary to the totalitarian version of law
as movement that is based upon principles dictated by Universal forces.
As totalitarianism promises to liberate law from the interventions of man by
unleashing the natural laws of History or Nature, it completely bypasses the principle
of consensus iuris and other central features of criminal law. The laws of movement
which conflict with the principles of positive law profess to speak for the principles of
justice that derive not from action or mankind, but from Man as the embodiment of
universal supra-human forces. These universal forces are the first principles that
presuppose any artefact or human institution. This means that any reliance upon 'valid
law' as determined by consensus iuris would naturally conflict with the 'Natural'
ethics ofMan as interpreted by the total state.
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In practice this entailed that the Nazis had little concern for the laws and
regulations they themselves had issued, because even structural procedures of positive
law could no longer govern the operations of the secret police and party institutions.
Instead, Nazism, like other genocidal governments, organised and implemented their
laws ofmovement directly through the agencies of the secret police. By this procedure,
the public decrees could be used as a facade for their operations, and thereby preserve
the relative anonymity of their actual sources of authority. The totalitarian states of
Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia both maintained the facade of positive law by
passing laws and decrees that in no way covered the operations of the secret police and
other party agencies responsible for genocide. Arendt suggested that the Russian
"constitution of 1936 played exactly the same role the Weimar constitution played
under the Nazi regime: it was completely disregarded but never abolished" (Arendt,
1968: 395). This indicates that the policy of genocide, as primarily organised and
implemented by the forces of the secret police, operated in a state of exception which
suspended the law's application to all the actions of the secret police thereby allowing
them to operate under a new kind of order determined by the laws ofmovement.
This rejection of the concept of consensus iuris entails that the space enabling a
public conscience has collapsed between the individual and state under the force of
genocidal operations that realise the human embodiment of law-as-movement. This
operational space created for the genocidaires by the forced rejection of consensus
iuris is completely at odds with the understanding of traditional criminal law and
punishment. The collapse of a spontaneous public sphere, which was, in part, sustained
by the law, enables genocide to be conducted as an expression of Natural or Historical
forces which resemble law. How this collapse is technically possible and what it entails
will be explored in the next section. The important point established here is that
genocide's radical divergence from positive law means that the boundaries which
protected the political sphere are replaced by a law of movement that collapses the
public conscience (Durkheim's conscience collective) by excluding spontaneous
actions which may restrict the forces of Nature or History. The suspension of positive
law, which enables governments to redesign society through systematic destruction,
does not mean that totalitarian governments are lawless. Rather, totalitarian
governments operate within the laws ofmovement which constitute a new paradigm of
'law' without legality where the other is decimated by an organisational force that
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continually animates its own sui generis laws based upon principles which are distinct
from and contradict positive law.
Changes to law and politics are thus essential categories for uncovering the
possibility of genocide and the full extent of its effects. The unique brilliance of
Arendt's theory is that she gives us a detailed historical account of how the central
features of totalitarianism crystallised into a new kind of government by virtue of how
it operated in terms of law (incessant movement), policy (terror by eradication) and
political space (elimination of plurality). What Arendt unfortunately does not explore
is the technical details of how the law can be transformed and united with a policy of
genocide. It is to this investigation that I now turn.
'Law' without Legality: Genocide in the State ofException
To articulate the operational space of genocide beyond positive law it is necessary to
examine the state practice ofjuridical suspension. Arendt's brief, yet fruitful discussion
of totalitarian law directs us towards theories that concern the state of the exception—
the decision taken by an authority which suspends the constitutional order. Carl
Schmitt's exploration of this practice of government revealed that this suspension of
the entire juridical order, for reasons of practical emergency, is based upon the
sovereign decision that entails "a relation to a juridical context" (Schmitt quoted in
Agamben, 2005: 33). This is because, Schmitt suggested, "the state of exception is
always something different from anarchy or chaos, in a juridical sense, as an order
exists in it, even if it is not a juridical order" (2005: 33). Yet, Schmitt's goal was to
reveal the links between the state of exception and the juridical order by virtue of the
sovereign's power to decide on the state of exception. The sovereign's decision to
suspend the application of the law in a state of emergency supposes an inability to
define a priori what may constitute an 'emergency'. The ability to decide is thus
predicated upon the practical circumstances confronting the state that cannot be
detailed ahead of time. This entails that the decision to suspend the law is the nexus
which grounds the sovereign as something akin to the "living law" (Agamben, 2005:
70). This is possible because it presupposes that the norm is only applicable by the
decision to enforce it practically. This means that the application of a norm is nowhere
entailed within the norm itself and requires some other, in Schmitt's view, sovereign
force to apply it. Without an internal drive that emanates from within the norm itself, a
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norm's practical application is reliant upon a notion of sovereign authority, who by
virtue of this power, retains the authority to both enforce and suspend the law's
application. On one level, the decision on the state of exception is thus a suspension of
law's application that marks it as a threshold between a proper juridical space and a
topography of anomie (normlessness). Agamben writes that:
...the state of exception is the opening of a space in which application and norm reveal
their separation and a pure force of law releases (that is, applies by ceasing to apply) a
norm whose application has been suspended. In this way, the impossible task of
welding norm and reality together, and thereby constituting the normal sphere, is
carried out in the form of the exception, that is to say, by presupposing their nexus
(2005:40).
This means that in order for the law to have any practical effectiveness there are times
where the decision has to be made to suspend its application by the same authority that
enforces the law. Yet, despite enabling an articulation between the state of exception
and the juridical order, Schmitt's theory leaves us with a paradox. As Agamben has
observed:
[Schmitt's theory] is a paradoxical articulation, for what must be inscribed within
the law is something that is essentially exterior to it, that is, nothing less than the
suspension of the juridical order itself (2005: 33).
The state of exception, as enacted by a political authority, is a situation where the
orders of the sovereign are "juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal
terms" as they exist in a situation where the law's application is suspended (2005: 1).
Thus, the state of exception appears as a legal form, where the sovereign issues decrees
with the binding force of law, yet without a traditional legal form. What Schmitt's
paradoxical articulation entails is that the sovereign's power of decision to declare a
state of exception is the nexus that unites the two fundamental elements of law: norm
and application. The sovereign's power of decision to suspend the constitutional order
thus guarantees its juridical anchorage to the law by virtue of a decision in an
exceptional situation. Since the decision can be made to annul the juridical order, this
state of exception "represents the inclusion and capture of a space that is neither
outside nor inside (the space that corresponds to the annulled and suspended norm)"
(2005: 35). This is why Schmitt can write that "the sovereign stands outside of the
normally valid juridical order, and yet belongs to it, for it is he who is responsible for
deciding whether the constitution can be suspended in toto" (Schmitt quoted in
Agamben, 2005: 35). Schmitt attempts to give the state of exception a juridical context
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through a nexus grounded in the sovereign decision, even though this meant that the
rule of law "lives only by the exception" (Schmitt quoted in Agamben, 2005: 58).
Sovereign authority as one who decides on the exception is thus defined by being the
exception to the juridical order, yet is also its living embodiment.
Topologically the state of the exception is, as Agamben writes, really "defined
by the oxymoron ecstasy-belonging", a place where the sovereign is both inside and
outside the juridical order at the same time (2005: 35). The state of the exception,
therefore, "introduces a zone of anomie into the law in order to make the effective
regulation of the real possible" (2005: 36). Thus, Schmitf s attempt was to "inscribe the
state of exception indirectly within a juridical context by grounding it in the division
between norms of law and norms of the realisation of law" (2005: 50; emphasis
added). To contend with Schmitt's paradox Agamben suggests that it is necessary to
break the legal link between the state of exception and the law and "define the
meaning, place, and modes of its relation to the law" (2005: 51).
Agamben suggests that Schmitt's theory fallaciously attempts to link the state
of exception with the law, when in actuality,
the state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or unconstitutional,
commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all
legal determinations—and above all the very distinction between private and public—
are deactivated" (2005: 50).
The state of exception is thus a space that is completely anomic (normless) and thus
any attempt to annex an inherently normless sphere with the law is fallacious.
Agamben sees this space of the exception as a problem for law where the law,
as being parasitical upon authoritative force, can be extended into new spaces beyond
what was traditionally open to legal regulation under normal conditions. For Agamben
this means that the law is attempting to entertain a fiction or "mystical element" in
attempting to annex or lay claim to a sphere where the law cannot exist. By permitting
law to be negated by a sovereign decision, the "law seeks to annex anomie itself'
through its link with authority (2005: 39). The force of law reaches into situations that
are inherently ungovernable. By virtue of a state of exception an organisation of pure
violence without a formal legality attempts to bring order to a space that is
fundamentally normless. Agamben's contribution to an understanding of the state of
exception is insistent upon "the separation of "force of law" from the law" as being a
central problem confronting the law, rather than being an issue solely of state power,
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that is, of a constituent authority whose violence embodies law (2005: 38). On the one
hand, the state of exception defines a "state of law" where the constitutional order is in
place, but is not applied (it has no force), and, on the other, it creates the space for
decrees that do not have the formal efficacy or value of law, yet they still acquire a
binding significance or 'force'.
This violently regulated, yet legally anomic space of the exception is the
operational topography of genocide. Genocide receives its law-like character without
the formal legal restrictions of a constitutional order, from an authority that fallaciously
embodies the force of law. In other words, the state of the exception is the operational
space of the secret police organisations that receive their orders from an authority that
represents the fallacious image of the force of 'law'. What the state of the exception
leaves open for reclamation is "a force of law without law" that may be assumed by a
state authority or a revolutionary organisation (2005: 39). The indiscretion that
naturally exists between the norm and its application, which normally sustains the
law's functioning, is exploited by an authority underpinning law's application, which
has, in our current political circumstances, its manifestation in the monopolies of
violence—states and revolutionary organisations. Yet, the space opened by the state of
exception enables a policy of genocide to operate unhindered by constitutional law,
thereby liberating the forces of law to confront the emergency 'threats' that confront
the body politic.
In light ofmy discussion of totalitarian law, Agamben's argument suggests that
the force of law, as wielded by the sovereign, occupies "the threshold of indifference"
that exists between anomie and law (2005: 73). However, what Agamben's approach
neglects to add is that the state of exception brought about by an authority also relates
to and possesses a law governed character as exemplified by totalitarian regimes.
Agamben is correct when he suggests that the "biopolitical character of the paradigm
of auctoritas", as exemplified by the modern phenomena of sovereignty, "attains its
appearance of originality from the suspension of the juridical order" (2005: 85). Yet,
what accompanies this suspension is the creation of a new 'law' imposed by the
apparatuses of the state that would be allowed to operate freely according to the
Universal forces of 'Nature' or 'History'. This 'law' attempted to regulate spheres of
human life by imposing a systemic order of violence designed to realise these
Universal forces. The state of exception thus represents not an "empty space, in which
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a human action with no relation to law stands before a norm with no relation to life",
but an opportunity for an authority to bring about a new vision of law with a
foundational basis in the Universal that cannot be disrupted by human action (2005:
86). Whilst it may be advantageous to deconstruct the "fiction" that allows the state of
exception to function, by transforming the "juridico-political system...into a killing
machine", the authority bringing forth this transformation can also suspend the law not
so as to ensure its proper functioning, but to realise a new form of law without a basis
in consensus juris (2005: 86). Since an authority represents the force that has the
ability to apply and thus suspend law, the state of exception is the technical mechanism
for governments to transform and reapply law in new and more radically violent ways.
The Nazis, for example, never bothered to formally abolish the Weimar
Constitution because its applicability was suspended in a state of emergency following
Hitler's assent to authority. On February 28, 1933, Hitler proclaimed "the Decree for
the Protection of the People and the State", which suspended the article of the
Constitution concerning personal liberties (Agamben, 2005: 2). From this point
forward, the Third Reich operated under a state of exception that lasted for twelve
years. This state of exception is the central procedure that enables the other's total
elimination. As Agamben writes:
...modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of
exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of
political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who...cannot be integrated into
the political system (2005: 2).
When the other becomes a central feature of characterising groups that 'cannot' or
'should not' be integrated into a polity, the state of the exception, enacted by a
sovereign decision, releases the normative restraints upon authorities who employ
violence that collapses the juridical topography. The state of the exception has the
potential to become the zone within which the other is destroyed. The pure violence
unleashed in the state ofexception releases the policy ofgenocide from the boundaries
of positive law and is instrumentalised as the dynamic embodiment of a vision of
design.
This ability to declare a state of exception is a juridical fallacy that enables the
policy of genocide to have the force of 'law', without any formal and traditional
legality. This does not mean that following the state of exception those responsible for
atrocities cannot be held accountable by the restored or reconstituted legal order. The
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precedence to hold 'emergency actions' committed in a state of exception accountable
to law dates back to Roman times, and does occur today in rare circumstances.7 Yet, it
is important to note here that it is technically possible for organisations of violence to
operate outside the juridical order in a state of anomie and attempt to colonise this
space by reference to a new kind of law without legality.
The Limits and Convention ofLaw
In summary, there are two important conclusions to be drawn from the preceding
examination of law and genocide. The first point is that the state of exception
technically opens the way for state authorities to develop an organisation entirely
unaccountable to the existing constitutional and legal order. The importance of
Agamben's work is that he examines this possibility from within the components of
law itself to attempt to develop a theory of the state of the exception. In questioning
how the law permits the space of exception to exist, Agamben reveals that the law is
powerless to restrain executive authority due to how authority functions as a nexus that
unites both norm and application by virtue of the power of decision. This means that
the rights of man, which were supposedly inalienable, have proven "to be
unenforceable whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any
sovereign state" and where constitutional rights were suspended (Arendt, 1968: 293;
my emphasis). This ability to suspend the rights of citizens under a state of the
exception has become a permanent feature of all contemporary states, blurring the
distinction between the exception and norm. The permanence of the state of
emergency, as a feature ofstates, indicates that the potentialfor genocidal 'solutions'
is not restrained by the existence ofdomestic laws that ensure individual rights. Once
the state of exception has been declared, states or organisations with the intention to
eliminate groups cannot be restrained by the principles of legality. The state of
exception is thus a mechanism which allows a centralised force, once used to enforce
the law, to suspend and abandon formal legality by opening the avenues for new forms
of'law'.
7 The assassination of Roman citizens under a state of exception was punishable once law was restored,
as with Cicero following the repression of the Catiline conspiracy. The genocide committed by Pol Pot's
Khmer Rouge has never been legally investigated nor prosecuted. No formal prosecutions, as of yet,
have taken place in Argentina for the atrocities committed during the 'Dirty War' despite attempts by
civil rights activists.
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The other point to be gleaned from this discussion is that totalitarian
governments express the need to describe the policy of genocide as a radical measure
that is congruent with a reinterpretation of 'lawfulness'. As Adolf Eichmann never
tired of saying, "the words of the Fiihrer have the force of law" (Eichmann quoted in
Agamben, 2005: 38). The reason why genocidal states acting in an anomic space seek
to reclaim 'Law' is that there is an inherent need to operate the state, even in
circumstances of extreme violence, with an inherent and underlying legitimate order of
'Law'. The radical and perverted policy of extermination enacted by governments
never abandons the image of a lawful order. The image of a universal Natural or
Historic order is, rather than a random feature of totalitarian propaganda, a constituting
feature enabling the state's menacing radicality in its drive to redesign society through
the extermination of the other. This 'faith' is not grounded in the tenets of an ideology,
but is rather based upon the desire to operate within a logical and consistent order.
Identifying this underlying legitimate order of 'Law' relates not to expediency which
may serve to enable collective assumptions that co-ordinate an organisation of
violence. Rather, this basis in law is an inherent disposition that constitutes the hubris
of those elite forces in their vision to reorder society. Zizek has called this kind of
perspective the "symbolic big Other"—the thought that there is an underlying
impersonal set of rules with which we should co-ordinate our existence (Zizek, 2002:
163).
A classic example of this comes from the legalists at the Wannsee conference
in January, 1942, all of whom expressed the reservation of deviating from this
universal legal order of Legitimacy. Their concern was never the nature of the
genocidal measures, nor even less about its validity based in the anti-Semitic
conspiracy, but rather the fact that the decision to exterminate the Jews did not fall
within the legal order which constituted 'Legitimate' policy that would fall under a
conventional understanding of Law. The state of exception as a technical measure
served to negate the legalists' concerns over legality as the policy was conducted
during a time when all constitutional obligations were suspended. To the legalist
objections, Eichmann's statement that the sovereign's words carry "the force of law" in
a state of exception thus negated these reservations over law and legitimacy.
In summary, my discussion of genocide from the perspective of law and
politics has endeavoured to reveal the immanent divergences between a traditional
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legal order and one performing the violence of genocide. This also entailed exploring
the technical mechanisms within traditional law itself which enable a policy of
genocide to operate in a state of anomie where law is suspended. The divergence
between law-as-movement and positive law-as-boundary reveals that the tenets of
genocidal ideology are proscriptive measures of design oriented by Universal 'laws'
that supposedly stem from the organic existence of humanity. As the laws of
movement are the embodied aspects of humanity, genocide becomes the method of
realisation and clarification of these universal forces. The embodiment of these forces
entails both the abandonment of positive law-as-barrier and a collapse of political
space that was once supported by this function of law. As the laws of movement
replace positive law, the collapse of space as a feature of the grammar of totalitarian
design affects the human condition in specific ways; manners which destroy the
capacity for political action. I now turn to the task of exploring the particular
modalities of space that are collapsed by a policy of genocide.
III. Genocide as the Collapse of Space
The common liberal interpretation of totalitarianism as put forth by Rummel and
Horowitz, viewed this form of government as an abusive order in terms of a gross use
of power and betrayal of human freedoms (Rummel, 1995; Horowitz, 2002). Adopting
Arendt's perspective I have argued that this 'common sense' position, as it attempts to
explain genocide, grossly underestimates the impact of this new order of government.
Arendt understood that confronting totalitarianism meant addressing the effects of
genocide and terror by understanding them within a comparative political topography.
From this perspective, Arendt rejected the standard liberal interpretation of
totalitarianism by suggesting that such governments did not merely destroy the
freedom and dignity of their victims, nor even humanity, but rather undermined the
capacities of humans to inhabit a common world. Thus, the systemisation of genocide
and terror served to undermine the common spaces that help constitute individuality in
the world.
One such artefact is the thought that humans have "the right to have rights"
(Arendt, 1968: 299). This capacity, which presupposes any specific constitutional
declaration of rights, imbues humanity with the ability to bear rights inherently and
thus grounds humanity as the source of law. At the time of their inception in 1789, the
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consensus was that the right set out in Declaration of the Rights of Man were
'inalienable' rights meant to protect individuals from the new powers of sovereign
states and from other developing or competing forces within society. This sentiment is
expressed best by Emile Durkheim when he wrote that
It is only through the state that individualism is possible...We might say that in the
State we have the prime mover. It is the State that has rescued the child from
patriarchal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State that has freed the
citizen from feudal groups and later from communal groups; it is the State that has
liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyranny.. .And that is what justifies
the increasing scope of its functions (Durkheim, 1957: 64).
The proclamation of these rights carried forth by the state were thus intended to signify
that the source of Law derived not from God, or its symbiotic political order
manifested by the divine right of kings, but from Man independent of the privileges
bestowed by feudal history or divine authority. In other words, human rights provided
the much needed protection in the new post-feudal order were individuals where no
longer embedded and hence supported by the estates in which they were born. Yet, the
historical rise of rights language arose out of the desire for a representative government
that would be able to express the will of 'a people' rather than of the prince. The
abstract figure of Man became sovereign in matters of law just as 'the people'
proclaimed their sovereignty in matters of government. As 'the people' became
enshrined in representative government, the 'inalienable' Rights of Man became
grounded in the right of the people to posses this ability of self-government. The
Rights of Man, which were supposedly inalienable, as they were independent of all
governments, became blended with the question of self-government. Thus, rights
proved to be unenforceable the moment when individuals lost their own governments.
This meant that representative governments became, as I have discussed previously
concerning the state of exception, the force behind law's application. This entails that
the image of man became inexorably interwoven and socialised within a concept of 'a
people'. Arendt writes that
The whole question of human rights, therefore, was quickly and inexorably blended
with the question of national emancipation; only the emancipated sovereignty of the
people, of one's own people, seemed to be able to insure them. As mankind, since the
French Revolution, was conceived in the image of a family of nations, it gradually
became self-evident that the people and not the individual, was the image of man
(Arendt, 1968: 291).
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The Rights ofMan were supposed to serve as a relational barrier between government
and other social factions. Yet, what demonstrated this failure was the systematic
appearance of stateless persons. Without a government to ensure a minimal standard of
rights, stateless persons found that they had lost their place in the world since no
governments were willing to extend basic rights to non-citizens.
The loss of the capacity to have rights was thus possible by making 'the people'
of representative government the sole arbiter of law's application. In other words, as
states were given the powers to ensure individual rights this also allocated them the
ability to suspend rights. This power of suspension entails that the individual can be
denied a public or political identity and thus collapses a space where individuals can
constitute themselves through expressing opinions with others. With the artefacts of
law and rights suspended in a state of exception, these governments collapse the
capacities of individuals by suspending rights and imposing an architectural model
designed to reconstitute society. Governments have developed specific kinds of violent
interventions designed to negate the capacities such as rights and political action.
Arendt suggested that the concentration camp was the institution that best
expressed the character of totalitarianism because, as 'laboratories', they represented
the radical and perverse effort to change the physical shape of human nature by
destroying the capacity for action and forcing victims to behave regimentally according
to ideological rules. Yet, from a historical perspective of genocide, industrial mass
murder has not been a favoured method of extermination used by states. The Nazis,
particularly earlier in the genocide, used methods of destruction that were far from
industrial, much of it being done by firing squad or by creating conditions conducive to
death by attrition or disease. The modern industrial pattern of genocide, in which the
Holocaust stands as the exemplary case, is in that sense at least not the paradigmatic
exemplar of genocide to which all later methods of genocide are to be measured.
Acknowledging this point does not detract from the argument that genocide is
contingent upon and also manifests a collapse of space. Rather, the roads to systematic
destruction and the annihilation of entire groups itself undermines the most basic
human capacities of the victims through a variety of strategies.
Arendt indicated in a topographical manner what kinds of capacities are
collapsed by conducting systematic annihilation; in what she referred to as the three
stages in "preparation of living corpses"—humans stripped of all their worldly
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distinctiveness (Arendt, 1968: 451). The first concerns, as I have indicated, the
capacity of humans to be rights-bearing subjects: "the first essential step on the road to
total domination is to kill the juridical person in man" (1968: 447; my emphasis).
Conducting genocide under totalitarianism sought to 'prove' and 'demonstrate' that the
inalienable Rights ofMan were nothing more than a liberal fiction that could easily be
destroyed. By revealing rights to be nothing more than an artefact derivative of weak
sympathies associated with rival political systems, genocide could operate as a method
by which to stress the importance of supra-natural forces for totalitarian government.
By destroying this capacity to have rights, the systematic destruction of peoples
becomes not only possible, due to the lack of any safeguards and boundaries that
ensure the space between state and subject, but also because the Rights of Man are
shown to be nothing in comparison to the eternal forces of nature that 'genuinely'
embody humanity. The important point concerning the capacity to have rights is thus
that before the right to existence can be questioned, a condition of rightlessness must
be established.
The second stage in this collapse concerns "the murder of the moral person in
man" (1968: 451). This is accomplished by "making martyrdom, for the first time in
history, impossible" (1968: 451). The perverse, yet skilled, techniques of genocide
developed by the SS made it possible to corrupt social solidarity. By making the daily
functioning of the death camps dependant upon the cooperation of its victims, the
organisation of genocide robbed the inmates of any milieu that could nurture moral
conscience and hence resistance. The instinct for individual survival meant that it was
better to commit injustice and stay alive rather than simply become an unknown
victim. Without any witnesses to testify to the circumstance of their demise, a victim's
death is robbed of any memory and hence meaning for the community. The key
feature of this collapse into superfluousness was the anonymity of mass death. This
was accomplished by the scale and secrecy of human destruction that accompanies
genocide. The scale and secrecy of mass atrocity meant that any attempts at heroism
would never be remembered because all the victims were doomed to perish sooner or
later. Rationally, there was no point to resist when the likelihood of success or
remembrance was removed. For Arendt, the systematic crafting of this sceptical
8 For a discussion of the impossibility of testimony see Agamben's discussion of the 'Musselmanner'
(Agamben, 1999).
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sentiment in the camps was "the real masterpiece of the SS...Their great
accomplishment" (1968: 451). Without any social meaning in a world, gestures of
good will and heroism lose their significance and decisions of conscience become
absolutely questionable. With the certainty of death secured in the minds of victims,
the subjective choice becomes a question not between life and death or "good and evil,
but between murder and murder" (1968: 452). To extend the complicity of mass
murder to the victims themselves meant that there was no guilt-free escape from the
system of destruction; the best one could hope for was personal survival. The
systematic destruction of genocide created conditions where friendship or heroism
(that is, questions of moral conscience) became completely equivocal. Without a
community that is capable of remembrance, death signifies that individuals never
really existed.
The third stage in the process concerns the killing of individuality and
spontaneity. The most significant accomplishment of the camp system was that it
destroyed the individual spontaneity "to begin something completely new...that cannot
be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events" (1968: 455). This
capacity to act, which Arendt termed natality, was the key component of human
freedom and political action. The system of genocide accomplished the eradication of
natality most fully inside the camps by removing all traces of their distinct
individuality. By conducting genocide en masse using the methods of transportation,
the removal of belongings, imprisonment and execution, annihilation served to remove
any signs of distinction that expressed individuality. Thus, the organisation of genocide
dealt not with individuals, but individual expressions of a kind of population or group
category.
At this juncture the efficiency of mass slaughter and the destruction of
individuality merge in line with the laws of movement. Victims are treated equally as
objects of a category that transcends the features of their individual character and are
placed in degrading circumstances that functions to reinforce this perception. Merit,
wealth or social status are trumped, or may even be employed in the service of a policy
of genocide which functions to confirm ideological categories. In the camps, Primo
Levi witnessed how the conditions of life gradually destroyed the human features of
individuals of diverse backgrounds, reducing them to beings who reacted only to the
principles of survival (Levi, 1996: 90). With each individual subject to conditions that
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erode the capacity to act spontaneously as an expression of their distinct character, the
victims of genocide are compressed into becoming the embodiments of a mass
category.
The Superfluousness ofthe Executioners
Destroying the juridical, moral and individual capacities of man in the victims also
called for, Arendt suggested, the creation of the "One Man of gigantic dimensions" that
also compromised the humanity of the executioners (Arendt, 1968: 466). She claimed
that the laws of movement transformed human material into two categories
(executioner and victim) which were designed to accelerate the force of Nature or
History in a logical and consistent manner. This entailed that the executioners must
also lack any spontaneous will or conviction that might obstruct the horrific demands
these laws. This is what Arendt meant when she suggested that the totalitarian system
of government is designed to make all human action "superfluous" in the service of its
laws.
Arendt's analysis of Adolf Eichmann highlighted the point that totalitarianism
sought to use or transform even the most banal subjects into the roles embodying
supra-natural forces. In her correspondence with Carl Jaspers, Arendt (1993) became
convinced that the Nazis built their system of government not on some "radical evil"
that could not be grasped by human understanding, but rather upon the systemic
development of convictionless subjects who rejected any motivation outside of private
concerns. This judgement pertaining to the motivation of the perpetrators was extended
to mean that there was no single ideological motivation to be grasped by any in-depth
examination of the executioners involved in a policy of genocide. These governments
selected executioners like Eichmann who were reliable and "thoughtless" subjects who
would interpret the nature of Hitler's orders without compromise or spontaneous
deviation (Bernstein, 1996a: 142). The notion of the "banality of evil" was seen by
Arendt as a new concept of evil that departed from the history of traditional evil
actions based upon identifiable demonic motives. With Eichmann, Arendt suggested
that his horrific deeds did not correspond to any demonic motives. For Arendt, this
created a gulf of accountability between the horrific deeds and the noticeable lack of
demonic motives in the mind of the doer. When confronted with Eichmann she wrote
that:
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I was struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the
incontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. The deeds were
monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now on trial—was quite
ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous (Arendt quoted in
Bernstein, 1996a: 141).
The conclusion that Arendt reached in bridging this gap between deed and doer was
attributed not to his ideological conviction, which was absent, but to his banal
"thoughtlessness"—his incapacity to think and judge the impact of his actions.9 This
thoughtlessness is not a feature unique to Nazism, but was also a prevalent feature of
Stalin's genocidaires. Nikolay Bukharin wrote concerning the Ukrainian genocide that,
The worst result of the events of 1930-33 was not so much the sufferings of the
peasantry, but the deep changes in the psychological outlook of those Communists
who participated in this campaign and, instead of going mad, became professional
bureaucrats for whom terror was henceforth a normal method of administration and
obedience to any order from above, a high virtue...[this indicated] a real
dehumanization of the people working in the Soviet apparatus (Conquest, 1986: 343).
The system of genocide became possible because it rested upon and created
convictionless subjects—the gigantic "One Man"—who could "all behave like the dog
in Pavlov's experiments" and be able to embody and execute the laws ofmovement as
if they were all identical persons without conscience (Arendt, 1968: 455). The
executioners of these laws could be motivated by ordinary desires for money, status,
job satisfaction or personal/prejudicial vengeance. This observation is supported by
current research into the motivation of lower level genocidaires in the Holocaust which
revealed the absence of any universal social or ideological convictions, unlike those in
elite positions within the ruling hierarchy (Browder, 2003).
In summary, only by considering the three deaths of subjectivity and the
character of the executioners does the importance of a theory of genocide as the
collapse of space gain its full force. The collapse of space thus applies however
unequally to all those involved in the system of destruction. All those with spontaneous
moral convictions would prove to be too unreliable to serve as the executioners of the
laws of movement, just as those spontaneous individuals who took great risks to save
others do not signify the many victims of genocidal violence. This examination entails
thus that for systematic genocide to occur there needs to exist a collapse of the spaces
surrounding and constituting the human condition. Without reliable victims and
9 This analysis ofEichmann inspired Arendt to undertake her last (unfinished) major work titled The Life
ofthe Mind concerning judging, willing and thinking.
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executioners a systematic genocide organised by a state would become almost
impossible to implement. Another question that must be faced for an investigation of
genocide is how much of Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism still applies to
contemporary cases of genocide.
Exemplars ofTopographical Collapse
In Rwanda, the creation of this 'One Man' (divided into its two roles as executioner
and victim) meant that familial relations, commercial bonds and neighbourly
friendships were no guarantee against being killed as a Tutsi or a Hutu 'conspirator'
nor having to 'work' in support of the genocide. The Rwanda genocidaires were not
unlike other 'ordinary' perpetrators of genocide as described by Arendt. Although a
recent study has shown that many of the avoues (confessed genocidaires) used
ideological language that expressed the core of extremist Hutu ideology, many of the
200,000 perpetrators also clearly took advantage of the war and genocide to settle
personal scores, increase their social or economic standing, and/or committed atrocities
out of an obligation to the government (Mironko, 2004: 51). Mironko writes:
The ordinary Rwandans I spoke to in the prisons did not kill Tutsi only because they
were Tutsi, but for a range of reasons that included safeguarding their wealth from
invading Tutsi, as per government propaganda. Many others killed to obtain wealth, as
the genocide leaders promised that they could seize the property of their victims. Some
Hutu killed in order to save their own lives. They were told that they had to kill or they
would be killed, and examples were made of those who refused (2004: 59).
This 'ordinariness' of these motivational patterns is also demonstrated Verwimp's
recent empirical study. He argues that it is not exaggerated to think of the genocide as a
"labour market" centre for participation where people followed government orders out
of economic self-preservation and gain (Verwimp, 2005: 321). He writes:
The poor, landless group...whose livelihood crucially depends upon the availability of
off-farm low skilled jobs (mostly working on someone else's farm) and/or the chance
to rent land from a landlord, were in a very vulnerable position. They could expect to
gain from participation [in the genocide]: it has been widely documented that a large
number of participants, mainly the rank and file among the perpetrators were very
interested in the property of the murdered Tutsi. Among the property, land was a much
desired asset (2005: 319).
This research suggesting that ordinary economic motivates contributed to the Rwandan
genocide is consistent with Arendt's banality of evil hypothesis that ordinary or banal
motives (or even no motives at all) can be used to facilitate horrific atrocities. The
restrictions placed upon labour in a state of exception meant that people would suffer
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economically unless the new laws of movement inciting the destruction of Tutsi and
Hutu conspirators were followed. The forces of the Rwandan state collapsed the space
of ordinary economic opportunities in service of a condition of expropriation to be
profited by genocidaires themselves. This condition of expropriation meant that the
ordinary desires for economic gain or stability could serve rather than hinder the
execution of the genocide.
This manufactured situation where ordinary motives of self-interest, common
in civil society, are manipulated in service of genocide serves to create a disparity of
motivational understanding. Conventional 'common sense' does not bridge this gap
between common motive and horrific evil, because, as Arendt argued, this kind ofevil
has no motivational depth: there is nothing beyond what is ordinarily apparent. The
lack of evil or demonic language by which the perpetrators of genocide might have
used to convince themselves (and others) of the need to commit such extreme violence,
means that for Arendt there is nothing to be found by questioning the content of their
motives which may specifically account for genocidal behaviour. In a letter to
Gershom Scholem, Arendt writes:
It is indeed my opinion that evil is never "radical," that it is only extreme, and that it
possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the
whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is "thought
defying," as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and
the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is
its "banality." (Arendt quoted in Bernstein, 1996: 138-9).
Any attempt at intellectual depth in such examinations always returns to the
ordinariness of individual motivations that were employed in the service of genocide.
In Rwanda recent evidence has shown that ordinary language not only
accompanied the killings, but did so in a manner that organisationally enabled the
genocide. As Mironko observed, this kind of language was an established discourse
"associated with hunting" and "signals...used to alert the community in danger" that
served to facilitate the destruction of Tutsi (Mironko, 2004: 53). Under ordinary
conditions these vocabularies served benevolent ends. Yet, during the genocide they
became vocabularies that facilitated the mass killings. The collapse of the spaces in the
Rwandan case meant that communities ceased to operate according to traditional
morals and occupational roles. Instead, many (mostly young men) became executors of
new laws without changing the common language and multiplicity of ordinary
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motivations that were situated within an economic condition of opportunism. Thus,
participants became the functionaries of government 'work' (the common euphemism
for the genocide) that constituted a condition of expropriation which existed in the
wake of genocide. Thus, what constituted the collapse of space, that is, what was
excluded from acceptable public action was not the normal desires for economic or
social gain, but rather the distinctiveness of self-sufficiency expressed by the skill of
their trade under normal economic conditions. Rather than serve as distinctive
producers of economic enterprise, the perpetrators were forced by the government or
compelled by their own self-interest to become the executioners of a policy of
genocide that built upon and satisfied ordinary social or economic motives.10
Other scholars investigating these distinctive spheres of social and political life
recognise how the effects of terror and totalitarian laws undermine the substantive
character of these spaces. Michael Walzer, in his investigation into the Spheres of
Justice, suggested that the "maximum coordination" to eradicate the other directly
contradicts the "differentiation" of various spheres of life (love, civic virtue, leisure,
social welfare, etc) (Walzer, 1985: 316). The "complex equality" contained within
these distinct aspects of life "is the opposite of totalitarianism", since diversity can
only mitigate the effective coordination of terror and genocide by mitigating the laws
of Nature or History. By opposing the Spheres ofJustice with totalitarianism, Walzer
understood that the spheres of social life are areas that contain their own character by
virtue of norms which can only detract from the Universals laws that 'underpin all
human behaviour'.
Arendt saw that the gap created between motivation and deed, where ordinary
intentions are capable of enabling the horrific violence of genocide, cannot be
understood by way of examining the perpetrator's depth of thought. These examples
10
Just as in Rwanda, civic relations and motives, as well as the bonds of family life, did not provide any
protection from the organisation of genocide under Nazism. Jewish spouses who shared the bonds of
marriage and had families with their non-Jewish partners were also targeted by the policy of genocide.
The story of Lilli Jahn, a Jewish doctor married to a Protestant physician, is a case where the bonds of
family (the attachment to her four children) did not mitigate the genocidal contention with Judaism
(Doerry, 2004). Despite her being interned and murdered by the Nazis only after her divorce from her
husband, others like Lilli, who were still married to their non-Jewish men, were also interned and
murdered. Lilli Jahn's friend Lotte, who was also in this predicament, was saved by the good-will of a
woman doctor, and only survived the genocide by being sheltered in a convent near Freiburg (Doerry,
2004: 255). These kinds of stories are indications that the coordinated efforts of genocide are
accomplishable through the destruction of the spheres that constitute individual distinctiveness, which
can only entail the collapse between the private and public sphere.
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from Rwanda suggest that any retreat into other civic or private spheres do not entail
any categorical protection from becoming a victim or a perpetrator. The lesson to be
gleaned here is that genocide is not based upon a motivational sphere where the
perpetrators are actually motivated by the forces of Nature or History. Rather,
motivational language is not only stratified, as recent empirical research indicates, but
it is also the case that genocidal governments actively create conditions where
thoughtless and convictionless subjects perform their functions (as victims or
perpetrators and sometimes interchangeably) according to the laws of movement.
Genocidal authorities, through the technical implementation of force, collapse space by
changing the conditions upon which ordinary vocabularies of self-interest operate.
The Limits ofArendt's Theory ofTotalitarianism for a Study ofGenocide
Despite the insightful depth of Arendt's investigation of totalitarianism and its relation
to a policy of extermination, there are limitations to what her theory of totalitarianism
can tell us about genocide. Examining these boundaries can illuminate what important
areas of overlap between genocide and totalitarianism are in need of exploration. I will
argue in this section that the paradoxes of genocide are implicitly identifiable within
Arendt's theory, yet are not explored or openly identified for reasons relating to the
kind of historical investigation of totalitarianism. I want to argue that it is necessary to
extend the inquiry of genocide beyond the concern over its associations with a
particular form of government. Thus, my efforts have been designed to shift the
debates about genocide from a focus on the rivalry between totalitarianism versus
democracy, to one based upon the distinction between the grammar of genocide versus
authentic political action. Despite the great value of her theories of politics and
totalitarianism, Arendt's substantive historical investigation limits the power of what
her theory of totalitarianism can tell us about the policy of genocide. This is because
what constitutes totalitarian government is the dynamic system of institutional terror
that results in genocide, and not a kind of anti-political grammar that animates and
'legitimates' the extermination of groups. This limitation comes to the fore when one
examines and exposes the tension latent within a central feature of totalitarian
government: anti-utility.
In her investigation of the concentration camps, Arendt fell short of revealing
the paradoxical nature of genocide, despite acknowledging the anti-utility of the Nazi
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system at the expense of the war effort. She argued that the camp system defied any
commonsense utilitarian thinking because the genocide trumped all other priorities of
the government. The flouting of commonsense is demonstrated by the camps'
anti-utilitarian function, the fact that not even the supreme emergencies of military
activities were allowed to interfere with these "demographic policies." It was as
though the Nazis were convinced that it was of greater importance to run
extermination factories than to win the war (Arendt quoted in Bernstein, 1996: 92).
According to Arendt, the anti-utility of totalitarianism is expressed through the policy
of genocide because it is based upon the perverse logic of ideological thinking. The
logical purity of totalitarian ideology means that a policy of extermination makes
precise sense if two attributes are present: 1) a certain system of "paranoiacs" is in
place "where everything follows with absolute necessity once the first premise" that
the other must exterminated; and 2) a "pure" organic group is in danger of being
contaminated by inferior groups or races (Arendt quoted in Bernstein, 1996: 92).
This explanation suggests that Arendt does acknowledge a utilitarian function
for a policy of genocide that lies outside the boundaries of traditional common sense.
From Arendt's perspective, totalitarian genocide is a betrayal of common sense if one
assumes that government is about the aggrandisement of power. Yet, totalitarianism
possesses a utilitarian function in service of their ideological "supersense"—the
unquestionable and instinctual devotion to the validity of belief (Arendt, 1968: 458).
This ideological description of genocide does, however, undercut the poignancy of her
anti-utilitarian comments because genocide does have a utilitarian function for
totalitarianism as it creates and justifies the government and society it seeks to
establish. Arendt writes:
Without the concentration camps, without the undefined fear they inspire and the very
well-defined training they offer in totalitarian domination, which can nowhere else be
fully tested with all of its most radical possibilities, a totalitarian state can neither
inspire its nuclear troops with fanaticism nor maintain a whole people in complete
apathy (Arendt, 1968: 456; my emphasis).
This tension exists because the standpoint and purpose of evaluation oscillates between
a perspective of common sense and one situated from the perspective of totalitarian
government itself. Although Arendt does not resolve this tension, Bernstein argued that
there is no discrepancy in characterising the system of genocide because its anti-utility
is only "apparent" because what really concerned Arendt was how the camps
functioned to make humans superfluous to ideological laws (Bernstein, 1996: 96).
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This argument does not resolve the tension either, because the contradiction
derives from the policy of genocide itself and not from the other aspects of the
totalitarian state. Arendt's account retains this tension because what characterises
totalitarian governments is their terror methods of genocide as they engineer human
superfluousness. The mutually constitutive link between genocide and totalitarianism
means that Arendt's approach avoids questioning the operational language of a policy
of annihilation itself, treating genocide as an expression of totalitarian government.
Thus, the paradoxical nature of genocide itself is not identified because there is no
exploration of the kind of grammar that underlies this policy and how this language is
contradicted by the conduct of genocide itself. What Arendt's approach provides is a
crystallisation thesis about the structural rise of a novel form of government by
analysing the conditions, purposes and destructive aspects of a system that collapses
political space in order to manufacture human superfluousness. Thus, to better account
for genocide and even perhaps to resolve this tension in Arendt's perspective requires
that the notion of genocide must be uncoupled from the notion of totalitarian
government.
Arendt explained the functions of the camps as a policy of genocide that
qualified a new form of government which broke with the perspective of traditional
politics. Therefore, to think of totalitarianism as being a form of government that is
based upon the libido dominandi (the lust to dominate or rule) is a serious mistake that
ignores the importance of its ideological laws of movement as being the essential
expression and embodiment of this form of government. By revealing the importance
of total domination as a tool for reshaping mankind through genocide, Arendt sought to
show that the anti-utility of the system revealed the distinctiveness of totalitarianism as
a new form of government departing from the perspective of traditional political
historiography. The fundamental point here is that this apparent anti-utility falls short
of revealing just how deeply paradoxical a policy of genocide is for perpetrating the
government's own ideology, regardless of the government's form (autocratic,
totalitarian or democratic). Instead, her focus was to address the "hidden structure" of
totalitarian government as it was expressed by the terror created by the concentration
camp system." Overall, Arendt was concerned with "Twentieth-century political
" In a letter to Carl Jaspers (Sept. 4, 1947), Arendt acknowledged that there had been a significant
change in her thinking: "the third and concluding part will be devoted to the structures of totalitarian
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developments" that have "driven the Jewish people into the storm center of events" and
that finally resulted in the "emergence of the unprecedented crime of genocide in the
midst of Occidental civilisation" (Arendt, 1968: xiv\ my emphasis). Her primary focus
was thus upon the novel political development of the time, namely the advent of
totalitarianism.
The second feature of Arendt's investigation that is limited concerning an
investigation of genocide concerns the victims of totalitarianism. As Arendt's
investigation of the Jewish question was confronted through facing political
developments, "political anti-Semitism" became the virulent kind of anti-Semitism
which explains why the Jews became the central targets of Nazi policy (Arendt quoted
in Bernstein, 1996: 54). To explain this political variant, Arendt goes into great detail
about the historical rise of political anti-Semitism. The central point that matters for
my purposes here concerns the fact that Jews became subject to political anti-Semitism
in Europe at a time when Jews were rapidly losing public power and influence. Anti-
Semitism thus became an "Outrage to Common Sense" because it appeared most
explosive to the population at a time when Jews possessed no real political power
(Arendt, 1968: 3). Thus, Jews came to be viewed as a politically isolated group that
possessed wealth. Arendt accounts for this relationship by exploring the role of power
present in the political culture of Europe. It became possible to persecute "powerless or
power-losing groups" because "what make[s] men obey or tolerate real power, is the
rational instinct that power has a certain function and is ofsome general use'''' (1968:
5; my emphasis). The fact that Jews appeared to European society as a group with
"wealth without power" effectively made them targets of hatred (1968: 5). Wealth
without function revolts society because this condition negates the bonds that hold
society together by demonstrating that wealth only has personal significance. Arendt
writes that
Wealth which does not exploit lacks even the relationship which exists between
exploiter and exploited; aloofness without policy does not imply even the minimal
concern of the oppressor for the oppressed (Arendt, 1968: 5).
Yet, despite this recognition of a "general rule" of totalitarian victimology, Arendt
suggests that the importance of this targeting principle exists "only in order to refute
states. I have to rewrite this completely because I've only recently become aware of some important
things here, especially in regard to Russia" (Arendt quoted in Bernstein, 1996: 89). These "important
things" she refers to are the preponderance of the concentration camps.
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those recommendations of common sense which lead us to believe that violent hatred
or sudden rebellion spring necessarily from great power and great abuses" (1968: 5).
Thus, Arendt is dismissive of these kinds of general rules because they are abstracted
from the historical contexts and stories which give them meaning.
What Arendt overlooks here is the existence of the victim paradox as a way of
identifying the family resemblances that exist within the architectural grammar of
genocide as a policy. Other than an investigation into political anti-Semitism there is
no examination of just how important the general language of genocidal victimology is
in seeking out and destroying the 'power' of the powerless as a distinct strategy of
government. Arendt's perspective cannot give us a specific picture of genocide because
it seeks to confront the nature of totalitarianism through a kind of historical storytelling
that rejects the significance of "general rules" as it applies to her investigation of
political anti-Semitism. Yet, what is puzzling about her theory of totalitarianism is that
she does not relinquish the importance of identifying the family resemblances between
historical instances of totalitarianism, despite the substantive and competing ideologies
of Nazism and Stalinist Communism. This scheme thus seeks to qualify overarching
resemblances with substantive historical analyses to explain the structure of totalitarian
regimes without describing the resemblances of victimology present in the instances of
Russian totalitarianism. Thus, Arendt never identifies the common traits that link the
victims of genocide together, but focuses instead upon the political and institutional
dynamics that were produced by a policy of extermination or "liquidation" (Arendt,
1968: 319).
Overall, Arendt's theory of totalitarianism, despite its brilliance in giving us an
insight into how a policy of extermination operates for totalitarianism as a novel form
of government, does not give us enough insight into the policy of genocide and its
central grammar such as to enable us to better account not only for the paradoxical
nature of genocide, but also to enable us to understand it as a distinct strategy of
government in dealing with the other. There is thus a need to investigate the
architectural grammar of totalitarian language as it is seeks to instrumentalise a policy
of genocide. To give a more comparative middle-range account of a policy of genocide
means addressing not only case histories, but also qualifying a new understanding of
genocide as a collapse of space, by better revealing the linguistic schemes that
specifically underpin a policy of extermination. In other words, it is necessary to
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investigate the linguistic paradigm that informs the social and political thinking that
underpins the desire to eradicate the other. This means that there are patterns of social
and political discourse that can better account for the stability of genocide as a
'solution' to the problem-other which cannot be explained by historical coincidence
nor governmental form. This position entails moving beyond the methodological idea,
as demonstrated empirically by Rummel (1995), that governmental forms can tell us
something important about the immanent operations of a policy of genocide.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued for a new political and juridical understanding of
genocide. I first premised this argument upon the antithetical divergence between
genocide and two theories of political action. I suggested that genocide, as an
organisation of force, is only possible if positive law is suspended, since the nature of
organizing mass atrocity can only be accomplished where the boundaries separating
and relating the citizen and state have been fundamentally reconstituted and collapsed
by a new form of law without legality12. The central hypothesis was that this operation
of force that destroyed the function of positive law-as-boundary constituted the first
step in the collapse of political space.
I analysed this reconstruction in political and juridical terms. I first argued, in
revealing a limitation of Carl Schmitt's theory, that the nature of force can constrain
the political. I explained this limitation by discussing Arendt's distinction between
power and force, and argued that the presence of force can fundamentally erode the
sphere of politics by employing methods of deceit and violence. In this sense, genocide
is the quintessential exemplar of force as it represents organisational violence whose
purpose is to eliminate the potential of political action with the other. From Arendt's
theory of politics and totalitarianism I showed how they constituted diametrically
opposed systems of government, the former based upon a public space that avowed
individuals to define who they are in communication with others, whereas the latter
destroyed the public sphere by a system of terror and genocide that defined what
people are by making humans superfluous to the forces ofNature or History.
In the second part of this chapter I argued that the policy of genocide, as it is
characterised by a dynamic expansion of violence and reduction of space, should be
12 Cf. Judith Shklar( 1986).
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understood topographically. This meant that the forced manipulation of social and
political institutions is interwoven with a language of design where humans become
the embodiments of living space. I suggested that this design is manifested by genocide
as it comes to fundamentally replace the function of positive law. Through Arendt's
analysis I argued that genocide is inextricably linked with the function of law-as-
movement. As humans become the embodiments of Natural and Historical forces, this
precludes the possibility of individual distinctiveness in public, since these 'laws'
presuppose that all are the living embodiments of a single force of universal
proportions. By suggesting that genocide can only exist in a post-Durkheimian social
order, I sought to examine exactly how the social conditions of genocide rested not
upon the commitment to fervent ideological beliefs, but rather upon a non-spontaneous
social order, one that contrasts with the conditions that underpin criminal law. 1 also
explained that genocide is not based upon a lawless society as exemplified by
tyrannical government. Genocide is thus a policy derived not from lawless
government, but from a highly regulated and organised enterprise in spite of its
extrajudicial nature. By describing genocide as being based upon law without legality,
I described how it was possible to create the potential for genocide in the state of
exception—a state of anomie where law is suspended. I described how state and
revolutionary authorities retain the technical possibility of suspending the applicability
of law in a state of emergency in an attempt to colonise an inherently anomic realm
with the laws ofHistory or Nature through the violence of genocide. One conclusion to
be reached from this discussion was that attempts to outlaw genocide could not restrain
the state from suspending these legal norms, since the force of law's application rests
in those authorities who possess the means of violence.
In the final part of this chapter I examined what kinds of spaces are collapsed
by a policy of genocide. Following Arendt, I showed how the nature of genocidal
atrocity destroys the three core aspects of political action: the juridical person (in the
ability to posses rights), the moral person (in having the potential for public memory
and heroic action), and the human person (by retaining the capacities of conviction and
spontaneous action). The systematic destruction of the other is not only dependant
upon manufacturing the superfluousness of the victims, but also those who perform as
executioner. Superfluousness is necessary for genocide in order to unleash the laws of
movement because to commit horrific violence demands a consistency of behaviour
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that is at risk of being interfered, and hence interrupted, by spontaneous judgment and
conviction. I showed how the superfluousness of the perpetrators created a gap in
understanding that existed between the horrific deeds and banal motives. I explored
these ordinary motivations in the case of Rwanda and showed how genocide operated
in conjunction with socio-economic motives and other ordinary vocabularies of
succour and sport. I argued that the ordinary vocabularies of motive became
recontextualised in support of the genocide by the force of government. In the final
section of this chapter I explored the limitations of Arendt's thesis for the study of
genocide and argued that her task of exploring the crystallisation of a new political
form (totalitarianism) obstructed a clear view of genocide as a distinct policy of
government. The reason for this obscurity occurred because what defined
totalitarianism as a novel form of government was based upon an account of genocide
under the concentration camp system. I argued that in order to explore the inherent
grammar of genocide on its own, one must abandon the association of genocide and
governmental forms. Now that I have discussed the limitations of governmental forms
as an explanation of genocide, I shall turn to an exploration of its practice and language
of architecture.
Chapter Five
The Architecture of Terror
[States that] have made a proper beginning conducive to improvement may by
circumstance become perfect...but...the majority of men will not accept new laws
designed to introduce new institutions in the state unless they are shown the necessity
for them. Since such a necessity cannot arise except in [the] event ofdanger, it is likely
that the state willperish before it is ever brought to a perfect order.
Niccolo Machiavelli1
All that the good call evil must come together that one truth may be born: O, my
brothers are you, too, evil enough for this truth? The bold attempt, prolonged mistrust,
the cruel No, satiety, the cutting into the living—how seldom do these things come
together! Butfrom such seed is—truth raised.
Friedrich Nietzsche
The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle ofour philanthropy. And one
shall help them to do so. What is more harmful than any vice?—Active sympathy for
the ill-constituted and weak-Christianity.
Friedrich Nietzsche3
Introduction
One of Arendt's most insightful observations concerned her warning that "totalitarian
solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong
temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political,
social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of men" (Arendt, 1968: 459; emphasis
added). This passage suggests that 'totalitarian solutions' may operate as practical
interventions independent of full-blown totalitarian governments. This means that
genocidal solutions can be supported and conducted independently of the form of
government which implements them. One should no longer expect to witness a
symmetry between totalitarian government and totalitarian solutions. Arendt's
suggestion acknowledges that while totalitarian governments may be ephemeral,
1 The Discourses (1981: 91 -2).
2 Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1969: 218).
3
Twilight ofthe Idols/The Anti-Christ (1990: 128).
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appearing only for brief periods in our political landscape, their methods of elimination
survive as "strong temptations", that are established features of domination that are
open for reclamation and employment by those who govern.
Sheldon Wolin's recent work has provided historical evidence to add validity to
this insight. Totalitarian methods, he writes, such as "mass persuasion, indoctrination,
and controlled terror", have become "major tendencies in all politics of the latter half
of the century" (Wolin, 2004: 519). Governments have adapted and expropriated
methods of deception and terror that have become permanent features of not only
authoritarian governments, but also ofmany Western representative democracies.4 This
evidence suggests that there are factors independent of the form of government which
incline states to accept genocidal solutions to 'social problems'. What I argue in this
chapter is that there exists a political grammar of design which predisposes those in
power to treat genocide as a temptation—one of many 'legitimate solutions' to
'problem populations'.
My central argument of this chapter is that there is a grammar which is
embraced by governments that postulates genocide as one of many 'acceptable
solutions' to the 'deficiencies' of a societal design. Part of this chapter will thus
explore the substance of this grammar. I claim that this grammar of design shares
family resemblances with what Sheldon Wolin has called "critical totalitarianism"
(Wolin, 2004: 465). Before reaching this discussion of grammar, I examine part of the
sociological structure which gives this grammar its public potency; that is, the context
of its 'speech'. In the second part of this chapter, I explore the immanent structure of
this grammar that enables a public by revealing the importance of specific attributes:
paradigmatic incommensurability and consistency. Specifically, I explore how the
structure of this grammar is designed to engender legitimacy and popular support by
investigating the cognitive and discursive scheme employed by governing authorities
to establish genocide as a temptation for specific audiences. 1 will argue that the tenets
of this scheme can, if accepted, constitute a logical trap where audiences are more
likely to adhere to specific suppositions about the other as encouraged by the strategic
management of information and events. Once accepted, the tenets of this grammar can
function to mitigate resistance from unmediated social groups—those citizens not part
4 Cf. Wolin's reference to the Bush administration in his article titled 'Inverted Totalitarianism' in The
Nation, May 19, 2003.
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of the traditional party or organised labour structure. More importantly, however, I
suggest that this strategic effort is part of a cycle of violence which is conscientiously
instigated and managed by authorities. This systematic effort is the exemplar of
Arendt's notion of 'force' which enables and carries forth the grammar of genocide.
I. Managing the Cycle of Terror
Arendt (1968) wrote that one of the greatest challenges for totalitarian governments
was to preserve the image of the 'other-as-threat' whilst exercising complete
domination over society. Under conditions of total domination, the elimination of all
opposition and organised resistance entails that the image of the 'secret-threatening'
other becomes more difficult to maintain, since the logic of control contradicts the
nature of the threatening other. The strategies to maintain the image of the 'other-as-
threat' are essential for understanding how governments manage societal contexts for
their terror policies. To pivot the transition to new, more 'perfect order' demands
mitigating civic opposition and increasing cooperation by employing effective methods
to better 'contextualise' or add credence to the government's propaganda.
Machiavelli, as quoted above, suggested that the multitude can only understand
the need for "new laws"—that is, a reordering of society—under conditions of
emergency created by subversive threats to the social order; what he called the "event
of danger" (Machiavelli, 1981: 91). These events he referred to are the emergency
conditions which demonstrate that there actually exists "such a necessity" to change or
reform the fundamental principals of the social order (1981: 91). A key attribute of
modern state power is that many states posses the technological ability to manage and
manufacture events of danger to augment the nature of political life. When the
transition to a new order is instrumentalised by a grammar of design that professes to
be animated by the Universal forces of 'Nature' or 'History', the effort to change
society necessarily transcends and challenges the boundaries of law and descends into
the once insular spheres of private life. The "perfect order" for these 'totalitarian' (that
is, totally encompassing) efforts thus depends upon an ethic of managerialism that can
break with or suspend existing social and political boundaries in order to
instrumentalise the temptation to eliminate the other (1981: 91). This is accomplished
by reference to the various forms of 'special pleading', which proclaims that the threat
of the other demands new laws and methods which circumvent the established juridical
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institutions that once ensured a space for the political and juridical subject. These kinds
of special pleading are the instrumental proclamations intended to mitigate opposition
and increase public support for "new laws" (1981: 91). Yet, these forms of managerial
intervention would barely qualify as 'manipulations' if governments would confine
themselves to proclaiming special pleas regarding the other. Instead, what governments
actively seek most is the ability to change or act upon the conditions which regulate
patterns of civic action to 'validate' their interventions.
To overcome the paradox of total control authorities can thus manipulate the
conditions which effectively resituate the "majority of men" in a position where the
need to reorder and 'protect' society becomes rational and acceptable even against
those with no actual power (Machiavelli, 1981: 49). 'Resituating' entails augmenting
the material and social conditions which incline the majority of people towards certain
kinds of action and opinion. Governments, in these situations, thus possess the ability
to both build upon existing conditions and also consciously determine the conditions of
opinion as expressed by much of the population. One strategy that demonstrates this
ability is the creation or reliance upon insecurity to harness societal change. On a
societal-wide level, Melson, Fein and others have hypothesized that civil and
international conflict can exacerbate domestic insecurity which may serve as a catalyst
for governments to conduct genocide (Melson, 1992; Fein, 1993). Below I will
examine how this is possible for states to create and perpetuate a milieu of insecurity
which inspires individual preserving action in support of a policy of extermination.
There exists sociological evidence which suggests that those groups who are
established in elite positions in society react in predictable patterns to the conditions of
insecurity. In The Established and the Outsiders, Elias and Scotson showed in their
description of the established and outsider dialectic that the more threatened the
established group felt, the greater their beliefs were likely to be driven "towards
extremes of illusion and doctrinaire rigidity" (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 93). The
established members of the community used "their power to define the situation and
impose their definition on all those involved" (Bauman, 2003: 144). This definitional
tendency encloses "the newcomers in an iron cage of stereotype" that relies upon "a
highly simplified representation of social realities" (2003: 144). Elias and Scotson also
found that the established group reacted to the presence of outsiders by closing ranks,
thus forging greater social bonds that would ensure that their status in the community
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would be preserved. The importance of Elias and Scotson's research was that they
showed that the structural conditions of their bonding determined the dynamics of
discrimination and oppression. This meant that discrimination was determined "not by
any of the characteristics possessed by the groups concerned", but rather by the
conditions within which they were related to each other (Elias and Scotson, 1994:
xxxi). Thus, the power of the situation, where one group possesses an established hold
within a community, was found to govern their interrelation with those outside the
established social order. The outsider group was judged by the established community
as newcomers who lack cohesion and discipline. Anomie was "perhaps the most
frequent reproach against" the outsiders because their presence threatened the
solidarity within the established group (1994: xxv). The "emotional barrier" of
solidarity felt by the established group meant that they
felt impelled, and had the sufficient power resources, to treat those of another group
collectively with a measure of contempt, as a people less well bred and thus of lower
human value, by comparison to themselves (1994: xxi).
What the established community feared most was becoming anomic and losing their
standing within the community. The 'threatening' existence of outsiders was thus
conveyed by a language of 'contamination' in reference to their corrupting influences
'intended' to erode solidarity. How this kind of relational dynamic becomes influenced
by a strategic manipulation of insecurity will be the focus of this first section.
The purpose of this section is thus to show how established authorities, who
control the means of violence, can both capitalise on a situation of disparity and
intentionally intensify it by strategic interventions, effectively adding greater force to a
condition where beliefs about the other become more radicalised and entrenched. Thus,
there exists a pattern of reinforcement where radicalised and entrenched beliefs
resembling prophecies are directly influenced by collective action against the other.
My central argument is that the cycle between the language of the other and the
conditions of society is mutually reinforcing; that is, vocabularies of action and
motivation about the other can inspire action, and in turn influence the conditions in
which the other is situated. Likewise, a reverse pattern is also identifiable;
governments can employ measures of force that change the conditions upon which the
relations with the other are based, making more radical beliefs appear necessary in
circumstances of emergency. In both of these hypothetical scenarios, the other
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becomes the pivot (that is, the Lacanian 'quilting point') for a radical transformation of
society through a policy of genocide.
In the first part of this Chapter I will examine how an established group can
manufacture the ideological basis for genocide by the strategic use of violence and
even by the commission of genocidal atrocity itself. Genocidal violence can function to
set in motion predictable reactions that can add credence to ideological doctrines that
advocate extermination. The focal point of this manipulation concerns the creation of
emergency conditions to augment the established community's expectations about the
others' future actions and present loyalties. Genocidal practice is not only a policy
reaction to these emergency conditions, but is also what demonstrates and constitutes
the reality of an emergency situation itself. Genocide, as both a corollary and
constitutive emergency measure, thus fulfils the central demand of the elite forces of
society: that the contention with the other should become unleashed from all societal
restraints and implemented as the primary ideological drive to reorganise the social
order.
The second part of this section will concern the discursive dimension of this
cycle by investigating the substantive sociological patterns of attributing motive to the
actions of the other. This investigation entails analysing the discursive format and
function of positing motivation as a strategy to influence the future actions of victims
and perpetrators. In the third section of this chapter, I will show how these
vocabularies of motivation become interwoven with the self-fulfilling prophecy. This
relation between vocabularies of motive and strategic action forms a cycle where
individual action directed towards self-preservation on the part of the intended victim
functions to fulfil the specific ideological tenets of the government's fight against the
'domestic enemy.' The interaction between the conditions of emergency and the
vocabularies of motive constitutes a cycle that generates its own destructive
momentum. The first half of this chapter thus puts forth an explanation of how the
spaces of society (morality, law and politics) come to be collapsed by the strategies and
conditions managed by authorities.
Genocidal Action as Ideological Confirmation
Contrary to the prevailing assumptions about violent conflict, the social and ethnic
differences between those who commit genocide and those subject to it have tended to
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be marginal and more often non-existent. This lack of identifiable division means that
genocidal authorities are faced with a task of exposure and clarification of 'hidden'
differences between groups. The importance of Elias and Scotson's investigation
showed that the structural interrelation between groups is a central factor in generating
discriminating behaviour (that is, manufacturing difference). The stratified conditions
of the situation, where one group possesses power and solidarity, and the other does
not, is also a contributing factor in the possibility of genocide. Current investigations
into minority-state relations have called this kind of approach "constructivist" because
it argues that the boundaries between groups are not historically or racially entrenched,
but are "produced and reproduced by specific social processes" that are under continual
evaluation (Fearon and Laitin, 2000: 874). In this section I want to explore the role of
strategic violence in demonstrating the 'secret divisions' between groups that
instrumentalise a policy of genocide. I will argue that genocide itself, rather than being
a form of violence requiring strict divisions between groups, can also function as an
instrument producing or reconfirming new divisions between groups. Genocide can
thus actively inspire its own ideological premises by acting as if the social distinctions
are in fact genuine.
This position differs from the dominant conflict-genocide hypothesis—as held
by Harff and Gurr, and Shaw, and discussed in chapters Two and Three—where
genocide is seen as a consequence of genuine social or political conflict and group
divisions. Instead, I argue that genocide can inspire the conditions necessary for its
own performance. Due, in part, to the extremity of its force, genocidal violence is thus
a kind of intervention that changes the contours of decision making patterns, which can
increase the likelihood of genocide becoming the principal policy of societal design.
G. K. Chesterton, in his critique of contemporary doctrines, famously remarked
in his appraisal of the guillotine that all progressive or revolutionary actions that seek
to reformulate the world demand fixed ideals:
The guillotine has many sins, but to do it justice there is nothing evolutionary about it.
The favourite evolutionary argument finds its best answer in the axe. The Evolutionist
says, "Where do you draw the line?" the Revolutionist answers, "I draw it here:
exactly between your head and the body". There must at any given moment be an
abstract right or wrong if any blow is to be struck; there must be something eternal if
there is to be anything sudden (Chesterton, 1908: 115, 1 16).
164
Any decision to act decisively in public matters always-already entails some sort of
reference to collective ideals that are engendered by the acting authority—"As long as
the vision of heaven is always changing, the vision of the earth will be the same. No
idea will remain long enough to be realised..." (1908: 115). Yet, Chesterton implicitly
recognises that ideals are only important as they are effectual, and it is this effectuality
of ideals that makes systemic actions possible. The force of any logic is thus only as
powerful as it is both effectual and eternal. If, for example, a political position suggests
that a group is threatening to contaminate society through corruption, there must be
events or visible actions to demonstrate the validity of these ideals. However, there is
no single method that operates in the realisation and spread of eternal ideals. For the
majority, ideals are only valid if they are demonstrated as 'facts' of the world in which
they live. Events such as trials, punishments or violent conflicts themselves can
demonstrate the validity or existence of ideals, some of which inspire patterns of
intense emotive adherence.5
I am suggesting that the modern power of governments can be employed to
validate established ideals by strategic actions (such as manufacturing events),
effectively adding greater poignancy to the seriousness of a contention or worldview.
An exemplar of such actions is evident in the recruitment of suicide bombers. Too
often one assumes that these individuals are the "subject supposed to believe"—in
order for the bomber to commit such an act, we presume that they are fervent adherents
to the cause (Zizek, 2002: 72). The suicide bomber, far from being the militant
character of the movement, is rather the recruited fodder gathered from those
experiencing anomie or psychological distress and who previously lacked any serious
public or ideological commitment. From what is known about the lives of suicide
bombers they are, as Zizek reports, persons in a condition of anomie and confusion
which is usually caused by some kind of personal trauma. As Zizek argues, it is often
the case that recruits "are terribly unsure about their beliefs, and they use the suicidal
act as a means of resolving this deadlock of doubt" (2002: 72). Recruiters of suicide
bombers seek out such individuals by persuading them of the virtues of self-sacrifice in
service of a political struggle. Paradoxically, subjects choose to resolve their personal
tension in life through self-destructive acts. Their suicidal action is thus the most
5 An example of such divergent reactions surrounding a specific event was observable in the O.J.
Simpson trial which juxtaposed the desires to acknowledge police corruption and racial discrimination
versus the desires for justice.
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extreme public demonstration of a self-justification: the militant ideologically
motivated explosion is the conformation that I am this as I stand here. Thus, even
though suicide arose out of a condition of anomie, their self-sacrifice represents a
declaration to the community and to himself that this was where he or she stood in
public matters. The extreme and violent intervention against an opponent is a
clarification of one's position that derives from and confronts a personal condition of
anomie. The bomber becomes the embodiment of ideals which reveals and re-states to
the community, and to the bomber himself, that there is a difference between us and
them. In this case, violence is the force that clarifies the intensity of the struggle, where
the explosion represents the demonstrated union with the cause. The extremity of
violence is to be understood as an indication of the seriousness of the antagonism
where the suicide bomber, like Chesterton's revolutionary use of the guillotine, is the
decisive agent-weapon that demarcates one's position in a pre-existent antagonism
except in reverse. Whereas Chesterton's revolutionary was motivated by fixed ideals,
the suicide bomber was driven by a condition of meaninglessness. The paradox here is
that the bomber uses the self-destructive participation to resolve a condition of
normlessness. In other words, the act of violent self-destruction is the conformation of
a set of ideals through the performance against an enemy without any prior ideological
devotion on the part of the bomber that may account for his actions. If it were not for
the fatality the act, the decision to participate in a violent struggle would likely inspire
greater belief and commitment to the ideals of the movement. The lesson here is that
terror movements can exploit the anomic conditions of society to expand and intensify
their struggles without any prior ideological commitments.
The significance of this pattern for an analysis of genocide is that violent
actions against the other can change the structural conditions between the other and a
state authority. Violent actions like those of the suicide bomber can function as
clarifications for public struggles arising out of anomic conditions prevalent in society.
Thus, the use of force by governments which employ the methods of civic persecution,
legal discrimination, extrajudicial arrests and assassinations are measures designed to
provoke divisive reactions from opponents which clarify political divisions or fulfil
other strategic aims. Once clarified governments can build upon these conditions by
exaggerating prevalent fears by strategically developing new forms of violent
intervention in conditions of emergency.
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There are also political consequences faced when employing violence as
opposed to other rhetorical strategies. On one level, the extremity of violence and
threat to human life signifies that the contention is serious and demands acute
attention. Secondly, violence can also further intensify political commitments by
provoking reactions from the political opposition and the targeted group. These
reactions are often predictable, and are thus open to management by the powers of the
movement. Genocidal violence and smaller scale atrocities can make personal and
collective security a primary social concern, and also serve to increase the obedience
and efficacy of government agencies assigned to carry out future violence.
Violence as Contextual Intervention
Another important strategy evoked by genocidaires, which operates in conjunction
with the promotion of division through violence, involves depicting the other as an
exceptional problem. Employing violence and terror against a group can thus instigate
reactions that demand 'special measures'. This specifically involves challenging the
existing conventions on the treatment of persons by the invocation of 'special pleas,'
which proclaim that customary obligations must be disavowed when considering the
other due to the uniqueness of circumstance or nature of the 'threat'. The means that
genocidaires never challenge the existing moral bans on murder and other measures
(torture and ill-treatment) enacted against individuals directly. Instead, their special
pleading advocates a suspension of the moral and legal order which extricates the other
from the traditional sphere of political and legal obligations. The state of exception, as
I examined in chapter Four, is fundamental in making genocide possible because it is
the technical extension of these pleas that instrumentalise the other's 'special
treatment'. The relationship between strategic violence and an ideology of special
pleading is inexorably and mutually reinforcing in that the abilities of modern state
power can control, build upon, and invoke the conditions of emergency necessary for
more radical interventions. The state thus possesses the ability to structure the
conditions of its own policies, including genocide, thereby greatly improving the
probability that their own ideals will become realised.
These forms of strategic action reveal the power of elites to encourage a radical
shift in paradigms towards totalitarian worldviews. The actions of elite forces
persecuting the other through propaganda, discrimination and systematic atrocity are
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interventions which bring forth a new set of coordinates that establishes genocide as a
temptation. These strategies of violence, in that they represent and instrumentalise the
desire to shift paradigms that treat extermination as a temptation, procedurally
resemble Lenin's understanding of actual freedom. For Lenin, "actual freedom" is
represented by a set of actions in which one seeks to instrumentally break with the
choice "between two or more options within a pregiven set of coordinates" and
"choose to change this set of coordinates itself' (Zizek, 2001: 7). "Formal Freedom",
on the other hand, means that choices are confined to an established set of coordinates
within a political perspective. Lenin's purpose in making a distinction between actual
and formal freedom meant to preserve a genuine radical choice, one that could break
away from established political patterns. States employing violent strategies for the
purposes of genocide break from the formal choices within the old order (e.g., from say
liberal doctrines of tolerance) by effectively changing the landscape in which opinions
about the other formed. Such violent interventions are the restructuring efforts by a
kind of 'revolutionary intervention from above', one that fundamentally changes the
society's political paradigm.
This kind of political situation was evident in Eastern Europe in the 1990s
when people were faced with a set of circumstances where political choice became a
formal matter between a set of pre-given coordinates. As Zizek explains, the genuine
revolutionary alternative means breaking away from these formally forced
circumstances.
The catch of the "transition" from Really Existing Socialism to capitalism was that
people never had the chance to choose the ad quem of this transition. Rather, they
were (almost literally) "thrown" into a new situation in which they were presented
with a new set of given choices (pure liberalism, nationalist conservatism...). In such a
situation of forced choice, "actual freedom" as the act of consciously changing this set
of choices occurs only when one acts as if the choice is not forced and "chooses the
impossible" (Zizek, 2001: 7).
Lenin's effort to preserve the revolutionary capacity of transition to an altogether
different kind of order is mimicked by authorities seeking a new order through the use
of violence. Genocide, and the strategic use of violence that makes systematic
eradication possible, is a perverse expression of actual freedom because eradication is
instrumentalised as transition, that creates and builds upon existing structural divisions
(e.g., established-outsider), which expresses the ability of an established elite to break
from a political paradigm.
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The conclusion to be drawn form this section is that violence and decisive
action can create the conditions to establish a further escalation in violence and social
divisions, thereby creating the potential for actual freedom and the bringing forth of
new ideals that instrumentalise genocide. The strategies of violence can thus function
to intensify and clarify social divisions and create the circumstances for a genocidal
grammar that treats total eradication as one possible 'solution'. What I have contended
here is that the strategic domination of context through violence can confirm or
encourage discourses of social division within an already stratified power situation. In
the next section I will explore the other discursive segment of this cycle by showing
how motivational language (prevalent in genocidal ideology) functions to orient future
actions that impact the likelihood of genocide.
The Function of Vocabularies ofMotivefor Strategic Action
C. Wright Mills argued that "we must approach linguistic behaviour, not by referring it
to private states in individuals, but by observing its social function of coordinating
diverse actions" (Mills, 1940: 904). Rather than expressing something prior in the
individual, motivational "language is taken by other persons as an indicator of future
actions" (1940: 904). These observations by Mills suggested that motivations are acts
in themselves, which greatly influence future conduct. As actors impute and ascribe
motivations to others and themselves, these descriptions have consequences for future
social conduct in that they serve to coordinate future actions. The goal of Mills
approach was to account for the reasoning behind the imputation of motives and
discern how they function in social situations in reference to action. Mills's analytic
model can thus help us understand how individuals (victims and reluctant perpetrators)
come to be entrapped in a genocidal situation by discursive methods that serve to
facilitate cooperative actions.
Drawing on G. H. Mead, Mills suggested that in a societal situation there exist
vocabularies of motive that apply to different institutional circumstances. In situations
where the conduct of its membership is questioned, he discovered that "as a word, a
motive tends to be one which is...an unquestioned answer to questions concerning
social and lingual conduct" (1940: 907). In other words, a "stable motive is an ultimate
in justificatory conversation" (1940: 907). Motivations, unlike other kinds of
judgements, carry a force that greatly impacts future social interaction. Positing
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motives are interventions that can serve strategic desires within the contours of a
situation. As Mills suggested they are designed principally to motivate actions from
other members in a situation, rather than feature as accurate descriptions of conduct.
Thus, in some instances if justifiable motives for a particular action cannot be found,
the future action may be abandoned altogether. When motives are being applied to
others one is not trying to describe the experienced social action (what actually
motivated an action), but to exact influence over others and themselves for the
purposes of future conduct.
To describe, for example, the actions of a man stealing food and clothing from
a store as being motivated by greed supposes that the person is culpable of the theft of
goods. However, under arduous circumstances, like those experienced by the citizens
of New Orleans following hurricane Katrina, or those suffering from severe poverty,
one may attribute motives of necessity to their decision to acquire goods for the
purposes of survival. In the first instance, positing motives of greed and moral disgust
invites future actions to sanction this kind of conduct to clarify and restore the social
order. Whereas, positing motives of need and struggle would result not in applying
measures of sanction, but may instead invite a clearly supportive course of action
which addresses and alleviates the needs of those compelled to steal under such
circumstances.
The questioning of motivation, whether concerning oneself or another, also
arises from the desire to change or reinforce future-oriented action. One may posit a
motive for a course of action which can both strengthen the action in the eyes of the
actor and win new allies for his programme. Vocabularies of motive are thus powerful
because as long as they possess a prima facie plausibility, they function to unify
support for a course of action. When, for example, government officials are imputing
motives for the need to implement a particular policy, they are convincing themselves
and influencing others about the direction of future conduct. What determines the kinds
of vocabularies of motive depends upon what context they derive from (that is, how
they are situated) and what intentions underlie the imputation. Motivation in
ecclesiastical contexts, for example, is often linked with moral and religious
terminology that describe actions as 'good' or 'bad' in light of the qualities of a
person's soul. Vocabularies can thus be conditioned by and tailored to an intended
audience as crafted by the judgement of the speaker. The imputations of motives
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should thus be understood as distinct actions that are intended to influence future or
current social conduct.
Motives are thus social instruments that orient future actions by appealing to
morals and other emotive sentiments. These kinds of motives are situated in the sense
that they occur as a reflection of the speaker in a situated time and place. When we
apply this theory to the occurrence of organised violence, one can witness a similar
pattern for the strategic use of motivational vocabularies. Motives accompanying the
decisions in favour of war, for example, are "not "the causes" of war, but they do
promote continued integrated participation" in favour of the effort (1940: 908). Such
kinds of motives can be characterised, measured and compared to other motives in
similar situations and institutions of conduct. In the most recent conflict in Iraq,
weapons of mass destruction featured as a motivating issue to intervene with military
force. The problem in this case was that the motivational vocabulary used to promote
the war required verification upon completion of the campaign. Nevertheless, under the
rubric of arguments for warfare, "vocabularies of motive have careers that are woven
through changing institutional fabrics" and can be rearticulated from past events in the
course of a campaign (1940: 909). This entailed treating Iraq as a fight against the 'war
on terror', situating it within a motivational language that purports to threaten the
United States and the Western world.
Concerning genocidal circumstances the pattern of this motivational structure is
virtually identical. The others are enveloped by a discourse that professes to speak for
their collective desires, that is their inherent 'genuine' motives. These motives are
strategically organised based upon the intended action of the perpetrators. Should the
future actions of the state likely favour genocidal violence, authorities will devise and
attribute motives towards the other which are likely to treat genocide as a temptation or
necessary course of action.
Motive, Ideology and the Organisation of Violence
With the other functioning as a pivot for the transition to a new social order, the
motivational language can become interwoven within much larger narratives. In
Stalinist Russia, as in Nazi Germany, these grand schemes reached their apogee where
the struggle against the enemy became a "struggle of humanity itself against its non-
human excrement" in accordance with 'History' and 'Nature' (Zizek, 2002a: 127).
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This antithesis, despite being morally generalised, does have historical and present
importance for substantive policy. These Universal notions serve, as I mentioned in
chapter Four, vital functions in articulating the image of the other as a point de capiton
for 'legitimate' struggle, which accounts for why many genocidal governments have
had no concern with genuinely verifying the validity of these motives. The importance
of my present argument for this section is to show that these situated motives are
manipulations (clear fabrications or caricatured features of a situation) that are
designed to situate, organise and inspire a particular pattern of future conduct. This
means that vocabularies ofmotive serve similar sociological functions for governments
that seek to transcend the particular set of coordinates of the situation by discursive
means.
Under Stalinism, the self-destructive nature of the regime was based on the
clear fabrication of plots and sabotage involving elements of its own government set in
increasingly generalised terms which targeted groups and individuals within and
outwith the regime. Nazi police, on the other hand, were always searching for actual
evidence associated with any subversive action or persons (Jews, Gypsies, Jehovah's
Witnesses, communists) and exacted their policy of genocide and terror according to
evidentiary categories. That there was never any evidence of such actions or that these
'determining' categories, such as race, were valid in light of critical reason was not a
concern. In Rwanda, efforts to locate and exterminate Tutsi and their Hutu
'conspirators' assumed a more suspicious basis, questioning the allegiance of many
Rwandans, including Hutu, as to their standing in relation to the 'Tutsi enemy'. In
these examples, motives are intended to be dynamic, in that they can apply to various
kinds of victim behaviour. They are also forward-looking, in that they establish a set of
criteria for judging the future action which is to be expected from the other. By
attaching motives to the other-as-group, they profess to speak for the hidden desires or
instinctive inclinations brought about by their 'Natural' or 'Historical' constitution
independent of their will. In this way, motives function to solidify expectations about
the other and rally support for a particular pattern of action, which can be demonstrated
by how individuals react to the manipulation of circumstances. The act of positing
motivations is thus interwoven with the attempt to create and make preponderant a set
of social expectations that will demonstrate that there is a 'problem of the other' and
simultaneously establish the patterns of how the other must be eliminated.
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These motivational vocabularies are the central components of the perpetrator's
ideology that gives a reliable account of why the other is a 'problem' in need of a
radical and perverse 'solution'. Ideology, as Daniel Bell explains, is
not simply a Weltanschauung, a cultural worldview, or a mask for interests, but an
historically located belief system that fused ideas with passion, sought to convert ideas
into social levers, and in transforming ideas transformed people as well. When it
becomes a striking force, ideology looks at the world with eyes wide shut, a closed
system which prefabricates answers to any questions that might be asked (Bell, 2000:
xi).
This ideological effort, as practically manifest by attributing motives, does not operate
by persuasion, but through deception and force because the organisation of these
vocabularies are designed to be strategic tools that operate in non-consensual contexts.
Contextual interventions, as I examined in the last section, in combination with these
vocabularies constitute a force designed to collapse opinions about the other into a
destructive format. The goal is thus to animate these vocabularies by interweaving
them within institutional fabrics. As Arendt has noted:
The forms of totalitarian organization...are designed to translate the propaganda lies of
the movement, woven around a central fiction—the conspiracy of the Jews, or the
Trotskyites...into a functioning reality, to build up...a society whose members act and
react according to the rules of a fictitious world (Arendt: 1968: 364).
What gives motivational vocabularies their appearance of validity is their unity with
the organisation of government and their ability to account for, however crudely, the
actions and 'essence' of the other. This ideological strategy thus realises the principle
of gestalt: the sum interaction between organisation, motivational discourse and
circumstance is a more poignant method to compel individuals to support or remain
complacent about the plight of the other. In other words, the sum interaction of these
practices is greater than the influence of each.
Integrating Motive and Organisation
This organisation that manages vocabularies of motive and their contexts operates, in
part, by strategically realising the projected motives of the other. One pattern most
often employed to organise motivational vocabularies in cases of genocide is through
'mirroring'. As I noted earlier in the case of Rwanda, "accusations in a mirror" are
motives projected upon their intended victims which are derived from their own
intended actions (Des Forges, 1999: 64). This strategy is know to us from a document
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found in Butare prefecture that describes in detail these kinds of strategies that were
intended to generate mass support for killings (1999: 65). In their doctrines,
genocidaires would thus impute their intended actions upon their victims. In Rwanda,
it was widely supposed in the Hutu propaganda literature that the forces of 'Tutsi
unity' were intending to conduct a genocide of their own against the Hutu should the
RPF successfully secure the country. This same strategy has also been documented in
the former Yugoslavia. In the case information sheet of International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Stojan Zuplyanin, a leading member of the Serb
nationalists in the Autonomous Region of Krajina ("ARK"), was accused of having
"promoted and disseminated propaganda that portrayed the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats as fanatics intending to commit genocide on Serbian people" (IT-99-
36). In Nazi Germany, Hitler's chilling prophecy that "In case the Jewish
financiers...succeed once more in hurling the peoples into a world war, the result will
be...the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe" was another typical expression of
this motivational strategy (Hitler quoted in Arendt, 1968: 349). Like all its substantive
manifestations, these passages, if translated into "nontotalitarian language", would
mean I intend to make war and I intend to commit genocide (1968: 349). It is thus
appropriate to interpret these types of statements as a strategy assigning motive to the
other which intends to bring forth a new paradigm of future action. By proclaiming that
radical action is necessary to address the 'special case' of the other, a policy of
genocide becomes a genuine temptation when substantiated by motivational
vocabularies that profess to speak for the other.
What makes Mill's theory important for analysing this strategy is that motive
attribution is uncoupled from the faculty of validating judgements. This means that
motivational descriptions serve as distinct actions that have a functional-social
dimension in coordinating future policies. Vocabularies of motive are no longer
individual expressions of judgement or opinion, but have an important social
dimension directing future action which can, in the contexts described, embrace the
logic of genocide. I now turn to a more detailed examination of these vocabularies in
conjunction with violent action.
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Rwanda, Genocide and the Strategic Use ofMotive and Violence
In this section I will explore by example how the use of violence manipulates a societal
context, making these motivational vocabularies appear warranted. I will argue that
strategic interventions that employ violence can serve to legitimate vocabularies of
motive by changing how they are situated, thus providing them with a greater prima
facie plausibility.
The strategic actions that fulfilled these kinds of motivations vary with each
case, but they all function to liberate the image of the other (as an exemplar of actual
freedom) from the common sense concerns that are engendered spontaneously between
people. As in the case of Rwanda, it was a common strategy to employ the threat of
RPF invasion and ethnic conflict as a single struggle against 'Tutsi unity' for political
advantage. As I mentioned previously in chapter Three, the events in Kigali on October
4-5, 1990 concerning the reported discovery of hidden arms and radio communications
equipment and explosions, were staged events created by the Habyarimana government
and attributed to RPF infiltrators. This served as the pretext to arrest some 13,000
people and was later exploited by the interim government for purposes of creating a
state of emergency throughout the country following the president's assassination.
What made these strategic actions so effective was that they were based upon
vocabularies of motive engendered within the movement's propaganda. The discovery
of arms and communication equipment implied that there were infiltrators
communicating with RPF forces in Uganda who were planning coordinated covert
military action against the Rwandan government. This 'discovery' along with the
massive arrests served to substantiate the motives of infiltration, conflict and
domination on the part of Tutsi who were aligned with the RPF. In other words, these
strategic actions served to fulfil the ideology of the Hutu power movement by
reinforcing the vocabularies of motive depicting 'Tutsi-RPF' as infiltrators and spies
seeking to undermine the Hutu government.
Specifically, these 'emergencies' added greater substance to Hutu ideology,
especially after the coup by Tutsi military officials that occurred in neighbouring
Burundi. Motivations projected upon the Tutsi described them as intent on destroying
the sense of Hutu identity through subversion and mass killings. In line with these
concerns Hutu propagandists, for example, suggested that the RPF was planning to
"restore the dictatorship of the extremist Tutsi minority" by "a genocide" targeted at
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"the extermination of the Hutu majority" (Des Forges, 1999: 78). Even random and
unrelated events, like the digging of large ditches by the RPF (most likely for defence),
was interpreted as an anticipation of the impending genocide by 'the Tutsi'. In April
1992, the newspaper Jyambere reported that Tutsi opposition parties were distributing
arms to their youth wings, yet this was what the Habyarimana forces were actually
doing in preparation of'self-defence'—the official euphemism for the 1994 genocide.
The events in Burundi thus served as a reminder of what can actually happen to a
democratic Hutu government should a state neglect the 'secret power' of'Tutsi unity'.
This strategy was very effective in Rwanda as it convinced people that they
were continually in a state of emergency which maintained the expectation that the
state would use whatever measures necessary for 'self-defence', including mass
killings. This projection of motive, articulated with specific reference to past 'Tutsi'
atrocities and domination in the Great Lakes Region, made the genocide, as enacted by
the interim Hutu government, seem like a consistent response to a 'History of Tutsi'
motivation and action. This 'Historical' consistency of past actions added depth and
credence to the 'Tutsi' motives created by the Hutu Power movement. Specifically,
Hutu doctrines openly proclaimed that if the RPF was successful in securing the
country they would institute a new form of Tutsi domination that would recall past
colonial oppression and similar kinds of atrocities like those experienced in Burundi.
The strategic use of violence against Tutsi and the 'Historical' re interpretation of Tutsi
actions were designed to engender mass support by providing them with a tangible
prima facie plausibility. Due to the restrictions placed upon the press and opposition
groups, these strategic actions became virtually unverifiable by independent sources,
whilst government propaganda provided the only consistent and accessible set of
explanations for contingent events.
Instrumentalism, the State ofEmergency and Self-Preservation
Lacking any vantage point to found a perspective of genuine realism (the ability to
reliably distinguish between genuine and fictitious descriptions of events) genocidal
governments manage a paradoxical situation of controlled-insecurity to increase public
cooperation. The paradoxical situation of insecure domination is also maintained and
expressed through the techniques of organisation which employ emergency measures
to demonstrate the motivational vocabularies of the other. In this section I will show
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that the rationality of self-preservation as inspired by a state of emergency can expedite
victims' cooperation in their own destruction.
As I have argued throughout this thesis genocide operates under conditions of
total domination where all the rival centres of authority within and outwith the targeted
group have collapsed in order to prevent other avenues of resistance and evaluation of
the perpetrating authority. Governments secure their hegemony by fostering a situation
where fear is pervasive, yet not paralysing so as to avoid a situation of chaotic self-
preservation that would disrupt its organisation. Authorities establish expected avenues
of action which confine the victims' actions to patterns which verify motivational
vocabularies that function to reinforce the perpetrator's ideology. This means instilling
opportunities for victims to avoid harsh treatments should they cooperate with the
demands of authority. In some cases, as concerning the Holocaust in Western Europe
(as opposed to the East) the Nazis relied heavily upon the cooperation of the
community hierarchy in order to expedite genocide.
Thinking they had a chance to save parts of their communities, Jewish
representatives were forced into a new role as Judenrate—elected or appointed
representatives of the community designated to 'negotiate' with Nazi authorities. This
role meant that community leaders, with the assistance of Jewish police, cooperated
with the 'resettlement', helping to run the ghettos and facilitate orderly 'deportations'.
All those trapped in such a situation realised that they were embroiled in a "save what
you can game" where Jewish representatives thought that there was a chance of saving
parts of the community by negotiating within the confines of the Nazis' order
(Bauman, 1991: 129). Under these circumstances, victims played into the hands of
their executioners by allowing their actions to be guided through a twisted bureaucratic
road founded upon the rational desire for survival. This 'carrot and stick game', was a
diabolical plan which exploited the victims' rational desire for self-preservation to
unknowingly cooperate in their own demise. This circumstance demonstrated that
"modern, rational, bureaucratically organisedpower" had the ability "to induce action
functionally indispensable to its purposes while jarringly at odds with the vital
interests of the actors" (1991: 122).
What made this bureaucratic scheme function smoothly was that it created the
idea of choice in the minds of the victims. This was made possible by building
exceptions into the selection system that would alleviate (only temporally) the
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suffering of some the victims. Thinking that they could avoid their fate by qualifying
for some kind of exemption meant that there was a chance that they could save
themselves and those around them. What many did not know, however, was that their
fate was sealed from the beginning, and the system, like all modern bureaucracies, was
designed merely to expedite the genocide without further straining manpower and
resources. In Hilberg's words,
The Germans were notably successful in deporting Jews by stages, because those who
remained behind would reason that it was necessary to sacrifice the few in order to
save the many. The operation of this psychology may be observed in the Vienna
Jewish community, which concluded a deportation 'agreement' with the Gestapo, with
the 'understanding' that six categories of Jews would not be deported. Again, the
Warsaw ghetto argued in favour of co-operation and against resistance on the grounds
that the Gennans would deport sixty thousand Jews but not hundreds of
thousands... The fatal arithmetic was also applied in Vilna, where Judenrate chief Gens
declared: 'With a hundred victims 1 save a thousand people. With a thousand I save
ten thousand.' (Hilberg quoted in Bauman, 1991: 133-4).
There were perilous moral consequences associated with self-preserving action as
sought within the established system. Striving for an exception to the 'deportation'
system in terms of petty privileges, exempted statuses, or a stay of execution simply
meant that the victims "tacitly accepted the premise of the design" (1991: 131). As
Bauman indicated,
Whoever saw in the ruling a personal chance could claim the benefits only while
simultaneously accepting the assumption that warranted both the general rule and the
exceptions: that 'normal' Jews, Jews 'as such', did not deserve the ordinary rights
offered by German citizenship (1991: 131).
The other consequence was that this system established the conditions where
individual actions, however morally corrupt or abhorrent, could be deemed 'rational'
and hence acceptable so long as they preserved the survival of the individual.
Exceptions built into the system ensured that the moral solidarity of the victims would
be thoroughly corrupted by individuals struggling for survival. This condition, where
self-preservation led many to survive by stealing, bribery or betrayal, eroded moral
solidarity between victims and invariably supported the instrumental efforts for total
extermination. The other consequence of this was that it 'demonstrated' the ideology of
Nazism. The plight ofmany German and Western European Jews revealed that rational
self-preservation ultimately meant cooperation and self-incrimination; "that everything
the Jews did to serve their own interest brought the Nazi objective somewhat nearer to
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full success" (1991: 135). Authorities who control the conditions of survival could thus
structure in exceptions to gain not only greater cooperation from victims, but also, as I
shall show by further examples later, 'demonstrate the genuine' corrupting character
ofvictims.
This organisation of genocide, based upon securing cooperation from the
community, is not always prevalent in other genocides. Bauman does acknowledge that
the war against Russia was a "war of annihilation" which meant that Jews and other
peoples were exterminated by Einsatzgruppen and other military units with little or no
cooperation from their victims (1991: 117). Thus, the roads to genocide were varied
when it came to soliciting the cooperation of the victims. Yet, there are cases, unlike
the Holocaust, where civic, rather than victim cooperation, served to intensify the cycle
of terror in much the same manner. Thus, there are cases where bystanders are forced
to comply with an instrumentalism which exploits their rational desires for self-
preservation in service of genocide. As I shall show in the next section, many victims
and even reluctant citizens in Rwanda had little choice in dealing with the military and
militia forces that conducted the genocide. Often they faced restricted choices under
such circumstances: either they resisted and face immediate injury or death or, if given
the opportunity to cooperate, they could postpone their fate in the hope that fortune
will somehow intervene on their behalf. With the certainty of death secured in the
minds of both victims and reluctant citizens should they fail to cooperate, most if not
all will choose the rational course based upon their immediate desire for self-
preservation. Cooperation even with the remote chance of survival became the only
rational option.
Rwanda, Self-Preservation and Civic Cooperation
Reluctant perpetrators are those common citizens unfortunate enough to be caught in
situations where their cooperation is procured by force. In the case of Rwanda, their
concern for self-preservation likely derived from two mutually sustaining directions.
First, from the direct actions of police and military forces designed to ensure
compliance, and, second, from the socialisation of fear represented by the image of the
other who was said to be in allegiance with an invading army, one that was also
responsible for the assassination of the President.
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Both of these forces are meant to ensure the cooperation of common people
thereby making pliable elements out of the social structure based on a concern for self-
preservation. The state thus sought to accomplish this by a 'bureaucracy of
behaviourism', which comprised the sum total of rules and exceptions upheld by the
means of violence. The worsening security situation caused by the conduct of the
genocide and by the war with the RPF meant that personal safety was a primary
concern for many Rwandans. In this context of insecurity, the bureaucracy of
behaviourism was employed by the coercive powers of state authority in service of the
genocide, in which many men were confronted by government forces and cajoled into
joining the civilian 'war' effort. It was expected that Hutu fulfd their "civic duty" by
contributing to the on-going violence. Des Forges writes that:
Burgomasters used the same forces to oblige dissident citizens to join in the genocide.
They directed or permitted communal police, militia, or simply other citizens to bum
down houses and to threaten the lives of those who refused to join the violence (Des
Forges, 1999: 236).
Strategically, this pattern of compliance was accomplished in a number of ways. One
pattern was based upon the fact that many Hutu who resisted cooperation were
themselves accused of being Tutsi (by changing their identity cards) or were accused
of being their accomplices, all of which appealed to their sense of personal welfare.
These kinds of interventions are measures based upon the mechanism of negative
reinforcement. This kind of reinforcement is designed to increase the frequency of a
behaviour (i.e., government cooperation) by the removal of a negative stimulus. In
order to increase compliance, the threats to personal safety were persistent features of
certain domestic circumstances. To comply with the demands of authority, in line with
the pre-established avenues of behaviour, meant that the threats against personal
welfare would be nullified by those who submitted to the required behaviour. Thus,
compliant behaviour was met with the removal of a negative stimulus in order to
increase the frequency of cooperative behaviour.
Authorities also employed other strategies that were designed to reinforce the
frequency of cooperative behaviour. An array of positive reinforcements, such as
wealth or social advancement, were used for the purposes of genocide. The new sense
of Hutu solidarity that arose from their collective 'work' appealed to a psychology of
aggression, which made it possible for many young men who were not the head of a
household to join the ranks of those profiting from atrocities (Verwimp, 2005). Other
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positive reinforcements were the advantages of moving into the new hierarchy of
government and militia positions created by the conflict. Material gains in terms of
land, money or valuables could be acquired in a country where land and economic
opportunity was scarce. These conditions of behaviourism made it rational for
individuals to partake in actions that they may have found abhorrent. Concern for one's
immediate welfare meant that it was rational to conform to the demands of authorities
by calculating the potential consequences of one's actions.
Another behavioural strategy designed to procure conformity derived from
applying a negative stimulus or sanction. These stimuli are designed to decrease the
frequency of non-conformist behaviours by subjecting individuals to harmful or lethal
sanctions. By consistently sanctioning individuals concerned for their welfare to end
such behaviours, authorities collapsed the avenues and spaces of refuge around
individuals who then would be expected to rationally comply with the governing
patterns of behaviour. Hutu who did not cooperate in the genocide or were caught
aiding Tutsi were threatened with an array of punishments: from fines by the local
community or even with death by police or military forces. This behavioural a system
of rules thus served to increase the efficiency of rational action of both cooperative and
reluctant genocidaires in conjunction with the pervasiveness of self-preservation
manufactured by a context of insecurity.
Insecurity and the Widening 'Net'
To further establish the circumstances conducive for individuals to act in line with the
organisation of genocide, the government used the threat of the RPF to widely define
their domestic enemy and heighten fears regarding domestic sympathisers. Defining
the 'enemy' in broad terms meant that the military high command focused on Tutsi
"who refused to accept the revolution and wanted to re-conquer power by any means"
(Des Forges, 1999: 77). This meant that anyone who represented an independent power
base opposed to the killings found themselves targeted by the police and military. For
the interim government there was no distinction between the war against the RPF and
this domestic effort to consolidate power through the removal and assassination of
obstructive community leaders that were opposed to the genocide. After all, the Tutsi's
chosen method, according to the doctrines of Hutu Power, involved "infiltration" and
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guerrilla warfare, and was designed to effectively contaminate Rwandan society by
disrupting its organisational apparatus (1999: 74).
The way to identify these infdtrators and their Hutu accomplices was by way of
identifying "too great [a] tolerance for Tutsi and their lack of commitment to Hutu
solidarity" (1999: 75). Infiltrators were also said to disguise themselves by forging
their identity cards that displayed the holder's ethnicity. This meant that greater militia
and police intervention in Rwandan society potentially suspected many ordinary
Rwandans, forcing those under suspicion to verify their ethnic identity. This created
the expectation that if one's identity and intentions towards the government were
unclear anyone (even 'genuine' Hutu) would become legitimate targets. The widely
defined notion of the domestic enemy served not only to heighten security fears, but
used these concerns to make it more efficient to organise a cooperative civic structure,
bringing community leaders, who were once opposed to the policy, in line with the
central government's demands by forcing other civilians to demonstrate their
commitments to domestic 'security'.
The nature of this 'security' situation became apparent several weeks into the
1994 slaughter. During the period of'decapitation' or consolidation of authority, where
other ranking opposition was systematically eliminated, all people of Rwanda were
"beginning to understand that a system dedicated to the destruction of the Tutsi
provided no security for Hutu either" (1999: 300). There are cases where citizens
expressed "astonishment and indignation" at the seizure of Hutu in their local
community, stating in one example: "You are supposed to be killing Tutsi, so why take
him? If you start taking Hutu, where will it end?" (1999: 300). This effort to
consolidate domestic authority intensified people's concerns for their own safety. This
meant that when the time came for local communities to organise support for the
genocide, the security situation facilitated the avenues for individuals to act in
accordance with their rational desires for self-preservation, even against persons who
were no threat to Hutu society. Those who enthusiastically participated, on the one
hand, were poised to gain from the rewards offered by bribes and possessions of the
victims, not to mention other common social benefits. In this circumstance, the
preponderance of a situation of self-preservation compelled individuals to act
rationally in terms both of their self-interest and of the collectively egoistic interests of
establishing a Hutu State.
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This state of emergency created by the war following the President's
assassination added credence to the vocabularies of motive within Hutu Power
ideology that premised 'Tutsi unity' and domination. The RPF, which invaded Rwanda
shortly after the President's assassination due to the commencement of the mass
killings, also confirmed to many the validity of the vocabularies of motive prevalent in
National Radio broadcasts and newspapers at the time. These vocabularies of motive
imputed an image of 'Tutsi unity', which became manifest by the RPF invasion—if the
Tutsi were being killed only a genuine 'Tutsi' army would rescue them. As a military
force of this 'ethnic union', the RPF invasion inspired the ideology ofHutu separatism
by further contributing to the deteriorating security situation. The invasion provided a
greater urgency to advance and activate the civic network of civilian 'self-defence',
which would conduct the genocide.
Another vocabulary of motive within this paradigm concerned the colonial
history of Rwanda under Tutsi domination. The propaganda of the early 1990s sought
to project the Tutsi as a group akin to Nazism: being "nostalgic for power" and
dreaming of "colonial expansion" through "killing large numbers of Hutu" that "would
leave no survivors" (Des Forges, 1999: 80, 78). The story followed the argument that
an RPF victory would restore the basic hierarchical structure of the monarchy and
would reclaim all the property that they had occupied, implying that many Hutu
holding land in a vastly overpopulated country would become destitute. This claim
seemed to resonate effectively with those "cultivators who were working lands
received after the expulsion of the Tutsi" during the revolution (1999: 78). These
motives also involved wider economic domains (banking and highly coveted import
and export licences), claiming that Tutsi influenced the domestic economy and were
over-represented in influential professions. This dominance, exploitation and terror
could only be expected to grow once Tutsi political domination was secured by the
RPF.
The efforts at securing total societal domination went hand in hand with
creating a milieu of self-preservation which could be used to assist the genocide by
inducing individuals to act rationally in their self-interest in an architecture determined
by authorities. This circumstance meant that when faced with the bureaucracy of
behaviourism, individuals would likely comply with the demands of authority and
internalise the vocabularies of motive provided by government propaganda. The
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established motivational vocabularies provided a ready-made and rational avenue to
address their fears, thereby persuading "listeners and 'honest people' that they are
being attacked and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary 'for
legitimate [self] defense'" (Hutu document quoted in Des Forges, 1999: 66). From the
evidence presented by Des Forges, it is known that this tactic worked "extremely well"
in specific cases such as the Bugesera massacre of 1992 and during the genocide of
1994. This kind of planning was made known by documents found in Butare prefecture
titled 'Note Relative a la Propaganda d'Expansion et de Recrutemenf. It describes the
strategies of "how to sway" public behaviour regarding political opponents and
advocates using "lies, exaggeration, ridicule and innuendo" to "persuade the public that
the adversary stands for war, death, slavery, repression, injustice, and sadistic cruelty"
(Des Forges, 1999: 65, 66). In a state of total domination, self-preservation and the
vocabularies of motive became the effective tools to manage society and
instrumentalise genocide. Both the domestic security situation and these motives
constituted a manageable cycle between social discourse and context which mutually
sustained a policy of genocide directed by behavioural techniques that used the
rationality of its subjects as a way to ensure their compliance.
Rationality and Self-Preservation in the Military andMilitias in Rwanda
As concerning the interests of the military and civilian militias, there were great risks
to be taken, yet also benefits to be gained from the conduct of the war and genocide.
Without the Tutsi and RPF, the military's standing in Rwandan society retained little
hope of expanding. The Rwandan Army (some 30,000 soldiers), represented by its
High Command, opposed any negotiations with the RPF, which it successfully
defeated (with foreign help) in 1990. As many recruits became accustomed to the
advantages of military life, much of the military dreaded the possibility of
demobilisation brought about by the negotiations at Arusha.
Some political parties used the possibility of demobilisation to intensify and
direct the military's opposition toward their contention against the Tutsi by juxtaposing
the military's interests with the ideology of 'Tutsi-RPF unity'. Other politicians,
however, tried to allay these fears by suggesting that soldiers could be used for
development projects and other tasks. This proposal actually backfired, and further
intensified the fear that military officials would return to a life of menial labour. With
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these concerns, the political stance of the military was influential in the President's
decision to disavow the Arusha Accords. This decision meant that the military would
remain on a war footing up until and through the genocide of 1994. On September 21,
1992, Colonel Nsabimana, "sent a top secret memorandum to his commanders
identifying and defining "the enemy" in a report that sought to examine how to defeat
the RPF and their partisans" (1999: 63). The report indicated that the RPF was
recruiting from among "Tutsi refugees", the Ugandan Army, "Tutsi inside the country,
Hutu dissatisfied with the regime in power, unemployed people inside and outside the
country" and "the Nilo-Hametic people of the region" (1999: 63). This flexible and
inclusive category of the 'enemy' (a feature of Hutu Power propaganda) became
operative within military institutions before and during the genocide in 1994 at a time
when the structure of the military was fundamentally questioned.
To preserve the central importance of the Rwandan military and its militia
organisations, it was in their interests to reject the Arusha accords which called for
power sharing, military demobilisation and restructuring. Embracing a hostile stance to
the RPF and the wide category of 'enemies', which meant favouring warfare and even
genocide, was a radical way of preserving the military's structure. Thus, from the
military's perspective, peace proved to be more of a threat than the conduct of a war
and the genocide. The political organisations supporting this stance of the military
derived not only from the extreme base of the Hutu Power movement, but from other
sectors of society that shared the general interests of Hutu solidarity. In the interest of
preserving the military size and structure, the High Command opposed peace, and
eventually favoured genocide in support of the interim government founded upon Hutu
ideology.
In summary, the cycle of terror is a process that is composed of manipulating
contexts and motivational vocabularies designed to be mutually reinforcing. This cycle
is managed by a state bureaucracy and commanded by the means of violence to create
a system in which individual rationality can be constrained by the manipulation of
context and relied on to expedite a policy of genocide. The context of this system
depends upon the resources of violence which are not controlled by the reluctant
citizen. Context therefore is a manifestation of design and management to create the
circumstances which forcefully compresses individuals into a behavioural subject who
reacts rationally according to their desires of self-preservation. By making pervasive
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this circumstance and by bringing the prefectures in line to organise local citizens to
cooperate with the genocide, the interim government in Rwanda could overcome the
organisational problems confronting the genocide, which was created by the dispersed
geographical circumstances of the victims and the local moral bonds which protected
them. By conducting centralising and 'beheading' operations designed to align prefects
with the demands of the genocide, the architects created the conditions of self-
preservation that served to expedite local cooperation from reluctant individuals.
Likewise, the military also possessed rational grounds for cooperating and conducting
the genocide. The desire to preserve the importance and structure of the military
hierarchy also meant that these organisations possessed incentives of their own to
support the interim government. Their inherent desire to preserve the structures of the
military meant that many in the military rejected the established avenues for peace and
opened the way for a rational acceptance of anti-Tutsi doctrines which linked the RPF
with Tutsi ethnicity.
My findings in this section suggest that Bauman's claim that "the rationality of
the ruled is always the weapon of the rulers''' is not confined to the Holocaust alone,
and is expeditiously influential in other cases of genocide (Bauman, 1991: 142). Under
conditions of total domination, many who directly and tacitly supported genocide saw
their avenues of resistance drastically collapsed in these circumstances of destruction.
Many were either killed, forced into hiding or flight, or bribed their way to safety. In
Rwanda, those who reluctantly chose to cooperate with the zealous militia and military
forces were placed in conditions where their rational desire for self-preservation
expedited the genocide thereby nullifying the reservations of moral duty toward Tutsi.
This architecture of motivation and context ensured a steady supply of civic
cooperation in many areas of the country. As it turned out in Rwanda, the river called
'rational self-preservation', fed by the avenues of motivational discourse, ran with the
corpses of victims, and along with them perished the moral dignity of those who were
forced or, could not resist, the benefits of cooperation.
II. Resistance, Victim Self-Preservation and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
The extreme nature of a policy of genocide is such that it serves to provoke calculable
responses from both the reluctant perpetrator and the victimised. As I argued in the
previous section, strategic violence of a genocidal sort can create the conditions which
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expedite its fulfilment adding to a milieu of emergency. One of the developments I
wanted to explore here is the reaction of victims to a milieu of self-preservation and
show how patterns of resistance can serve to fulfil the motivational vocabularies
applied by the perpetrators. In other words, victims attempting to resist the measures of
genocide are forced into a milieu of self-preservation which acts as a self-fulfilling
prophecy—a process that enables and confirms, rather then mitigates, the vocabularies
of motive projected upon the other. Patterns of resistance in these treacherous
circumstances meant that self-preserving action can amplify the cycle between context
and the prima facie plausibility of motivational descriptions. The paradox of this
prophecy is that even the victims' patterns of resistance are harnessed by the
perpetrator to expedite their destruction.
A sociological account of this process was described by Robert Merton in his
Social Theory and Social Structure. Also known as the Thomas Theorem, this process
highlights the fact that "men respond not only to the objective features of a situation",
but also "to the meaning the situation has for them" as individuals (Merton, 1957: 421 -
2). As people assign meaning to a situation, their subsequent behaviour is determined
by the ascribed meaning of the situation. These meanings about the situation are
important as they contribute to specific social expectations which have been shown to
be primary indicators of future social action.6 Yet, without delving into detail,
Merton's analysis has relevance for trying to understand the influence of social
expectations upon collective behaviour. This relevance, I believe, should be extended
to an examination of genocidal action as such expectations are essential to secure civic
cooperation by providing a language that can legitimate perverse and extreme
behaviour.
Merton's hypothetical example of the "Last National Bank" gives us a clear
indication how this process works in a social situation (1957: 422). Rumours about the
Bank's insolvency were circulating throughout the town, despite the bank's good
standing and comparative liquidity. As people began to preserve their savings by
withdrawing it from their accounts, in case these rumours were in fact true, their
actions contributed to the growing expectation that the bank was indeed failing. As
6 In 2005, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics based upon
their research into the power of expectations in economic cycles. They showed that these cycles were
determined in large part by the expectations of production and other expectation-based forces in the
economy. Cf. (Kydland and Prescott, 1982).
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more depositors began to withdraw their money, the bank actually became insolvent.
What this example reveals is that the stable financial structure of the bank was
dependant upon a definition of the situation that judged the bank to be stable. The
belief in the "validity of the interlocking system of economic promises men live by"
was undermined by people's action in accordance with a different definition of the
situation, one where people judged the bank to be insolvent (1957: 422). Once
depositors had defined their expectations in accordance with these insolvency rumours,
contrary to the genuine promises of good standing, the consequences of this unreal
situation became real by their self-interested interventions to protect their savings. In
other words, the expectation of insolvency and the consequential self-interested
interventions transformed an imagined situation into reality.
This process is evident not only under ordinary economic situations, but also
within the social conditions between the established and the other. In pre-war America,
Merton recognised that the self-fulfilling prophecy played a significant part in race
relations (between what Merton conceptually called the in-groups and out-groups). In
one poignant example, he confronts the prejudice of the 'natural' inferiority of African-
Americans expressed by trade union members of the time. When excluding minorities
from trade union membership, the unionists cited the 'facts' that under strike
conditions minorities failed to ensure union solidarity and often broke ranks in favour
of employers. Yet, because of discrimination, their exclusion from the job market
meant that the strikes created opportunities for these workers that would not normally
be open to them under amicable employment conditions. Based upon this 'evidence',
unionists often adhered to doctrines of racism which suggested that African-Americans
fail to adhere to the virtues of union solidarity because of a 'natural' or 'historical'
tendency to cross picket lines. The failure of these kinds of doctrines rests upon the
fact that the situation of discrimination, not their 'nature', created the propensity for
some to seek new opportunities by breaking strikes, all of which reinforced the
'evidence' that legitimated their exclusion from union membership. As Merton
described:
...by defining the situation as one in which Negroes are held to be incorrigibly at odds
with principles of unionism and by excluding Negroes from unions, he invited a series
of consequences which indeed made it difficult if not impossible for many Negroes to
avoid the role of scab (1957: 424).
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Under strike conditions, people in discriminated circumstances were invited into the
jobs which they were otherwise excluded. The relations between the situation of the
'naturally-incorrigible' black strike-breaker and the targeted other share a strong
procedural affinity.
In cases of genocide the self-fulfilling prophecy is a process that ensures the
moral corruption, humiliation and dehumanisation of its victims. Under conditions of
total domination, governments controlling the conditions of the other amplify their
powerlessness by encouraging or condoning discrimination and repression. Due to
these conditions of discrimination, individuals who are excluded from the established
society will resort to coping with this situation by using methods which unintentionally
confirm the character of the 'other-as-group'. Many bystanders may find it all too easy
to conclude with what was only self-evident according to the perpetrating ideology:
that the other's methods to deceive, bribe and corrupt are 'inherent traits' that
undermine the established society. By acting individually to try and secure or advance
their circumstances under conditions of discrimination, the other is forced to
compromise the values of the established social order, thereby fulfilling the 'prophetic'
tenets of the perpetrating ideology. What the members of this society fail to see is that
the established order, which they support, produces the very kinds of 'facts' or
regularities in the others' behaviour which they observe. By controlling the situation in
which the other is held to be 'incorrigibly' at odds with the principles of the established
society, perpetrating governments initiate a series of consequences which make it
impossible for victims to avoid acting as the powerless and 'corrupting' other.
Under the conditions of Nazism, for example, the Judenrate behaviour
reflected the general moral bankruptcy of the entire victimized Jewish population. The
circumstances which created a milieu of self-preservation meant that individuals
attempting to circumvent the conditions of their oppression searched for exceptions
often at the expense of others within their own community. Deception, bribery, theft
became the tools of survival for many under such conditions. As Bauman observed,
The Jews were first proclaimed immoral and scrupulous, selfish and greedy detractors
of values, who used their ostensible cult of humanism as a convenient cover for naked
self-interest; they were then forced into an inhuman condition where the definition
promoted by propaganda could become true. The cameraman of GoebbeTs ministry
had many a field day recording the beggars dying of famine in front of luxurious
restaurants (Bauman, 1991: 147-8).
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While trying to save themselves and their families through finding exceptions to the
rules of annihilation, community leaders accepted bribes, and offers from others, which
supported their relatively comfortable accommodations while the others were kept
under physically degrading conditions. Ultimately, victims had a choice of
(temporarily) saving themselves by deception and corruption or they faced the direct
path of degradation and death.7
Despite the different circumstances in other cases of genocide, the distinct
pattern of this self-fulfilling prophecy is evident in other cases. Stalin's interventions in
the rural Ukraine in the 1930s present us with examples which confirmed for Soviet
officials the existence of the 'Kulak'. One of the most common forms of resistance
mounted by farmers was explicitly self-destructive—in terms of property and their own
lives. Rather than surrender their property and the only way of life they have ever
known to a new collectivised system of agriculture that reduced them to a newly
relegated class in Soviet society, many farmers chose the path of self-destruction which
confirmed to the Soviets the identity of the self-interested and recalcitrant kulak. As I
cited in chapter Three, the woman who set fire to her farm, rather than relinquishing it
to the state, was indicative of the kind of resistance behaviour. During the famine
murder was also quite common. Friends and family members would kill in order to
steal from each other for "a few pounds of flour, and few loaves of bread" or even
revert to cannibalism to survive (Conquest, 1986: 257). When cases such as these were
discovered by authorities, 'suspects' were not brought before traditional courts, but
transferred to the Security Police where most were shot.8 Cases of suicide were also
quite prevalent, especially when under investigation by government authorities.
Suicide was viewed as an attempt to assert one's individuality against the state's desire
for cooperativeness and, as a subjective act, was thus understood to be a subversive
way of defying the obligations to the state.
As juxtaposed to confessions made popular by the show trials of many senior
officials, suicide was seen as the subjective defiance of the Soviet state in its struggle
against a world enemy. In the daily lives of its subjects, "what mattered was not inner
7 A similar circumstance was also observable in Germany's 'war of annihilation' in the East. Following
the advances of the army, thousands of destitute refugees fleeing the war and the pogroms were depicted
by German news reels (i.e. propaganda films) as destitute 'hordes' fleeing west to undermine and
contaminate German living space.
8
Conquest reports that 325 cannibals (75 men and 250 women) from the Ukraine were still serving life
sentences in the Baltic-White Sea Canal prison camp in the late 1930s.
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belief in the propositions of the ruling ideology, but following the external rituals and
practices in which this ideology acquired material existence" (Zizek, 2002a: 90).
Suicide was seen as a defiance of these "external rituals" of obedience. Revolutionaries
at the show trials, in confrontation with false charges, were expected to show their
"ultimate fidelity to the Revolution by publicly confessing" (2002a: 97). Following
high-profile suicides, the government sought to deprive such actions of their subjective
authenticity. Thus, these show trials were "instrumentalized, [and] reduced to the 'most
cunning' forms of the counter-revolutionary plot" to bolster the movement's image of
struggle (2002: 104). The 'real' kind of subjectivity that was groomed by Stalinist
officials was the one manufactured by the extremities of the labour camps—that of
musselmanner who is resigned to their own fate under conditions they accept never to
challenge whilst always mechanically performing the demands of government.
This 'self-fulfilling prophecy of self-preservation' was also apparent in the case
of Rwanda. Targets of the genocide—Tutsi and Hutu 'accomplices' and those opposed
to the interim government—were expected to await their fate calmly in their homes. As
Des Forges observed: "Throughout the genocide, authorities had tried whenever
possible to send Tutsi back to their home communes to be killed" (Des Forges, 1999:
567). In much the same manner as in the Ukraine, self-preserving behaviour in Rwanda
was viewed as a conformation and exposure of the existence of 'Tutsi unity' and their
Hutu 'accomplices'. The lists of targeted people drawn up by government forces
sought out subjects at their places of residence or were instructed to go there after
being captured by government forces. A paradoxical outcome of this strategy,
however, was that it increased the avenues for resistance as supplied by their Hutu
neighbours willing to hide fleeing Tutsi. Des Forges observed
In some cases, however, home communities offered a strong defense of local Tutsi. In
Maraba, people protected an elderly woman out of gratitude for her husband's
generosity in sharing his land with others (1999: 567).
Despite these avenues for resistance, the practice of sending Tutsi to their home
commune also increased the probability of targeting those Hutu 'conspirators' who
were inclined to support their Tutsi neighbours or who were opposed to the genocide.
In a case where the community was divided over the fate of a suspected accomplice,
the sub prefect urged the community to support the genocide and suggested that
"certain persons whom we took to be our brothers are hiding secrets from us" (Sub
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prefect quoted in Des Forges, 1999: 568). In this case as with many others, the efforts
to defend a member of the community were seen as an indication of the accomplices'
determination to protect Tutsi. Any protection of Tutsi was thus used to fulfil the
prophecy of the Hutu accomplice who is 'keeping secrets' in support of an invading
army. By bringing forth greater suspicion and fear of allegiances within the Hutu
community, authorities sought to promote a state of self-preservation which would
incline people to seek support in local communities which invariably confirmed the
prophecy of accomplices. This gave local officials even more grounds to further
pressure those fearful of authorities to demonstrate their 'Hutuness' by cooperating
with the government. Thus, the practice of sending Tutsi back to their local community
was instrumental in fulfilling the prophecy of 'Hutu conspirators' and Tutsi infiltrators
because anyform ofresistance could qualify as subversive behaviour.
Other practices of resistance also served to fulfil the prophecies of the Hutu
Power movement. Their vocabularies of motive proclaimed that Tutsi were a united
force conspiring against Hutu governments throughout the Great Lakes region. It was
also suggested that they employed violent and deceptive tactics to undermine Hutu
authority. At some sites of resistance, besieged people organised their efforts for
fleeing or fighting. At Rubona in Butare and at Bisesero in Kibuye, "resisters used a
tactic called "merging" or kwiuga", which involved "lying down and waiting until
assailants had moved in among the intended victims, then rising up to face them in
close combat" (1999: 217). This strategy decreased the possibility that attackers would
use their firearms, because shooting would enviably create a crossfire situation
endangering other members of the attacking unit. This particular strategy confirmed
the propaganda that Tutsi will use deception to conceal their genuine intentions and
then strike with violence against Hutu government forces. As I noted earlier, Des
Forges had even speculated that due to the lack of communication between these two
cases of resistance, it was likely that "the RPF had taught this way of fighting during
training sessions for its adherents" (Des Forges, 1999: 217). This kind of speculation of
RPF involvement is itself an indication that such resistance tactics served to reinforce
the motivational vocabularies of Hutu Power by 'confirming' the existence of RPF
trained Tutsi infiltrators fighting against the interim government.
Others who organised resistance measures put in place a military-style
command structure to coordinate their flight from the country. Leaders of these groups
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both enforced discipline in the ranks and, through a division of labour, directed
strategies of resistance. When deciding to flee, they "arranged the departure of groups
at different times and in different directions to increase their chances for escape"
(1999: 217). This coordinated structure of resistance added credence to the propaganda
that 'infiltrators' resembled the appearance of civilians, yet possessed battle hardened
military skills from their cooperation with the RPF. The best known case of this kind
of resistance occurred at Bisesero, a mountainous ridge where Tutsi fought off the
military from April 8 to July 1. In another case, Tutsi fled to Bitare hill in Gishamva,
"a place where Tutsi had successfully resisted Hutu attackers in the early 1960s"
(1999: 495). These kinds of tactical characteristics were seen to be confirmations that
Tutsi are RPF infiltrators that will fight for the invading army using strategies that the
Hutu Power doctrines had predicted they would use as agents of the RPF—those that
resembled "snakes", or more often "cockroaches", disguising themselves before they
strike (1999: 401).
All these patterns of resistance may appear as ordinary, yet in emergency
conditions (during war and genocide) can appear to a situated observer as a
confirmation of the perpetrator's vocabularies of motive. These kinds of resistance
strategies thus served to confirm to the genocidaires the fact that there were Tutsi-RPF
infiltrators in regions of Rwanda that required "pacification" by the military and
civilian 'self-defense' forces (1999: 489). The conditions of self-preservation
established by the conduct of the Hutu government meant that the methods of Tutsi
resistance created a situation which resembled Hutu Power 'prophecies'. Forced to
survive by desperate and degrading means, Tutsi and those opposed to the genocide
reacted to conditions that were beyond their control. Even their rational desire to
survive, manifest in the practices of struggle, was harnessed by the perpetrators to
expedite their own demise. This architecture of collapsed space very much resembled a
bog which engulfs individuals in quicksand, the more one struggles to free oneself, the
deeper one becomes trapped. The victims' movements to resist thus served to deepen
their entrapment; the more innovative and dehumanising ways the victims struggled,
the more they appeared as the 'legitimate' targets of the perpetrating government.
Thus far in this chapter I have argued that there exists a mutually reinforcing
cycle between context and vocabularies of motive that enables a policy of genocide.
Each of these variables are managed by authorities to the specifications of design for a
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new social order. 1 first agued that authorities can create the conditions for genocidal
violence by employing violence itself against their intended targets. These actions have
the potential to exacerbate existing divisions between the established and other. This
was due to the reactions of the intended victims and the ability of such violence to
clarify and intensify the divisions between groups, both strategies of which could be
forecast and managed by the organisations of violence. Following this section, I
explored the discursive-ideological part of this cycle. Through an investigation of the
vocabularies of motive, I argued that the attribution of motive is a key component of
the perpetrator's ideology. I claimed that they constituted distinct actions which are
designed to build support for future actions. The attribution of motives are dynamic
and forward-looking, in that they are able to harness the social expectations of those
they seek to force into action.
Returning to the conditional segment of this cycle, I argued that the control of
context, as manifest by 'emergency conditions', has the power to encourage victims to
act rationally in accordance with their desires for self-preservation. Not only do the
creation of these conditions add greater prima facie plausibility to the vocabularies of
motive, but these circumstances facilitate both victim and bystander cooperation. This
cycle, when viewed in terms of the patterns of victim resistance, demonstrated the
power the self-fulfilling prophecy, which appeared to fulfil the 'validity' of the
motivational vocabularies. This entailed that the more innovative ways the victims
struggled to survive, the greater they appeared to confirm the vocabularies of motive
contained within the perpetrating ideology.
III. The Immanent Architecture ofGenocidal Logic
In this part of the chapter I will evaluate how a grammar of genocide functions to
ensure adherence based upon elements internal to its structure. Unlike the previous
section, which explored the sociological dynamics of vocabularies, I will describe the
immanent reasoning of ideological propositions and principles that purposely treat
genocide as a temptation. This treatment of genocide as a solution is designed to
achieve an adherence amongst particular societal audiences. I account for this
adherence by reference to how this grammar is structured. My central argument is that
because this grammatical structure houses these ideological principles in logical
paradigms, they behold a level of incommensurability vis-a-vis other worldviews. Due
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to the differing epistemological rules which determine 'truth value' within this
grammar, they can become impervious to various forms of critical reason. In this
section I show how this is possible.
The Incommensurability ofGenocidal Logic
The insularity of genocidal logic is perhaps best illustrated in reference to the structure
of scientific revolutions, where one view of the natural world replaces a once-dominant
perspective. The work of Thomas Kuhn (1970) suggested that if one examines the
history of scientific revolutions there is an inherent incommensurability between
scientific paradigms. This observation is based on an account of a descriptive theory as
an axiomatic system connected to observation by correspondence rules. Kuhn
maintained that meaningful explanations are derived by the interrelations of
observations and theoretical rules (Brown, 2004). Observations that are expressed in a
different set of these theoretical rules will employ different concepts and yield different
descriptions of a single body of observations. The key factor in this view is that the
observational language concepts themselves and their rules of validity are the
incommensurable elements of rival scientific explanations. The non-existence of a
common language in which to evaluate competing theories means that there are no
theory-neutral methodological rules that will allow an evaluation of these theories.
Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions is even more unsettling to scientific realism
when one considers that such theories "differ as to what features or considerations
provide the test of their truth" (Taylor, 1997: 42). Without any independent evaluative
criteria, there can be no epistemic evaluation of a rival mode of scientific
understanding.
Charles Taylor has argued, however, that it is possible, although not always
certain, to evaluate the transitions between outlooks in terms of gains in practical
understanding as we interact with the world. In other words, there are rational
considerations that have shaped the course of the dominant scientific worldviews
which are related to how we practically interact with our world. Taylor suggests that
the activity of explaining why things are as they are (what we think of as science) is
intrinsically linked to the activity of determining what the good is, and in particular
how human beings should live through attuning themselves to this order (Taylor,
1997:45).
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Talyor recognized here that a mode of understanding the world consists in our ability
to make our way about and effect our purposes in the world, what he refers to as "the
human constant" (1997: 48). This also means that it is possible to make a distinction
between the inner taken-for-granted logics of viewing the world and how we determine
the goods within it. Increased knowledge can thus aid our, what Martin Heidegger
called our "pre-understanding"—the uncritical and underlying purposes in dealing with
the world as we do (Heidegger quoted in Taylor, 1997: 48). By making explicit the
links between this form of understanding and our practical capacities of living in the
world, it is possible to employ forms of reasoning to evaluate rival worldviews which
intertwine explanations of the world with what the good is.
In analysing the transition between outlooks, one possible form of evaluative
reasoning can arise from the comparative judgement in relation to practical events and
the ability of a worldview to make sense of itself vis-a-vis other views in explaining
these events. In other words, a new moral outlook can make better sense of the
immanent difficulties within the old view and surpass it in these respects. Another
form of practical reasoning concerns the ability to influence the self-justification of a
transition from one moral view to another by clarifying an immanent confusion. This
error-reducing attempt—in identifying a contradiction or illuminating an issue whose
significance they cannot contest—can be conducted interpersonally or socially by
offering an interpretation of the person or group "which identifies these confused
feelings as confused and which thus, if accepted, will bring about the self-justifying
transition" (Taylor, 1997: 53). All these ad hominem or immanent modes of argument
are only possible if there exists a shared moral standard or position of some kind that
can pivot a transition to a new standard. In situations where cultural positions do not
share such common standards the basis for ad hominem reasoning is nonexistent.
This examination reveals that the greater the divergence between the goals or
values of worldviews the greater a political paradigm can become immunised from
some forms of critical reason. This is because there are no common moral or political
standards that may inspire a transition to another political paradigm. The important
reason why we should come to think of the combined understandings in a paradigm
format has to do with the fact that certain political grammars resemble scientific
paradigms and thereby use the incommensurability of their worldview to insulate and
legitimate a grammar that treats genocide as a 'solution'. In particular,
196
incommensurability can be an asset in retaining the loyalty of perpetrating elites and
even mass support.
To aid the disparity between rival worldviews, authorities abandon the
conventional rule for evaluating the validity of rival political paradigms. The key
strategy here is to fundamentally reject the common notions of the good, which can
customarily evaluate the truthfulness of a rival's position. Another specific strategy
that can increase a perspective's incommensurability is to adhere to views that are
more factually abstract and difficult to prove, thereby nullifying the common rules that
have traditionally evaluated political positions. This negates any ad hominem attempts
to encourage a transition to another moral outlook because the human constants that
mediate between transitions have been undermined, corrupted or replaced by an
altogether different paradigm.9 Thus, the potential error-reducing moves of ad
hominem reason are blocked by the structure of political paradigms themselves. The
incommensurability of rival outlooks is that they do not share the same adherence to
the facts of a political situation. Thus, only where outlooks can agree on the genuine
situation of the other can there be ad hominem reasoning which might pivot a change
in perspective. The point being made here is that the more radically mythical the
worldview, in rejecting common sense, the more immune it becomes to the efforts of
ad hominem reasoning. Those adhering to rival political paradigms may observe the
same societal events, yet their grammars—which each contain the incommensurable
principles of judgment and criteria of validity—have no common criteria or standpoint
on which to base comparative criticism. Understanding worldviews in terms of
incommensurability allows for the possibility of entrapping individuals in a form of
reasoning. By accepting the incommensurable goods of a political outlook, a new
worldview can function as a logical 'trap' because the good may necessitate and
encompass a series of consequential actions undertaken by states which the actor finds
morally abhorrent. The operation of "sequential action", as observed by Milgram in his
obedience experiments, can trap subjects in such a situation (Bauman, 1991: 157).
Once a subject agrees to partake in a course of social action (like an experiment
or even a political movement), and assume the obligations and benefits bestowed to
9 One important concern suggested by Taylor's critique is that for an outlook to become immune from
ad hominem reasoning there had to be no common cultural standards which may found a transition.
However, in many cases of domestic genocide the victim and perpetrator do share the similar cultural
foundations. The key difference here is that political paradigms can also share a common cultural milieu,
yet this commonality does not entail that they are themselves commensurable. Cf. (Pocock, 1989: 273).
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him, an individual can be entrapped and dominated by his initial commitment. A
decision to abandon a political movement, for example, entails that his past actions to
support the movement were somehow misjudged. In other words, to deny the further
intensification of a political commitment undercuts the subject's own moral position
which agreed with the values of a movement to which they initially committed. As
Bauman suggested, "the unwillingness to re-evaluate (and condemn) one's own past
conduct will remain a powerful...stimulus to plod on, long after the original
commitment to 'the cause'..." (1991: 158). As I shall examine in the next section,
personal consistency (between actions and judgements) can be a powerful force which
can compel and change an individual's moral outlook. Thus, should the first premise of
a political paradigm be accepted—as it is inspired by the use of force, indoctrination or
deception—the interventions and policies following from this position can become
both easier to accept and more difficult to relinquish, since they are based upon a
grammar that is incommensurable to other worldviews. The eradication of middle
ground, the impossibility of blending or coexisting political outlooks, prevents a clear
discursive way-out once the assumptions about the other are accepted.10
The importance of this argument for the evaluation of genocidal grammar is
that it suggests that there is no rational path of contestation where the first principles of
an ideological outlook can be undermined by an appeal to shared standards. The
particular problem for this path is that governments seeking genocidal solutions
destroy or restrict all institutional forms of ad hominem reasoning. Suppressed by the
practical desires of keeping order through total domination, the governing authority
repressively prevents the formation of critical reason. Arendt's account of force (versus
power) is informative of a fundamental attribute of this genocidal scheme, since force
is used to eliminate forms of communication set within a given community. Under
conditions of total domination, incommensurability is thus actively promoted by
discouraging any factual evaluation based upon another mediating political
perspective. The government actively seeks to mitigate the formulation of rival
explanations in its struggle against the other.
My claim is that the power of a political grammar that instrumentalises
genocide rests significantly upon the incommensurability of its logic combined with
10 G W Bush's words in the state of the union address: 'you're either with us, or you're with the
terrorists' is a classic phrase emphasising and demonstrating this divide between conflicting worldviews.
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the use of force to suppress institutions that organise critical reason. This does not
mean, however, that a paradigm which instrumentalises genocide is actually infallible
and incapable of immanent or external critique. Rather, the structure of a political
grammar itself can be devised in a way that makes it less susceptible to forms of
critical reason. Specifically, this may help to explain why genocide is often ended not
by fractures within the perpetrator's institutions, but rather from the external forces of
a rival authority. In the following section I will examine two other immanent traits of
political paradigms which aid their mass appeal.
Infallibility and Consistency
The fundamental attribute common to those authorities that conduct genocide is a
political grammar that beholds the attributes of infallibility and consistency. This image
of infallibility, conveyed to the movement's core constituency, is based not upon the
enlightened intelligence of an elite or cult of personality, but instead on the 'correct'
interpretations of the "essential reliable forces in history or nature, forces which neither
defeat nor ruin can prove wrong because they are bound to assert themselves in the
long run" (Arendt, 1968: 349). Elites in this case see themselves not only as
accomplished and effective representatives of the people, but also as interpreting
agents of reliable, underlying and Universal forces whose task it is to unmask the
sources of contamination in society that are causing current societal problems.
The supposed infallibility of these Universal forces is interwoven and sustained
by demonstrations of its consistency through time. In many cases, unrelated and
coincidental events are interpreted as expressions of their opponents' skill and ability
to attack and uses these threatening features to build a consensus for its vision. As I
have described earlier in the case of Rwanda, the clearest example of this narrating of
coincidental events came from the government's strategy of manufacturing 'subversive
activity' by creating the condition in which victims unintentionally fulfil the
perpetrator's ideology. The elimination of coincidence is also accomplished by
selectively interpreting events and individual actions in service of their worldview.
This demonstrates the narcissistic tendency of these ideologies to reinforce the
infallibility their views by establishing an aura of false consistency that mimics the
'reality' of scientific laws concerning events which attest to the 'Nature' or 'History'
of their current struggle against the other.
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The Conditions ofConsistency and Infallibility
Arendt (1968) was the first to identify these formal elements of infallibility and
consistency as compelling characteristics of totalitarian authority, because they were
situated historically in a time when many experienced an atomised condition of
individualization following the destruction of the old political class-based system. The
importance of this transition to a mass-based political system meant that political views
were not regulated according to its traditional class hierarchies. Public susceptibility to
such radicalised views of the other was a result of societal conditions that could not
effectively integrate the majority of the population into established political
institutions. By no longer being integrated into the political structure, the "masses"11
became more susceptible to the consistent explanations offered by radicalised
worldviews (Arendt, 1968: 311). This was made possible because the traditional class-
based political parties and civic organizations nullified their core beliefs by
collaborating with the dominant authoritarian leaders. It was thus the totalitarian
movements which first appealed to mass support by suggesting that the underlying
forces which infringed upon society could be unleashed by a new political paradigm.
These movements thus appealed to the frustrated expectations of success in societies
plagued by economic stagnation and social malaise which, according to Arendt, was
characterised by the personal conditions of loneliness that constituted a 'mass society'.
Arendt complemented this account of mass society with another insightful
explanation of why traditional class-based politics gave way to totalitarian ideology.
Regardless of the social needs created by modern society, the susceptibility of the
population to totalitarian movements derived from the form of their explanations of
social and political problems. They uniquely offered consistent and logical
explanations to all political problems that took away the randomness of the political
atmosphere. The fictions of the first totalitarian governments (the Trotskyite
conspiracy and the Protocols of Zion), all "contain[ed] an element of plausibility"
which was extrapolated into a fiction that was "removed from all plausible control by
individual experience" (1968: 362). The advantage of these explanations was that they
were not restricted by the inconsistencies and randomness of the real world which
1 Arendt defines the term: "...masses applies only where we deal with people who either because of
sheer numbers, or indifference, or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organisation
based on common interest, into political parties or municipal governments or professional organizations
or trade unions" (Arendt, 1968: 311).
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naturally favoured the explanation of events from a variety of positions. Rather, the
goal of totalitarian government, she suggested, was to interpret, reduce and explain all
the randomness and problems of the world by reference to the regime's core
contentions.
Organisation and Consistency
As I noted earlier, the uniqueness of totalitarianism was that it incorporated these
attributes of reductionism and consistency into the structure of its organisations. The
government performed as if the contention with the other actually existed, effectively
transforming the propaganda from contestable milieu into a chief element of
governmental reality. Thus, the central explanation of social problems based upon the
fictions of conspiracies became interwoven with "the functioning of the organisation"
(1968: 362). So long as the organization existed, its appearance would be "more
convincing than any argument or mere ideology can ever be", since the contention
"was being realised every day in the functioning hierarchy of a political organisation in
whose framework it would have been very "unrealistic" to question it" (1968: 362).
Thus, for those audiences which accepted the conspiratorial premise of these
ideologies, consistency in upholding this contention as embodied in the government
became a vital component of authority. Ideologies are thus adhered to because they
offer consistent and 'attainable' solutions to the problems facing society as realised by
the workings of government. Yet, the question that remains is how is it that
consistency encourages others to conform to such fictions.
There exists strong social psychological evidence which suggests that an
authority, independent of the contestable social conditions of mass society, can
12maintain a level of conformity when it performs its tasks reliably and consistently.
The work of Stanley Milgram in his experiments on obedience to authority
demonstrated that authority figures who were viewed with a measure of legitimacy and
performed their duties consistently commanded the obedience of subjects in
administering harmful orders. In an experiment of forty subjects, 26 fully complied
with the experimenter's orders to administer a scale of supposed electric shocks (from
12 Daniel Bell has argued that the concept of "mass society" is an excuse for radical evaluations and
romantic notions of the past that do not correspond to existing social and political conditions. Such
evaluations are "completely riddled by value judgments" and ignorant of any history of social groups
(Bell, 2000: 28-9).
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a "Slight shock" 15 to a 60 volts to a "XXX" shock of 435 to 450 volts) to a
confederate who was to be judged on "learning tasks" (Milgram, 1995: 27). All
subjects in the first experiment progressed until the 300-volt stage that read "Intense
Shock" (1995: 27).13 The procedure that was to be administered by the subject was
clear and consistent. Shocks were applied to incorrect responses that were revealed by
a light and the subjects were asked by the experimenter to "move one level higher on
the shock generator each time the learner flashes a wrong answer" (1995: 28). As one
would expect, subjects showed noticeable signs of stress and when appeals were made
to end the trials, the experimenter responded consistently with a set sequence of verbal
"prods" spoken in a firm, but not impolite manner (1995: 28). Milgram discovered that
experimenter inconsistency in relation to the treatment of the confederate (the tested
and unseen other) and to the subject decreased the conformity of subjects to the
experimenter's requests. A consistent structure enacted by a presumed legitimate
scientific authority was one significant factor, Milgram suggested, that influenced the
subjects' conformity to orders that were unambiguously harmful.14 One conclusion was
that consistency—in the form of logically directed goals to accomplish a particular
task—was determined to be a significant element of obedience to authority.
Consistency, I would argue, reduces the obvious opportunities to question an
authority's judgment, thereby making an authority appear more adequate to be in
control of the experiment. Inconsistencies, on the other hand, may signify to the
subject that there exists an immanent fallibility of the authority's position and hence an
alternate avenue for critical interpretation and non-conforming action.
This breakdown of consistency, as I shall examine in the next section in a
discussion of dissonance, is viewed by many cultures as a fatal cognitive error that
demands correction. The importance of these findings for my investigation here is that
Milgram structured the experiment as to examine the behaviour of subjects in direct
confrontation with the imagined other by conforming to the demands of a governing
authority who expressed their intentions consistently.
13
Seventy-five percent of the subjects in these experiments believed that the shocks they were
administering were real (Kressel, 2002: 159).
14 The one notable and plausible criticism of this experiment by Ross and Nisbett suggested that
obedience was procured not on pure obedience to authority, but rather on the confusing situation that
impaired a clear "definition of the situation" that would have restricted compliance (Kressel, 2002: 160).
In any case, this argument contends that the situation, not the experimenter was ambiguous and therefore
holds no direct bearing on the proposition being evaluated.
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Consistency, Conformity andDissonance
Recent research by Straus indicates that the estimated number of genocidaires in
Rwanda numbered 170,000-210,000 people (Straus 2004: 94). Although the author
maintains that most of the killing was accomplished by "a small number of armed
perpetrators and especially zealous ones", this finding indicates that sociological
processes of conformity were likely involved in promoting these actions (2004: 95).
Research in social psychology suggests that certain types of social situations can
produce stark changes in beliefs about one's social situation or action, changes that
also have been shown to endure through time. Cognitive dissonance has been found to
produce these kinds of enduring changes in opinion resulting from common social
situations. In this section I will examine how dissonance-producing situations can
account for the adherence of ideals amongst those involved in atrocities.
Although no social scientist or scholar of genocide has examined the effects of
dissonance and social conformity, Mark Levene (1999b) has presented a theory
suggesting that the influences of the international capitalist system can add pressure to
"realize the unrealizable" through radical policies, including genocide. He argues that
"the imperative to modernize and compete within the capitalist world
system...provides the primary wellsprings and motor for the perpetration of genocide"
as it entraps states "in a dilemma of perception and self-perception" where they
"intensely perceive themselves to be weak, yet feel that they ought to be strong"
(Levene, 1999b: 46). States holding such self-perceptions "are prepared to go to the
greatest lengths to remedy their perceived shortcomings" and will take any 'short cut',
even committing genocide, to achieve modernization so as to compete within the
international system (1999b: 47). Although Levene gives us no step-by-step account of
how this practically occurs in a case of genocide, he does suggest that there are
external as well as internal "pressures" to compete through societal modernization.
When minorities, for example, pose threats or obstacles to progress within this order,
the state's chances "for 'taking it out' on some 'scapegoat' group...is greatly
magnified" (1999: 46). The candidates in this category are states "who still perceive of
themselves as nation-state players in the international system's race" whose national
tension, created by the disparity between their self-image and current reality, is the
"well spring" of genocidal solutions (1999: 49). Although this form of argument is not
unique in the social sciences, Levene is the first to apply this theory to the occurrence
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of genocide.15 Levene thus maintains that genocidal 'solutions' are revealed as 'short¬
cut' temptations in dealing with genuine self-image inconsistencies in relation to the
world system of nation states. His theory suggests that genocide is employed
instrumentally as a fast route to modernisation arising from external competitive
challenges with other states. Although I think Levene's theory overlooks the
importance of a monologic-introspective drive to restructure the society (as
exemplified by the perpetrator's paradox), his theory does raise the important issue of a
society's self-image and their political reactions to this judgement.16
One way that societal conditions can promote dissonance is when a society's
own self-image is incongruent with its experienced circumstances. In other words,
those individuals who experience a tension between collective expectations about their
own society and their current circumstances may choose to resolve this tension by
adhering to views against the other as an avenue to reduce this tension. Views many
change to embrace radical and consistent forms of accounting for social problems that
reject the basic principles of common sense and the world of facts. The desire for a
consistent explanation of the current social situation, which can offer a way of
reducing dissonance, does mean that the political can be corrupted by those skilled at
gathering support for fictional and unrealistic struggles. A devout adherence to a
radical political grammar may thus be symptomatic of a political condition where
15 This argument has been employed most notably by Daniel Bell in his contention against the concept
of mass society as it applies to American politics. Under his view, "Social tensions are an expression of
unfulfilled expectations" which are seen as a contributing factor to the development of radical, mass
based, political movements, rather than any general idea of a mass society of atomised individuals (Bell,
2000:31).
16 Levene is correct to note that genocidal governments seek a consistent self-image, but, as I have
argued, this effort to maintain consistency through genocide is not based entirely upon any sense of
external competition with other states—that is, motivations which have a fundamental utilitarian basis.
Rather, I have contended that a perverse obsession with creating the new stronger self-image, based
upon a destructive contrast with the other, is the key presupposition to the temptation of genocide that
can account for its performative paradoxes. Therefore, the limitation of Levene's theory is that it imbues
the suppositions behind genocide with an attribute of utilitarianism that is, upon closer examination,
nonexistent. As acts of "risk taking", such as genocide, are polices seen by Levene to be a quick
'solution' to a 'problem', his theory can only treat the contradictory outcomes of this policy (the
paradoxes of genocide) as aberrations, rather than an as expressions of other underlying motives or set of
driving forces. The paradoxes of genocide are neglected for the reason that consistent external
motives—desire for economic or regional domination—are privileged as the 'real' underpinnings of
genocidal policy without sufficient critical argument. Likewise, this view entails that problem
populations must somehow obstruct these utilitarian efforts in ways that actually exists and that apply to
the systematic representation of the other as a group, where genocide can, with foresight, 'solve' the
'problem'. The concern with this assumption is that there is no correspondence between 'problem
populations' and the desire to gain a greater international standing through genocide and economic
development, unless one assumes that the contentions about the other—as obstacles to greater power—
are actual representations of the domestic situation.
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many experience a stark conflict between their society's self-image and their current
conditions. These political grammars, should they hold an adherence all of their own,
can also be managed to function as a wedge by expanding the disparity between self-
images of greatness and a society's current condition. What is important to recognise
in these circumstances is that states possess the opportunity to build upon and
manipulate these conditions and exacerbate social tensions, which can then be relieved
by conforming to discriminating behaviour.
Cognitive dissonance, as contrasted with the sociality of reducing tension, is a
social psychological theory that suggests that when two related cognitions are mutually
inconsistent, one of them will change to restore a coherent consistency under certain
conditions. Rather than ascribing a cognative-metapyhisical value to this theory, it has
recently been reinterpreted by some scholars in social and linguistic terms where it has
precedence in existing research.17 The assumption by the cognitive dissonance school
is that inconsistency between opinions and actions causes "a form of psychological
discomfort" that is corrected by a change in one's opinions (Harmon-Jones & Mills
quoted in Neuman and Tabak, 2003: 266). This occurs when conflict is experienced by
the subject, which assumes that the greater the experiential performance the greater the
dissonance and thus the more inclined people are to change in favour of consistency.
The results from this school of research indicates that when opinions are changed as a
result of dissonance, "this cognitive activity had a relatively permanent impact"
(Aronson, 1995: 226). This means that conditions which foster opinion change through
dissonance and self-justification can have long term effects upon people's views.18
In a replication of an earlier study, Jonathan Freedman performed an
experiment where children were admonished with either mild or severe threats not to
play with an extraordinarily attractive toy. In both mild or severe groups, the children
complied with the demands not to play with the toy, but when presented with the toy
several weeks later to freely play with, it was the children who were harshly
17 Cf. Beasley and Joslyn (2001), and Neuman and Tabak (2003).
18 The inherent assumption within experimental psychology is that discoveries are seen to uncover some
universal dispositional rules of the human condition. These "nonrhetorical" approaches, as Neuman and
Tabak have termed them, can be contrasted with a rhetorical approach to dissonance which claims that
such changes in opinions can be traced to interactional sources, rather than cognitive ones (Neuman and
Tabak, 2003: 254). In the present case, debates about the 'true source' of this tendency are not relevant
to or infringe the thesis being described here, although I strongly suspect that dissonance is a
consequence of some, yet unknown, relationship between the nature of syntax and social interaction,
rather than a vague notion of 'cognition'.
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admonished that chose to play with the toy. It was argued that the children who were
confronted with a mild threat had "little external justification for this restraint" and at
the time of initial threat "they had a much stronger need for se/f-justification"
(Aronson, 1995: 226). In other words, children who chose not to play with the toy
needed to convince themselves that they weren't playing with the toy because they
'really' did not like it. This means that the cognition about the toy's attractiveness had
changed in congruence with the child's decision not to play with the toy due to the
mildness of admonishment.
In our present case concerning regimes that openly treat genocide as a
temptation, dissonance means that opinions may be susceptible to change or might be
reconfigured to embrace forms of reasoning that seek to resolve a tension between two
conflicting cognitions. A common scenario in which dissonance can be experienced is
when individuals are compelled by conditions or direct threats to act against their own
moral judgements concerning the other. This creates dissonance that can be relieved by
changing their moral judgements about the other in congruence with their compelled
actions. The assumption here is that opinions can be compelled quite permanently
towards accepting a violent worldview, despite the lack of actual evidence that such
threats (embodied by the other) are genuine. The practical consequence of this scenario
according to cognitive dissonance theory is that the less severe the prods designed to
compel behaviour, the greater the influence of dissonance. Thus, it is more effective to
secure opinion change without direct and serious threats because these measures
reduce an individual's experience of dissonance.
Alternatively, in such circumstances governments may require citizens to
participate in discriminatory acts—from reporting on suspected people or conducting
searches—which may conflict with their beliefs about the other, hence increasing
citizens' cognitive dissonance. To reduce the effects of this dissonance participants
could 'choose' to change their prior opinions about the other and the regime, making
them consistent their actions in support of the state. Thus, the dissonance that arose out
of the conflict between their views of the state's policies against the other and their
decisions to comply, meant that to maintain personal consistency their view about the
other would change in congruence with their actions. These changes can increase the
possibility that they will conform with more violent actions against the other in the
future. Moreover, other research has also observed that these morally disturbing
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actions can create a defence mechanism which can actually intensify views against the
other. The social psychologist Neil Kressel suggested that participation "in the killing
left many SS men feeling anxious and unsettled" (Kressel, 2002: 142). To balance the
situation, in line with the paradigm of oppression, this tension was aggressively
attributed to their enemies, "the perceived source of their discontent" (2002: 142).
Consistency between compliance with state actions and beliefs about the state can
foster greater commitment based upon the desires for personal consistency.
The importance of consistent political grammars is thus that they offer an
established avenue to resolve the conflicts created by dissonance-producing situations.
By offering a consistent explanation and 'solution' to a troubled political condition,
grammars can increase their adherence among the population without reference to the
validity of their judgements. Specifically, a method to resolve dissonance can be
accomplished by a change of opinion into already-established avenues of prejudicial
social mores or political positions in reference to the other. The important point to be
recognised here is that these doctrines are portrayed and organised in such a manner as
to address and resolve the tensions arising from societal conditions. What makes these
radical grammars more palatable is their context in situations of dissonance and their
consistent explanations designed to redress these tensions.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that personal consistency in
terms of the value judgements of others is not only a strongly established psychological
tendency, but also a cherished value of public life19 that can affect the likelihood that
radical and fictitious political grammars are adhered to by parts of the population.
More importantly, governments which actively incite and recruit participation in
discriminatory actions in accordance with their views of the other can increase
conformity with these views and greater forms of violent participation because they
offer avenues to reduce social tensions.20 In other words, authorities use strategies not
to produce direct ideological commitment, but primarily behavioural compliance
which later creates a circumstance where dissonance may be resolved by greater
19 It is a successfully proven political strategy to portray one's political opponent as inconsistent, as the
2004 American Presidential showed, when John Kerry was seen to currently oppose a war which he
initially voted in favour.
20 There are other techniques that are associated with this pattern of action and conformity, most notably
the "foot-in-the-door" effect. An experimentally verified technique, the 'foot-in-the-door' shows that "it
is easier to gain compliance with a large request if one first gets someone to go alone with a much
smaller request" (Kressel, 2002: 133). For experiments revealing the power of this effect see Aronson,
1995.
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ideological adherence. So long as individuals posses a rational desire for personal
consistency, the presentation of consistent solutions to the problems of society can gain
greater public adherence when situated within a context of dissonance producing social
conditions.
IV. Genocide, Nietzsche and Totalitarian Grammar
The previous sections of this chapter have examined how a policy of extermination
could be achieved by examining its external conditions of application and a grammar's
immanent structure. This final part of the chapter examines the substance of a political
grammar which privileges forms of violence, like genocide, as necessary or even
desirable instruments of domination. As morally abhorrent as these methods are, the
principal elements of this grammar can behold a seductive adherence all their own,
regardless of the social conditions imposed by governments or spontaneously
developed by 'invisible hands'. This means that political ideals can have an attraction
all their own for those possessed by the lust to dominate. In this final part I shall
examine the principles of this grammar manifested in its vision of society and those
ideally disposed to govern this milieu. I argue that the principles underpinning
Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy give us a model of a coherent and accessible political
grammar that embraces total destruction resembling the general grammatical patterns
underpinning genocidal governments. I do not claim, however, that Nietzsche has
inspired any modern form of totalitarianism—there is no causal historical link being
professed here. Rather, I understand Nietzsche's philosophy as a testament to how
various kinds of general principles can form a coherent understanding of a kind of
public, and that these general principles share a strong affinity with those political
versions of speech that have been substantively developed—that is, 'spoken'—by
genocidal movements.
Nietzsche's grammar, not unlike other versions of the political, seeks to
challenge other versions of the public in all their societal manifestations. His (1968)
vision of public life, unlike other theories of politics, contains a grammar of societal
design and vision of rule which purposely intends to stand alone and repel other
patterns of public life. He sought to accomplish this isolated stance by critically
undermining the entire basis of these rival patterns of existence, and by embracing
methods of harshness and cruelty designed to humiliate and utterly destroy its
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opponents. What legitimates its perverse and radically menacing methods of rule are
principles which conceive of rival cultural and political patterns in new corrupting
ways.
Nietzsche's view of the public did away with many traditional assumptions of
the political. The first was the domain of the political, the polis, once conceived in
contrast to the private. It was possible to nullify this distinction between private and
public because he "identified culture as the crucial site where the contest for total
power would be decided" (Wolin, 2004: 472). Culture as the prime object of struggle
was selected for its total pervasiveness of human life, spontaneously diffused, as
Edmund Burke thought, throughout society as a 'natural' rather than coordinated order.
Culture thus encompassed and ran through the entire spectrum of life from authority,
obedience and social norms, to industry, education and military institutions. Thus, a
strong theoretical tendency in Nietzsche's work strove to prioritize the control of
culture over the traditional notions of the public. Culture was thus seen as an
overarching domain and primary site of political contestation. This allowed Nietzsche
to relocate traditional notions of politics, such as class, inequality, domination, war and
revolution into cultural relationships. This made his vision all encompassing, in
attempting to identify the sources of opposing political doctrines.
Nietzsche's ideal character in his politics of culture was homo creativus—"a
world creator of value, beauty, and meaning, the stuff of great culture" (2004: 474).
Unlike Karl Marx's character of homo faber (the demiurgic power intended to bring
the material world into existence and sustain it by the mind-numbing demands of
production by the vast majority of humans), homo creativus for Nietzsche was the tiny
minority that delighted in cultivating their minds. Homo faber's opponent is thus the
few who exploit the many, whereas for homo creativus the few are threatened by the
many who exploit and vulgarise the values of the few—"all the swarming 'cultured'
vermin who feast upon the sweat of every hero!" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004:
474). This view of the public no longer treats the common good as a necessary feature
of political life, and instead treats it as an oxymoron; what is common can never be
good.
"Good" is no longer good when one's neighbour mouths it. And how should there be a
"common good"? The term contradicts itself: whatever can be common always has
little value (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 460).
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These cultural values that apply to the mass of the population diffuse themselves
throughout the hierarchies of the society. Thus, the idea of the good is the expression
of the herd morality as it is a sign of the power of the community. Culture as it is
possessed by the herd thus serves to oppress the nonconformists who do not fit within
the established rules of culture with its animus against the 'unique' and 'different'.
Disdain for culture is thus an attempt to reclaim the greatness embodied in the
"Ultimate Man", those who have been seen as "contemptible" by the majority—"They
have something of which they are proud. What is it called that makes them proud?
They call it culture..." (Nietzsche, 1969: 45).
For Nietzsche cultural values are not "the social representations of a
disinterested search for what is true or right" (Wolin, 2004: 461). Instead, his
philosophy viewed culture as harbouring values of truth which a society
institutionalises and enforces in order to preserve its power and existence.
Consequently, all institutionalised values and moral codes are seen as a projection of a
physiological instinct to power cloaked by a language of objectivity and truth.
Nietzsche wrote,
All events that result from intention are reducible to the intention to increase
power...The criteria of truth resides in the enhancement of the felling of power
(Nietzsche, 1968: 349; 290).
I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces,
for power, where the will to power is lacking there is decline. My assertion is that this
will is lacking in all the supreme values ofmankind (Nietzsche, 1990: 129).
The culture of the herd thus appears as a lack of instinct and vitality, where the
common and weak survive to propagate and hence degenerate mankind by crowding
out and feeding off the new, strong and unique.
This abhorrence with the many embodied in culture directed Nietzsche's fury
towards all discourses and institutions of cultural levelling (democracy, socialism,
religion (Christianity)) and their notions of truth. To thus undermine the basis of
culture, Nietzsche proposed to provoke a crisis in the herd by eroding their foundations
in truth. He wrote,
Man projects his drive to truth, his "goal" in a certain sense, outside himself as a world
that has being, as a metaphysical world, as a "thing-in-itself'...His needs as creator
invent the world upon which he works, anticipate it; this anticipation (this belief in
truth) is his support (Nietzsche, 1968: 299; emphasis added).
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His gross distaste of the many manifested in 'culture' fuelled Nietzsche's drive not
merely for destruction of 'Truth', but rather for a place where total destruction could
serve a singular vision to revivify heroic actions embodied by a new elite that would
bring greater value and new meanings to the human species—a drive that would
reclaim the value ofhigh culture. The Few who embody the greatness of 'high culture'
were described as gods or "new philosophers" or "Superman" with a privileged
standpoint which should be used to attack, expose and subvert the entire cultural
foundations (morality, aesthetics, spirituality) of their opponents (Nietzsche, 1969: 45).
The Few are thus the "human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give
themselves laws, who create themselves" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 461). By
their 'evil acts' against the common 'good' professed by the herd culture, this elite is
deemed essential for the "preservation of the species" by "overcoming" the
pervasiveness of decadence through the revivification of culture—""Preservation of
the species" is only a consequence of the growth of the species, i.e., the overcoming of
the species on the road to a stronger type" (Nietzsche, 1968: 299).
Nietzsche thus legitimates the politics of this 'evil' (that is, the anti-common)
elite as an urgent response to the cultural decay of the species. For the extraordinary
elite to dominate they must embrace heroic virtues which are seen as manifestations of
the will-to-power. Thus, the signs of cultural decadence are suggested by the
pervasiveness of weakness, submissiveness, mercifulness of herd culture, all of which
corrupts and mutually excludes the assertiveness of the will-to-power.
Wherever the will to power declines in any form there is every time also a
physiological regression, a decadence. The divinity of decadence, pruned of all its
manliest drives and virtues, from now on necessarily becomes the God of the
physiologically retarded, the weak. They do not call themselves the weak, the call
themselves 'the good'... (Nietzsche, 1990: 139).
If the species is to be preserved and extended into new heights, the will-to-power must
be 'liberated' by being embodied in an elite who will challenge the weakness
possessed and preserved by the many and their virtues of'goodness'. This struggle can
only be accomplished, Nietzsche suggested, by embracing harsh, demanding and
ruthless values embodied by "a master race whose sole task is to rule, a race with its
own sphere of life with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to
the highest peak of the spirit...beyond good and evil" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin,
2004: 462). Thus, this elite assumes the privileged standpoint situated atop, yet also
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inside the species, simultaneously operating the mechanisms of rule from a perspective
capable of encompassing the species.
For this is our height and our home: we live here too high and steep for all the unclean
and their thirst...(Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 471).
So let us live above them like strong winds...And like a wind I will one day blow
among them and with my spirit take away the breath from their spirit: thus my future
will have it (Nietzsche, 1969: 122).
The definition of success for Nietzsche's elite, the embodiments of 'high culture', is
the "moment when the extraordinary marginalises the normal, usurping its role to
become the dominant practice" (Wolin, 2004: 467). This struggle against the normal
takes place as a renunciation of the 'weak' activities of normal life (of love, family,
neighbours, co-workers), thereby stepping outside the traditional conceptions of rights,
justice, and punishment into the privileged vantage-point assumed by the elite.
This vantage point above, yet also within the species entails going beyond
reason and intellectual capability into the realm of 'instincts' without a substantively
specified form. All cultural pursuits are thus unmasked as expressions power because
the elite recognise a central tenet of nihilism: the meaninglessness of the world.
Holding the position that all interpretations of the world are false means destroying the
values by which the world has been constituted by the many and their intellectual
advocates. All epistemological claims should thus be understood in purely political
terms, as cultural expressions of the philosopher's will-to-power. The purpose of the
elite is thus to renounce this entire world of 'truth' and to embody the preconditions of
life: instinct, growth and the will-to-power.
Nietzsche's "critical totalitarianism", as Wolin writes, is meant to call attention
to its "reactionary character" which takes the form of a total-relentless destruction
(Wolin, 2004: 464). Nietzsche's "critical totalitarianism" embraces the idea of the self-
denouncing intellect, the 'mind denouncing mind' by invoking a vocabulary that
enables the mind to remake its own nature in the image of anti-mind; that is, in terms
of the primordial capacities of life. The elite thus assumes a physicalist or pre-political
character of the will-to-power in order to challenge the enlightened world of diversity
and the interchange of knowledge established by the Enlightenment. This has
consequences for the kinds of methods the elite employ in their domination of society.
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One consequence of a world without truth, where the mind renounces its own
intellectual capacities, entails that once all has been unmasked as power, all
observation rests upon appearance. Appearance is embraced because depth of intellect
burdens the elite with history and precedence. "What is required", Nietzsche wrote, "is
to stop at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, to believe in forms, tones,
words in the whole Olympus of appearance" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 468).
When knowledge of truth is denounced for surface and appearance, appearance is by
default reality. Nietzsche wrote,
"Appearance" itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i.e., in a world where
there is no being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created
through appearance...Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our
practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for us (Nietzsche, 1968: 306).
...the artist places a higher value on appearance than on reality...For 'appearance'
here signifies reality once more, only selected, strengthened, corrected...(Nietzsche,
1990:49).
This renunciation of'the actual' is designed to privilege the elite 'artists' in their 'high'
standpoint. This abandonment of 'reality' as a condition of rule is the opposite of a
traditional Machiavellian vision of authority.
To exercise power successfully, "a true Machiavellian must possess a keen
sense of political realities", a deep understanding of what circumstances and strategies
enhance and restrict power based upon an informed view of history (2004: 468). This
form of Machiavellian power is thus active or "effectual", continually searching for
new strategies in order to survive, yet bound by the realities of the situation. Authority
thus preserves a standing detachment of from the conditions determining the political,
while, and at the same time, maintaining close contact with what is genuinely
controlling these circumstances. Machiavelli's famous counsels about grounding
power in the knowledge of the people as they are a steady and reliable basis of
legitimacy expresses this grounded attachment with reality. Although Machiavellian
power is continually searching for a better position to secure its authority, it cannot be
classified as dynamic. Authority under this view desires expansion, as Wolin suggests,
"not because of some mission, but in order to survive" (2004: 468).21 Nietzsche's new
21 The Roman Empire's genocidal exploits, in what is now Romania, demonstrated this Machiavellian
principle of authority—should a minority become a genuine threat to a region and betray the agreements
made to the empire, they would be totally eliminated. In most cases, the executive opted for preserving a
"reputation of leniency" which encouraged opponents to surrender (Lintott, 1999: 50).
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elite, on the other hand, are opposed to being controlled by ideas of'self-preservation'
and 'natural selection' because they negate the primal will-to-power that derives from
within the subject. Nietzsche expressed this position most clearly by claiming it was
"Anti-Darwin" (Nietzsche, 1968: 364). He wrote,
The influence of "external circumstances" is overestimated by Darwin to a ridiculous
extent: the essential thing in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping, form-
creating force working from within which utilizes and exploits "external
circumstances"...(Nietzsche, 1968: 344).
What Nietzsche argues here is that the instinctual force of the will-to-power as
embodied by mankind effectually controls the circumstances for its survival; that is
mankind dominates the conditions of its own strength and growth. Thus, self-
preservation is only a secondary consequence of the will-to-power—"A living thing
wants above all to discharge its force: "preservation" is only a consequence of this"
(Nietzsche, 1968: 344).
The totalitarian view of power is thus principally concerned with liberating
itself through revitalising the grandiose mythical and artistic elements of appearance, a
Grosse Politik in contrast to Machiavelli's Realpolitik. It despises the confines of any
convictions that may be inspired by any 'realistic' worldview. "Convictions are
prisons", Nietzsche wrote, because
They do not see far enough, they do no see things beneath them: but to be permitted to
speak about value and disvalue one must see five hundred convictions beneath
one...Freedom from convictions of any kind, the capacity for an unconstrained view,
pertains to strength...Grand passion, the ground and force of his [Zarathustra's]
being...Grand passion uses and uses up convictions, it does not submit to them—it
knows itself sovereign (Nietzsche, 1990: 184).
Appearance can only become reality where it is dynamically based upon a grand vision
that is not constrained by any kinds of realistic convictions and where it is permitted to
perpetually expand within a mission-based antithesis22 exacted by all the vital
institutions of the elite. The performance of the grand struggle is the only determinant
of action, over and against any perspective that may make appeals based upon an
intrinsic knowledge of problems. This grammar does resonate in the history of
totalitarian government. As Hans Mommsen has argued,
22 In Nietzsche's Maxims he wrote: "42. For me they were all steps, I have climbed up upon them—
therefore I had to pass over them. But they thought I wanted to settle down on them.. .44. Formula ofmy
happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal...(Nietzsche, 1990: 37).
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[Nazi foreign policy was] in its form domestic policy projected outwards, which was
able to conceal the increasing loss of reality only by maintaining political dynamism
through incessant action. As such it became ever more distant from the chance of
political stabilization (Mommsen quoted in Wolin, 2004: 492).
Without this subordination of realism, the dynamically enacted antithesis would be
confined by other forms of consideration that may limit its struggle to overcome
decadence. Thus, one can say with accuracy that as the momentum of the antithesis
increases, the state's grip on reality loosens.
Machiavelli's Prince desired to exploit and incorporate the resources and power
of their foes and counselled to eliminate only those opponents who were genuine
conspirators and detractors of their power. Nietzsche's elite, on the other hand, desired
the obliteration of the enemy because their weakness posed a threat of contagion that
could undermine the heroic nature of the elite and retard the species. Totalitarian
dynamics thus turns revolutionary dynamics on its head. Instead of seeking a stable
position to dominate society like Machiavelli or, like the revolutionary, to acquire and
overthrow the powerful and privileged, the totalitarian sets out to exterminate the weak
and vulnerable elements that challenge its grand and expanding vision of strength.
What gives the weak their strength is the vestiges of modern culture (a morality of
equality and pity) pooled into a mass of culprits and sympathisers. Weakness has the
power to thus defeat the strong, not by assault, but by arousing their pity and thereby
corrupting their strength—"What is more harmful than any vice?—Active sympathy
for the ill-constituted and weak-Christianity" (Nietzsche, 1990: 128).
The Other and the 'Benefits' ofExtermination
Nietzsche's elite possesses a singular-totalistic and aggressive drive to bring down the
entire world it believes its enemies have made. The elite's privileged godlike
standpoint which professes to act in favour of the species means that their enemies are
depicted in dehumanising terms: degenerate, sick, decadent. This means that the elite
should not pity their opponents when it is necessary to enslave, terrorise or exterminate
an enemy, but also exalt in their total demise for the benefit of the species. The
"essential characteristic of a good healthy aristocracy" Nietzsche wrote in a chilling
passage, will be its accepting "with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human
beings who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to
slaves, to instruments" (Nietzsche quoted Wolin, 2004: 466). Yet, what is essential for
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this new ruthless elite was based upon the conviction that "conventional politics
diverted the creative energies of the best from cultural pursuits" (Wolin, 2004: 463).
To barter with the decadent in order to rule meant that they exorcised influence over
the strong—"And I turned my back upon the rulers when I saw what they now call
ruling: bartering and haggling for power—with the rabble!" (Nietzsche, 1969: 121).
This corrupting and degenerative effect became most acutely manifest in times of war.
Unlike total subordination, slavery and genocide, warfare tended to decimate
disproportionately "the most highly cultivated" and courageous (Nietzsche quoted in
Wolin, 2004: 463). Heroism and self-sacrifice in wartime put at risk the strong and
made them more vulnerable, whereas the weak, tending to avoid conflict, would likely
survive at the expense of the strong. It is thus essential that the new elite operate from a
special vantage-point not only atop the species (surveying it from the 'heights'), but
also from an actual position of total domination where the heroic Few could exact
'purification methods' without costing its strength. The ideal situation for Nietzsche's
new elite is exemplified not by war, but by total domination and terror to achieve
strength with no possibility of dialogue or any kind of interchange with its decadent
enemy. Nietzsche's elite thus rule purely in monologic non-costing terms.
From a perspective where truth and knowledge about action remain inherently
unknowable,23 the appearances of weakness are the sole manifestations and 'real'
indications of an enemy who uses cultural forms to pervasively and secretly transmute
its nature. It is this all-enveloping ethos ofweakness which has contaminated the social
body and inspires the elite to extirpate its visible manifestations. The enemy is thus an
embodied way of life, a being that can be vague or shifting in its appearances and
ingenious in its disguises. The difficulty in identifying the enemy means that new kinds
of intervention measures are required to penetrate into the depths of culture; ones
which can mirror, counter and challenge the secret and pervasive domination of the
enemy—this Himmler had in mind when he stated "we owe the art of government to
the Jews" (Himmler quoted in Arendt, 1968: 360). These secret all-encompassing
23 For Nietzsche, Wolin writes, "every action is unknowable" in the sense that no two actions are the
same and actual motives are "impenetrable" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 461).
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methods are required because of the nature of decadence,24 all of which entails
abandoning the old boundaries of law that ensure politics.
Operating ruthlessly on the surface of culture means the elite should follow
their instincts (the will-to-power) and avoid the depths of contemplation. Staying at the
level of appearance thus entails embracing a physicalist or pre-political vision of
culture, one that judges only what is apparent in themselves and in their opponents.
The challenge of securing the health of great culture through unmasking their
opponents could thus only be achieved by identifying and struggling against what is
clearly apparent: the weakness manifested in superficial physical traits. This was
because Nietzsche thought that once a culture was contaminated it could not be
restored to health by cultural measures alone—"Culture was insufficiently primordial,
too removed from life itself, from a primal force, from the body" (Wolin, 2004: 471).
'Curing' a culture was to be achieved, not by overriding, reinforcing or transcending
the elements over the weak, but by descending from culture into the realm of the
manifestly primal and physical—"The "savage" (or in moral terms, the evil man) is a
return to nature—and in a certain sense his recovery, his cure from "culture""
(Nietzsche, 1968: 364-5). This decent into the physical focused only on what was
apparent on the surface, "those whose visible appearance (shape of a nose) or condition
(ill) were the external marks of contagion" (Wolin, 2004: 471). Thus, 'unmasking' the
concealed elements of contagion required a regime of identification which first relied
only loosely on appearance, with the potential to expand their by uncovering other
invisible carriers of contagion. There is thus a progressive expansion from first
targeting the visible forms of weakness—those openly opposed to terror or
extermination (local leaders or opposition political officials) and other self-declared
elements of decadence—to exposing the /^visible forms through more invasive terror
methods. Since the 'invisible' targets of genocide need not have committed any act of
wrong-doing—what only matters is that the victims be identified with a general
category of decadence—this dynamic expansion of strength serves to efface the
sentiments innocence and pity that stands in the way of extermination. The elements of
contagion are thus not subjected to the traditional notions of transgressive
24 As Arendt suggested, "The Jews very clearly were the only inter-European element in a nationalist
Europe. It seemed only logical that their enemies had to organize on the same principle, if they were to
be the secret manipulators of the political destiny of all nations" (Arendt, 1968: 40).
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punishments, but are targeted because they belong to the identifiable patterns of a
particular race, nation or religion—all visible manifestations of 'weakness'.
A grammar of contagion calls forth a systematic form of intervention, which
will depict its methods of extirpation not in moral terms, but as a purification ritual
designed to improve or fulfil the greatness of its privileged position (as race or
species). By depicting its enemies as hidden carriers of 'infection', this grammar is
able to justify its total domination of the social body. All forms of violence that
eliminate contagion thus become sacrilised in the name of purification. The more
concealed the enemy, the more invasive and ruthless the methods must be, sniffing out
their 'illness' in places of refuge—"My genius", Nietzsche proclaimed, "is in my
nostrils" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 472). The consuming drive of this struggle
thus involves the perpetual identification, enslavement and eradication of the unfit:
"Nothing", Nietzsche declared, "has preoccupied me more profoundly than the
problem of decadence..." (2004: 472).
Nietzsche's passionate drive for a new elite was not restricted by Utopian
convictions of a 'just society' and thus possessed no final resting place or telos to be
reached. His central devotion was thus solely to the acts of critical intervention itself
which actualised the will-to-power, even if this should entertain contradictions or anti-
theoretical positions. The will-to-power deriving from instinct becomes the prime
motivating force that represents a continual provocation to discover decadence and
achieve new feats of artistry—"sexuality, intoxication, cruelty—all belong to the oldest
festal joys of mankind, all also preponderant in the early "artist"" (Nietzsche, 1968:
421). Eradication of the decadent is thus conceived as a never-ending campaign of
cultural hygiene performed within the grammar of instinct, physicality and appearance.
Yet, there are two elements latent within this particular grammar of decadence which
professes to speak for the 'nature' of the other by reference to a theory of
anthropology.
Two Anthropological Traits ofGenocide
Within the grammar of contamination professed by this view of the other are
anthropological traits which bind the attributes of decadence to the basic instinctual-
physical notions of the body. Thus, contained within this grammar is a 'logic of
genocide' that links the necessity to eliminate the inherent traits manifested by a group
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in reference to an anthropology of emanation. The language which necessitates the
elimination of the other exists within two anthropological traits.
The first essential trait within this logic is called libido dominandi (the instinct
to dominate). This lust for domination is described as a notion of collective egoism,
where the other, by their practice of cultural forms of decadence, obstructs and corrupts
the central tenets of the 'high' cultural patterns of authority, thus creating its downfall
and/or preventing the its greatness. The threatening other, as I argued in chapter Three,
is a paradoxical notion who is targeted for their powerlessness within an established
order. The libido dominandi embodied by the other is paradoxically manifest through
their powerlessness to contaminate and control society. Yet, how the libido dominandi
is a manifestation ofNatural or Historical forces that necessitates genocide, involves a
second interwoven trait that grounds the libido dominandi as the force of corruption
within the other's physicality.
The libido dominandi does entail that this drive is incorrigibly interwoven with
the constitution of the body. However, it does not account for those behaviours that are
derivative of from it. In other words, the corrupting behaviour of the other is
understood to emanate from physiological sources which do not allow for
rehabilitation, yet what is lacking here is grammar which accounts for this
manifestation of instinctual drives. The anthropological concept that sheds light upon
this libidinous behaviour is actio sequor esse (action follows from being). This notion
serves to articulate the determining link between the other's incorrigible characteristics
and their subsequent actions. Actio sequor esse has a long and enduring history in
Western literature, with many notable examples deriving from the New Testament
where it was employed to account for forms of deceptive action—a prime indication of
ecclesiastical evil.
Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they
are ferocious wolves. By their fruit you will recognize them...every good tree bears
good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit...Every tree that does not bear good fruit is
cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus, by their fruit you will recognize them
(Matthew 7:15-20).
No good tree bears bad fruit, nor does a bad tree bear good fruit. Each tree is
recognized by its own fruit. People do not pick figs from thorn bushes, or grapes from
briers. The good man brings good things out of the good stored up in his heart, and the
evil man brings evil things out of the evil stored in his heart. For out of the over flow
of his heart his mouth speaks (Luke: 7:43).
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This parable is also most poignantly applicable when Jesus of Nazareth is tempted by
the devil, where the devil is depicted as the one possessing the knowledge of scripture,
employing the words of God for ends which are deceptive and corrupting—tempting
Jesus to demonstrate his worth through selfish actions.25 These Christian scenarios
depict the devil, the epitome of evil, as a subject employing benevolent teachings for
pernicious ends by attempting to undermine the commitment of Jesus. By concealing
their true identity behind the words of God, false prophets obstruct the teachings of
26
religion and the path to God by undermining those who would practice Christianity.
What is apparent in these two concepts is a grammar which professes to
identify the sources of decadence by methods that are readily apparent: in the physical
essences or manifestations of the body. The appeals to the 'real', or depth inspired
search for the true sources of decadence are abandoned in favour of the 'clearly
apparent' indications of vice and their incorrigible sources embedded in the body. A
compelling feature of this grammar is thus a logic which dictates that the
manifestations of decadence expressed by actio sequor esse should be unmasked,
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classified and enslaved or exterminated because of its physical source.
Reflections on the Architecture ofGenocide
The actual line between what Wolin has called Nietzsche's "critical totalitarianism"
and the horrific manifestations of totalitarianism in practice being to blur when one
juxtaposes the grammar of Nietzsche's politics of culture with the governments that
have instrumentalised genocide (Wolin, 2004: 464). Nietzsche's dynamic of
destruction, despite its many facets, was seen as an essential preliminary
accompaniment of creativity, which would bring about heroic art and culture.
Destruction is thus seen as the expression of the will to overcome and at the same time
a rejection of Enlightenment rationalism which embraces the idea that truth is situated
at the end of an interchange of knowledge. As I have described, the driving principle of
25 For Jesus, temptation arose whilst fasting in the desert: "He ate nothing during those days, and at the
end of them he was hungry. The devil said to him, "If you are the Son of God, tell this stone to become
bread" (Luke 4:3).
26
Formulating the sources of evil in this way is affiliated with the term vice. The American heritage
dictionary identifies its root in the Latin vitium meaning fault or flaw, yet its usage also coincides with
the term vitis meaning vine. The illuminating fact about this term's etymology is that it derives from the
Latin root meaning vine (and later in German wei-), a weak-stemmed plant that grows upon established
surfaces. Vice in this scenario becomes interwoven with propagation, as 'outgrowth', and which is
consequently predestined by its nature to grow atop and contaminate established surfaces.
27
Perhaps the Rwandans were correct to refer to the policy of genocide as 'the logic'.
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this creative dynamic of annihilation is as an agent of purification. Classification,
purification and creation are the incentives driving the totalitarian to perpetually enact
terror, enslavement and mass murder. Confinement and purification were fundamental
components of not only the Nazi genocide of European Jewry, but also Stalin's
interventions in the Ukraine and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The ultimate purifier:
mass murder and the disposal of corpses; the ultimate method of confinement and
enslavement: the concentration camp system along with the regional enclosure of
killing sectors imposed by a total regulation ofmovement.
In Rwanda, the Hutu Power movement exemplified this grammar of
totalitarianism in the manners described above. It depicted the Tutsi as a contaminating
feature of Hutu society. Even though the majority of Tutsi were powerless and not
collectively organised as an ethnicity, they were 'Historically' predisposed to enact the
anthropology of decadence—weakness that is pervasively and secretively powerful, an
outgrowth of the libido dominandi. In creating the myth of 'Tutsi unity', the
propaganda of Hutu Power portrayed the Tutsi as a clannish tribe with "a singleness of
purpose" giving them an advantage over the diverse Hutu in Rwanda (Des Forges,
1999: 73). This myth linked the Tutsi living in Rwanda with those who "exploited
Hutu in the past and with the RPF, making it seem that there was a solid logic linking
past Tutsi actions to the present day struggle against the RPF" (1999: 73). In a
?o
propaganda article entitled "A cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly" the
adherents ofHutu Power articulate their reasoning of'Tutsi unity':
We begin by saying that a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly...A cockroach
gives birth to another cockroach.. .The history ofRwanda shows us clearly that a Tutsi
stays always exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil are just
as we knew them in the history of our country...Who could tell the difference between
the Inyenzi [cockroaches] who attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960s. They
are all linked...their evilness is the same. The unspeakable crimes of the Inyenzi of
today...recall those of their elders: killing, pillaging, raping girls and women, etc.
(1999: 73-4; emphasis added).
Actio sequor esse appears to us here as a Historical consistency that has revealed the
'true' and 'clearly apparent' nature of the unified Tutsi subject, the one who remains
predisposed to continually enact their life force: the libido dominandi.
What this example also demonstrates is the pursuit of the primal qualities of
man (the will-to-power) through the abandonment of truth and rationalism. This primal
28 The term "cockroach" is a term used to refer to RPF troops, and later generalised by some to include
all Tutsi during the genocide (Des Forges, 1999: 73).
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quality for Nietzsche was only attainable through the revitalisation of myth because
only by resorting to this dimension can one open up "a range of dramatic possibilities
denied to methodical philosophy" (Wolin, 2004: 485). The language of myth opens the
way for "heroic spirits who say Yes to themselves in tragic cruelty; they are hard
enough to experience suffering as a pleasure" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 485).
By embodying myth, the new elite actualise their potential to revitalise the species by
breaking away from the stunted herd mentality and providing genuine meaning to
mankind from within the pre-political instincts of humanity. Instead of being an
attribute of shame, repression and inhibition, the instinctual drive for power is
revitalised by embodying the high elements of aesthetic mythology (poetry, tragedy,
and music) and its heroic dimension (manliness, struggle, conquering and a continual
overcoming). Myths, such as 'Tutsi unity', are thus not merely elements of deceptive
propaganda but are also attempts to revitalise the communal bonds in a 'heroic'
struggle for new forms of domination and destruction—what Nietzsche called "a
mystic feeling of Oneness" (2004: 487). Under this view, the primal qualities of life
and myth were thus intended as methods of revitalisation where an elite could break
from the confines of civilisation and embody a spirit of rebellious auto-creation, which
could only be achieved directly through the destruction of decadence.
This emphasis on myth and nihilism reveals a fundamental component of the
totalitarian grammar, one that can account for the paradoxes of genocide. Unlike other
political perspectives, such as Machiavelli's Realpolitik, a totalitarian grammar
embodies Grosse Politik which is grandiose and heroic rather than radically realistic
that operates within a language of contamination, positing destruction as purification.
In conjunction with the rejection of reaching depth and embracing myth (as
exemplified by the rejection of Enlightenment reason), this grammar embraces
appearance and superficiality as reality, and is thus inspired to enact the destructive
dynamic against the weak even if it results in self-contradiction—"The wisest man
would be the one richest in contradictions" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 482). To
contradict a description of 'reality' means that one is not bound by their confining
values and rules of logic. Thus, the genocidaire is not prevented or hindered in any
way from relishing in new and different perspectives deriving from the primal will-to-
power. This mythical and dynamic drive of destruction that purifies and procures 'high
culture' accounts for the perpetrators paradox. A political grammar that rejects the
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realities of the situation by obsessively engaging in a dynamic of expansive destruction
of the decadent opens avenues for self-contradiction. Abandoning the realities of the
situation and embracing myth through terror and destruction increases the likelihood
that their methods, such as genocide, will contradict the fulfilment of their own
principles.
The singularity or totality of vision is another grammatical component which
can also help account for the perpetrator's paradox of genocide. With genocide
instrumentalised as a purifying intervention, which expedites the advancement of the
species, the resources of the perpetrating authority become consumed by the struggle
for 'high culture'. With one foot atop this privileged standpoint looking down upon the
species, and the other totally engaged and consumed by the methods of purification,
the authority's hold on reality is increasingly loosened as the momentum of this
purifying enterprise expands. The survival of the government thus becomes a
secondary question which is consumed by the actions that will certainly 'advance the
species for countless future generations'. This drive for a continual advance or
offensive by a destructive-purification, undercuts the tactical realities of a given
situation. For the Nazi elite, this meant failing to learn the advantages of tactical retreat
and civic cooperation in it war against Russia; in Rwanda this was manifest by
overextending the domestic effort to organise and arm poorly trained militia to enact a
policy of 'self-defence' which could not effectively defend against the RPF forces that
actually threatened the survival of the Hutu state. Thus, the effort to establish a new
elite by instrumentalising genocide as a heroic, myth-based and all-consuming
enterprise contradicts the realisation of the elite community's struggle for high culture.
'The Real' is thus encountered, as Lacan once suggested, when one's description of the
world breaks down, in this case into self-contradictions, which can no longer ensure its
stability in the world (Fink, 1995). 'High culture' in these cases thus diminishes its
own foresight for the realities of the situation by priding itself on the obsessive drive
9Q
for the new pure culture of the future.
29 Nazism, as an exemplar of this principle, represents the passionate indulgence in the aesthetics of
'high culture'—fine art, music (Wagner) and heroism as military conquest—whist operating a self-
destructive system of terror and genocide. The same principle is also apparent in other cases of genocide.
If one is to believe the accounts from the recent film Hotel Rwanda, one sees that the 'high' values of
the military class (whiskey, fine quinine, refined manners, conviviality, and discipline) is contrasted with
its role in organizing, conducting and condoning the mass murder, torture and rape of civilian Tutsi and
Hutu 'accomplices'.
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Likewise, there exist components of this grammar that shed light on the victim
paradox. With appearance and mythical descriptions pervading the culture of the new
elite, they are free to depict the other as a serious threat, not because they are powerful,
but rather on account of their collective powerlessness that contaminates the realisation
of greatness. Genocidaires are thus free to grossly relish in their life force (the will-to-
power) against populations that are ill-constituted in power terms. Because the other
holds back the expression of this life force—however this may be substantively
manifest by a perpetrator's ideology (economically, biologically or historically)—they
expresses their power of contamination which obstructs the 'advancement' of the vital
life force embodied in 'Nature' or 'History'. Decadence thus becomes a prime target
for those populations standing in the way of 'progress' and 'high' culture. This
grammatical component, embodied in a governing elite, accounts for the victim
paradox because the other is selected for their power to spread weakness and corrupt
the development of'high' cultural patterns.
Consequently, the fundamental feature of this grammar exists in its ability to
reinterpret and convert genuine thoughtless acts of crime (rape, torture, murder) into a
drive for creating a new social order which is, by its own account, confining. The
"mythic feeling of Oneness", as Nietzsche proclaimed, yearned for the primal unity
and meaning brought about by practicing art, song and dance. This primal celebration
of creation was to be achieved by embodying Dionysian mythology that dissolved "the
gulf between man and man" and "state and society" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004:
487). An elite relishing in this confined, yet ever-challenging and expanding
architecture of artistry is seen as its central virtue. Actualising this mythological
grammar through methods of hardness and cruelty (i.e., genocide), therefore seeks a
collapse ofspace that destroys the boundaries which once divided and related people
of different outlooks together in a polity. In other words, this grammar exemplifies an
architecture which is horrifically confining, carving out a physical geography by
domination and violence guided only by a mythical design of an elite community. A
drive to dominate culture thus entails a modern unmasking and totalising devaluation
of all rival values, their accompanying practices and physical embodiments. Confining
an elite to expanding heroic art, combined with an all-invasive (and pervasive) disgust
of decadence is thus the architectural distinctiveness of this grammar—what Arendt
referred to as the "iron band" of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1968: 466)
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With this grammar genocide constitutes a violent intervention that is interpreted
in the most 'advancing' or 'purifying' of ways, depicting cruelty and killing as being
creative, liberating and essential for the species. In this way, the truth of the will-to-
OA
power is "raised" by "cutting into the living" (Nietzsche, 1969: 218). In this dynamic
destruction, genocide becomes another instrument for procuring 'health' that
constitutes the architecture of total terror.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the architecture necessary for genocide. Three different
components of this architecture were explored. I first addressed the external form and
strategic application of this grammar—that is, its 'speech'. I argued that there existed a
mutually reinforcing cycle between context and discourse. This cycle consisted of how
contexts could be exploited (as with the anomic suicide bomber) or manipulated (by
violence in a state of emergency) in service of a political language. Likewise, in
examining the other part of this cycle, I claimed that the strategic employment of
vocabularies of motive constituted actions that can aid the reordering of society by
gathering mass support.
In the second part of this chapter I examined the immanent form of this political
grammar. I showed that such a grammar operates akin to scientific paradigms that
inherit in their structure an incommensurability with other worldviews. In fact, I
suggested that such grammars desire incommensurability to insulate their principles
from forms of critical reason. I also suggested that consistency and infallibility were
essential interwoven traits of a political grammar in order to maintain and conjure mass
support.
I also examined the substance of a political grammar that instrumentalises
genocide. I argued that Nietzsche's philosophy had explored and typified this
grammar. The specific grammatical principles apparent in the architecture of terror are
as follows:
1. Eliminating the boundaries of the political (law and private/public) by
advocating a 'politics of culture' which penetrates and encompasses all aspects
of human life.
30 For the full remarks about destruction as purifying and truth creating, see Nietzsche's quotes on the
first page of this chapter.
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2. The new elite acts as "emancipated spirits", abandoning all notions of
Universal truth (Enlightenment rationalism) and treating convictions (political,
moral, and religious) purely as means which are capable of actualising the
"Grand passion"—the will-to-power (Nietzsche, 1990: 185, 184).
3. Without the comforts of Universal meaning, a new elite is called for to
hubristically allocate themselves a privileged position inspired by a governing
formula—Grosse Politik (grandiose and anti-realistic). From this position they
sit in judgement over the whole domain of the 'species'.
4. This emancipation from truth and a privileged position opens the way for the
revitalisation ofmyth necessary for the development of 'high culture' and also
ensures that the masses can be controlled by an elite which manufactures and
employs fictions (lies, deception and ridicule) to maintain their privileged
position.
5. The mode of intervention and critique is totalistic. It employs destructive
means to completely eradicate and rid the world of the cultural patterns which it
believes its enemies have created.
6. The prime goal of indicting the decadent elements of culture is to revitalise the
biological health of the species. The elite's 'curing' of culture is thus to be
achieved by going outside culture by invigorating the primordial life instinct:
the will-to-power.
7. This 'purification' is to be achieved by identifying the appearances of
decadence. The elite base their judgement to destroy upon what is physically or
behaviourally apparent (body constitution, race, language, religion).
8. The notion of 'enemy' is incorrigibly embodied by category of decadence,
which is not subject to a contestation of counter claims, nor the rigorous
'realistic' rules of proof. Unencumbered by the other's demands, the rule of the
elite over the decadent is purely monologic.
By emphasizing the principles of this grammar present in Nietzsche's philosophy I did
not claim that there is a direct historical link with any totalitarian movement. In other
words, I do not claim that totalitarian authorities read Nietzsche and design their
society. Rather, Nietzsche described a way of viewing society that was present in the
European conscious or, as he suggested, will be manifest in the future conscious—
"Some men are born posthumously" (Nietzsche quoted in Wolin, 2004: 463). I have
suggested that Nietzsche's work is able to illuminate in a systematic way the principles
underlying what we now call 'totalitarianism', a claim that was put forth by Sheldon
Wolin (2004). Yet, my central claim was that one can better comprehend how genocide
becomes instrumentalised as a policy of government by articulating the self-
understandings of those elites in a grammatical format.
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Finally, I suggested that this grammar, in conjunction with the technological
strategies of application and form, was shown to account for the paradoxes of genocide
and described as an architecture of collapsed space.
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